Production Functions with Panel Data

Author(s):  
Andreas Behr
1992 ◽  
pp. 35-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guang H. Wan ◽  
William E. Griffiths ◽  
Jock R. Anderson

2020 ◽  
Vol 65 (05) ◽  
pp. 1293-1321
Author(s):  
KAORU HOSONO ◽  
DAISUKE MIYAKAWA ◽  
MIHO TAKIZAWA ◽  
KENTA YAMANOUCHI

Using Japanese firm-level panel data spanning from 2000 to 2013, we estimate industry-level production functions that explicitly take into account the complementarity and substitutability between tangible and intangible capital. The estimation results show that tangible and intangible capitals are complementary in most industries although the degree of complementarity substantially varies across industries. We further find that the relation between tangible and intangible capital in the production function accounts for the relation between firm-level tangible capital and intangible capital investments. Namely, firms’ tangible investments are more strongly positively associated with intangible investments as the degree of the complementarity between the tangible and intangible assets becomes larger. These findings show the necessity to take into account the relation between the dynamics of tangible and intangible capital in terms of their complementarity for precisely understanding the mechanisms governing a firm’s growth.


1992 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. H. Wan ◽  
W. E. Griffiths ◽  
J. R. Anderson

2008 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 100-109
Author(s):  
Bersant Hobdari

New and rich panel data for a large and representative sample of firms are used to estimate the effect of ownership structures on capital allocation. This issue is examined in a production function framework under alternative specifications. Our estimates confirm differences in capital allocation across firm under different ownership structure. Furthermore, we find that: (i) most of Estonian firms operate at the wrong point on their production function (ii) insider owned firms suffer from under-investment, (iii) state and domestic outsider owned firms display over-investment (iv) there is evidence of widespread managerial discretion


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