Identifying Critical Infrastructure Interdependencies for Healthcare Operations during Extreme Events

Author(s):  
Jukrin Moon ◽  
Taesik Lee
2005 ◽  
Vol 1 (2/3) ◽  
pp. 125 ◽  
Author(s):  
David M. Simpson ◽  
Thomas D. Rockaway ◽  
Terry A. Weigel ◽  
Paul A. Coomes ◽  
Carol O. Holloman

Author(s):  
Thomas A. Birkland ◽  
Megan K. Warnement

The September 11 attacks triggered concern about the performance of “critical” infrastructure on which social, political, and economic activity depend. The attacks moved terrorism to the top of the national security agenda and led to significant legislative, regulatory, and behavioral changes. Furthermore, the shift in focus to the threat of terrorism diminished policymakers’ appreciation and preparation for the natural disasters that communities typically face every year (Boin and McConnell 2007). The increasing number of declared natural disasters, coupled with the threat of terrorism, suggests that “extreme events” can lead to failures in critical infrastructure. These failures have national implications that can ripple through society and the economy. This chapter is about the performance of our interdependent infrastruc­ture systems in extreme events, which are outside shocks to infrastructures; we do not consider failures internal to a system, such as major power blackouts that are not triggered by some significant external shock. We argue that “infrastructure” is best considered as systems of technical and social systems that interact in both predictable and unpredictable ways. As such, we cannot simply consider their design and performance as solely technological problems. There is no one universally accepted definition of “infrastructure.” The Compact Oxford English Dictionary defines the term as “the basic physical and organizational structures and facilities (e.g., buildings, roads, power supplies) needed for the operation of a society or enterprise” but uses the example sentence “the social and economic infrastructure of a country,” suggesting that the term is very broad and very vague. The term came into widespread use in the 1960s and 1970s to mean “public works” (Boin and McConnell 2007). Alternative definitions link “public works” with narrowly defined systems, such as telecommunications and electrical systems, as well as broader systems such as finance, health care, and food production and distribution. The broader definition of infrastructure, which gained currency after September 11, refers to what’s become known as “critical” infrastructure.


Author(s):  
Louise K. Comfort

Managing critical infrastructures presents a specific set of challenges to crisis managers. These systems include electrical power; communications; transportation; and water, wastewater, and gas line distribution systems. Such infrastructures undergird the continued operation of communities in a modern society. Designed for efficiency, these technical systems operate interdependently, which makes them vulnerable to the stress of extreme events. Changes in population, demographics, land use, and economic and social conditions of communities exposed to hazards have significantly increased the number of people dependent on critical infrastructures in regions at risk. Although advances in science, technology, and engineering have introduced new possibilities for the redesign, maintenance, and retrofit of built infrastructure to withstand extreme events, the complexity of the task has exceeded the capacity of most public and private agencies to anticipate the potential risk and make investments needed to upgrade infrastructures before damage occurs. A mix of public and private ownership of infrastructure systems further complicates the task of ensuring public safety and security in crisis. Public agencies cannot protect communities alone. FEMA has developed a “whole of nation” approach to strengthen cross-jurisdictional linkages with state, county, and municipal emergency managers as well as private and nonprofit organizations. Computational modeling facilitates the exploration of alternative approaches to managing risk generated among a range of actors, interdependent infrastructures, and types of hazard events. Advanced uses of sensors, telemetry, and graphic display of changing performance for critical infrastructure provide timely, accurate information to reduce uncertainty in crisis events. Such technologies enable crisis managers to track more accurately the impact of extreme events on the populations and infrastructures of communities at risk, and to anticipate more reliably the likely consequences of future hazardous events. A basic shift has occurred in the assessment of risk. The focus is no longer on calculating the damage from past events, but on anticipating and reducing the consequences of future hazards, based on sound, scientific evidence as well as local experience and knowledge. Recognizing communities as complex, adaptive systems, crisis managers strive to create a continual learning process that enables residents to monitor their changing environment, use systematically collected data as the basis for analysis and change, and modify policies and practice based on valid evidence from actual environments at risk. Visualization constitutes a key component of collective learning. In complex settings, people comprehend visual images more readily than written or aural directions. Using graphic technologies to display emerging risk at multiple levels simultaneously provides an effective means to guide particular decisions at intermediate (meso) and local levels of operation. For communities seeking to reduce risk, investment in information technologies to enable rapid, community-wide access to interactive communication constitutes a major step toward building capacity not only for managing risk to critical infrastructure but also in maintaining continuity of operations for the whole community in extreme events.


2015 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 32-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Brassett ◽  
Nick Vaughan-Williams

This article critically examines the performative politics of resilience in the context of the current UK Civil Contingencies (UKCC) agenda. It places resilience within a wider politics of (in)security that seeks to govern risk by folding uncertainty into everyday practices that plan for, pre-empt, and imagine extreme events. Moving beyond existing diagnoses of resilience based either on ecological adaptation or neoliberal governmentality, we develop a performative approach that highlights the instability, contingency, and ambiguity within attempts to govern uncertainties. This performative politics of resilience is investigated via two case studies that explore 1) critical national infrastructure protection and 2) humanitarian emergency preparedness. By drawing attention to the particularities of how resilient knowledge is performed and what it does in diverse contexts, we repoliticize resilience as an ongoing, incomplete, and potentially self-undermining discourse.


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