The Shapley–Owen Value and the Strength of Small Winsets: Predicting Central Tendencies and Degree of Dispersion in the Outcomes of Majority Rule Decision-Making

2014 ◽  
pp. 289-308 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott L. Feld ◽  
Joseph Godfrey ◽  
Bernard Grofman
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Majority Rule ◽  
Owen Value ◽  
Degree Of Dispersion

scholarly journals Majority-rule opinion dynamics with differential latency: a mechanism for self-organized collective decision-making

2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 305-327 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco A. Montes de Oca ◽  
Eliseo Ferrante ◽  
Alexander Scheidler ◽  
Carlo Pinciroli ◽  
Mauro Birattari ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Majority Rule ◽  
Opinion Dynamics ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Self Organized

scholarly journals Group Decision-making: Consensus Rule Versus Majority Rule

2013 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 498-504 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Taylor ◽  
Kelsey Hewitt ◽  
Robert A. Reeves Dr ◽  
Stephen H. Hobbs Dr ◽  
W.F. Lawless
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Group Decision Making ◽  
Majority Rule ◽  
Group Decision

scholarly journals A model and the behavioral implications of the calculus of consent: The dilemma of public choice before public choice

PLoS ONE ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (12) ◽  
pp. e0243728
Author(s):  
Minjung Kim ◽  
Do Hyun Park
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Information And Communication Technologies ◽  
Majority Rule ◽  
Technological Factor ◽  
Social Factor ◽  
External Costs ◽  
Political Issues ◽  
Majority Rules ◽  
Decision Making Rule

The choice of a group decision-making rule is one of the most important political issues. Buchanan and Tullock have provided a framework for analyzing the optimal k-majority rule from the perspective of “methodological individualism.” They proposed the concept of “external costs” and “decision costs” and argued that the optimal k-majority rule takes place where the sum of these two costs–“total costs”–is minimized. Despite the fact that the approach is widely accepted as a tool for dealing with public decision-making rules, the study of formalizing these two costs in a quantitative manner has been relatively rare. We propose a systematic way of modeling these costs considering the assumptions mentioned by Buchanan and Tullock. We find that the resulting shape of the graphs is generally similar to that of the Buchanan-Tullock model, except for some minor details. Then, using this analytical model, we investigate several factors that could affect Buchanan-Tullock’s two costs and the optimal k-majority rule. We show that “clustering of disadvantages” (social factor) and “loss aversion” (personal factor) could increase external costs in Buchanan-Tullock’s model. These factors can result in a separation between the theoretical and actual optimal k-majority rules. Meanwhile, some recent developments in information and communication technologies can not only decrease decision costs, but also increase the same costs simultaneously through amplified “group polarization” (technological factor). If the effect of the former is not the same as that of the latter, this leads to a difference in optimal k-majority rules as well. These discrepancies bring us to the dilemma of “public choice before public choice.”

scholarly journals The ‘Uncle Tom’ dilemma: Minorities in power-sharing arrangements

2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 124-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon Fraenkel
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Majority Rule ◽  
New Caledonia ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Majoritarian Democracy

Mandatory power-sharing laws aim to balance power between groups in contexts where majoritarian democracy might disadvantage minorities. Yet, unless veto arrangements are in place, cabinet-level decision-making usually continues to operate under majority rule. Minority parties participating in such power-sharing executives may lose support in their own communities owing to a failure to deliver substantial reforms or to advance minority objectives and become seen as ‘Uncle Tom’ type figures who no longer represent their own community. This article explores examples of these dilemmas facing power-sharing cabinets in Zimbabwe, South Africa, Bosnia–Herzegovina, Fiji, and the French Pacific territory of New Caledonia.

Theory of Intelligent Collectives

2015 ◽  
pp. 188-204
Author(s):  
Megan McKoy ◽  
S. Spitler ◽  
Kelsey Zuchegno ◽  
E. Taylor ◽  
K. C. Hewitt ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Group Size ◽  
Majority Rule ◽  
Self Reports ◽  
Skin Responses ◽  
Selection Tasks ◽  
Galvanic Skin Responses

We review our theory of robust intelligence (RI) for groups. We examine the quality of decisions by groups in the laboratory under either majority rule (MR) or consensus rule (CR). Theoretically, engagement in decision-making becomes a factor depending on whether an individual is in a group or in competition between groups. From earlier research, measures of engagement in three-person groups included self-reports, counts of utterances during discussions, and changes in electro-dermal activity (i.e., galvanic skin responses, or GSR). We predicted engagement (number of utterances) would be greater under CR than MR; under MR, we predicted that GSRs would be greater (more attention). Based on partial analyses, participants under CR spoke significantly more often during discussions than MR. As predicted, after de-trending GSR data, we found MR produced higher GSRs and shorter discussions. Our recent work in group size has increased to five participants working on Wason Selection Tasks.

scholarly journals An Experimental Physiological Approach to Group Decision Making: Consensus Rule vs Majority Rule

2012 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 475-480
Author(s):  
M. McKoy ◽  
S. Spitler ◽  
K. Zuchegno ◽  
A. Enslein ◽  
S. Hobbs ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Group Decision Making ◽  
Majority Rule ◽  
Group Decision ◽  
Physiological Approach

Voting Procedures: A Summary Analysis

1983 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hannu Nurmi
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Majority Rule ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Simple Majority ◽  
Simple Majority Rule ◽  
Research Tradition ◽  
Voting Procedures ◽  
Marquis De Condorcet ◽  
Condorcet Paradox

Roughly two centuries ago the Marquis de Condorcet and Chevalier Jean-Charles de Borda originated a research tradition – by no means a continuous one – that over the decades has produced results casting doubt on many widely used collective decision-making procedures. The phenomenon known as the Condorcet effect or the Condorcet paradox is the well-known problem of the simple majority rule. The paradox bearing the name of Borda is less commonly known, but it also relates to a procedure that is widely used, namely the plurality principle. Either one of these paradoxes is serious enough to make these procedures suspect unless one is convinced that the situations giving rise to these paradoxical features are extremely rare. In this article we review some voting procedures that have been introduced in the literature. We aim at giving a synthesis of the assessments of procedures with respect to various criteria.

But What If We Cannot Agree?

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-88
Author(s):  
Richard Schmitt ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Dispute Resolution ◽  
Alternative Dispute Resolution ◽  
Majority Rule

A central challenge common to democratic processes is the inability of citizens to reach agreement on any given matter. Most frequently these disagreements are settled by vote, victory going to the majority. But majority rule is a fairly recent technique. Traditionally decisions were made by some form of non-opposition. This paper describes several versions of that decision-making technique and then shows how mediation methods, also known as “ADR” (Alternative Dispute Resolution), can replicate these traditional ways of overcoming disagreement. The paper argues that these techniques are frequently superior to electoral methods of reaching agreement.

The majority rule in individual decision making

2006 ◽  
Vol 99 (1) ◽  
pp. 102-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiao Zhang ◽  
Christopher K. Hsee ◽  
Zhixing Xiao
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Majority Rule ◽  
Individual Decision ◽  
Individual Decision Making

scholarly journals Examining learning coherence in group decision-making: triads vs. tetrads

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tsutomu Harada
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Group Decision Making ◽  
Small Groups ◽  
Majority Rule ◽  
Group Decision ◽  
Computational Approach ◽  
Approach To Learning ◽  
Q Learning ◽  
Learning Framework ◽  
Better Than

AbstractThis study examined whether three heads are better than four in terms of performance and learning properties in group decision-making. It was predicted that learning incoherence took place in tetrads because the majority rule could not be applied when two subgroups emerged. As a result, tetrads underperformed triads. To examine this hypothesis, we adopted a reinforcement learning framework using simple Q-learning and estimated learning parameters. Overall, the results were consistent with the hypothesis. Further, this study is one of a few attempts to apply a computational approach to learning behavior in small groups. This approach enables the identification of underlying learning parameters in group decision-making.

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