Mechanism design for one-facility location game with obnoxious effects on a line

2018 ◽  
Vol 734 ◽  
pp. 46-57
Author(s):  
Lili Mei ◽  
Deshi Ye ◽  
Guochuan Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Facility Location ◽  
Facility Location Game

A Cost-Sharing Scheme for the k-Level Facility Location Game with Penalties

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Feng-Min Wang ◽  
Jia-Jia Wang ◽  
Na Li ◽  
Yan-Jun Jiang ◽  
Shi-Cheng Li
Keyword(s):  
Facility Location ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Sharing Scheme ◽  
Facility Location Game

Mechanism Design for Constrained Heterogeneous Facility Location

2019 ◽  
pp. 63-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Kyropoulou ◽  
Carmine Ventre ◽  
Xiaomeng Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Facility Location

Facility location game with envy ratio

2020 ◽  
Vol 148 ◽  
pp. 106710 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuan Ding ◽  
Wenjing Liu ◽  
Xin Chen ◽  
Qizhi Fang ◽  
Qingqin Nong
Keyword(s):  
Facility Location ◽  
Facility Location Game

scholarly journals Strategyproof Mechanism for Two Heterogeneous Facilities with Constant Approximation Ratio

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Minming Li ◽  
Pinyan Lu ◽  
Yuhao Yao ◽  
Jialin Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Facility Location ◽  
Approximation Ratio ◽  
Total Cost ◽  
Facility Location Game

In this paper, we study the two-facility location game with optional preference where the acceptable set of facilities for each agent could be different and an agent's cost is his distance to the closest facility within his acceptable set. The objective is to minimize the total cost of all agents while achieving strategyproofness. For general metrics, we design a deterministic strategyproof mechanism for the problem with approximation ratio of 1+2alpha, where alpha is the approximation ratio of the optimization version. In particular, for the setting on a line, we improve the earlier best ratio of n/2+1 to a ratio of 2.75.

scholarly journals Mechanism Design for Facility Location Problems: A Survey

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hau Chan ◽  
Aris Filos-Ratsikas ◽  
Bo Li ◽  
Minming Li ◽  
Chenhao Wang
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Facility Location ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Practical Importance ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Facility Location Problems ◽  
Social Objective ◽  
Comprehensive Survey ◽  
Strategic Agents ◽  
High Level

The study of approximate mechanism design for facility location has been in the center of research at the intersection of artificial intelligence and economics for the last decade, largely due to its practical importance in various domains, such as social planning and clustering. At a high level, the goal is to select a number of locations on which to build a set of facilities, aiming to optimize some social objective based on the preferences of strategic agents, who might have incentives to misreport their private information. This paper presents a comprehensive survey of the significant progress that has been made since the introduction of the problem, highlighting all the different variants and methodologies, as well as the most interesting directions for future research.

The k-level facility location game

2006 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 421-426 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dachuan Xu ◽  
Donglei Du
Keyword(s):  
Facility Location ◽  
Facility Location Game
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