The present study investigates whether epistemic cognition in moral domain (dubbed metaethical cognition) develops analogously to epistemic reasoning regarding empirical knowledge. The study’s conceptual framework distinguishes two main areas of metaethical cognition (beliefs about the nature of moral judgments and conceptions of the process of moral judgment formation), and three metaethical stances (intuitionism, subjectivism, and transsubjectivism). In a sample of 200 adolescents ( M 1/4 16.18 years, SD 1/4 2.41), these metaethical stances could be reliably identified by means of a semistructured interview procedure. Adolescents’ metaethical stance was related to age, cross-sectionally as well as longitudinally. Furthermore, significant differences in metaethical cognition were found between high school students and an expert group of university students with special training in moral philosophy. Overall, metaethical and epistemic stances were correlated substantially. Findings demonstrate that metaethical reasoning development is a structural analogue of epistemic development regarding factual knowledge. Implications for studies on moral development and for research addressing the domain specificity of epistemic reasoning development are discussed.