Political Economy of the European Monetary Institutions and Reform Proposals

2017 ◽  
pp. 9-42
Author(s):  
Jose-Maria Martin-Flores
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
European Monetary

scholarly journals THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EUROPEAN MONETARY UNIFICATION: AN ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION

1993 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 85-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
BARRY EICHENGREEN ◽  
JEFFRY FRIEDEN
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
The Political ◽  
European Monetary ◽  
Monetary Unification

Leopold Kohr theorist of economic decentralisation

2021 ◽  
pp. 15-19
Author(s):  
Stefano Solari
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Monetary Union ◽  
European Monetary Union ◽  
Theoretical Argument ◽  
European Monetary ◽  
Social Scientists ◽  
Political Studies ◽  
Diseconomies Of Scale ◽  
Rela Tions

The work of Leopold Kohr has attracted attention from social scientists in the field of international political studies, but few political economists have studied his theoretical argument in detail. Few students have tried to unite economic and polit-ical arguments to understand his contribution in a more analytical way. We will argue that Kohr's principal theory (diseconomies of scale) was inherently econom-ic, an attempt to elaborate on the concept of scale in a broader perspective and in a more complex way, including the idea of quality and, in particular, power rela-tions. In this paper, we try to make sense of Kohr's idea of decentralisation by studying his contributions from a political economy perspective. Moreover, con-clusions will be drawn that relate Kohr's view to present-day governance problems in the European Monetary Union, in which actual governance reflects all dangers that this scholar feared.

Choosing union: monetary politics and Maastricht

1993 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wayne Sandholtz
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
European Community ◽  
Monetary Union ◽  
International Political Economy ◽  
Monetary Integration ◽  
Political Leaders ◽  
European Monetary ◽  
Monetary Regime ◽  
National Leaders ◽  
Heads Of State

At their Maastricht summit, heads of state of the European Community (EC) countries agreed to establish a single currency and a common central bank by the end of the century. For students of international political economy, the treaty on monetary union offers intriguing puzzles: Why did EC governments commit themselves to such a far-reaching sacrifice of sovereignty? Why did national political leaders in some cases outrun public opinion in their enthusiasm for monetary integration? This study seeks a political explanation of the choices that produced the late-1980s movement for monetary union in Europe. It examines the conversion to monetary discipline in several EC states during the 1980s, arguing that the shift toward anti-inflationary rigor was a necessary precondition for discussions on monetary union. The article outlines three general options for a European monetary regime, based variously on unilateral commitments, multilateral arrangements, and full integration. Treating national preference formation as endogenous and requiring explanation, the article weighs five propositions that explain the motives and preferences of national leaders.

scholarly journals The political economy of euro area sovereign debt restructuring

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Friedrich Heinemann
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
European Monetary ◽  
Debt Restructuring ◽  
European Central ◽  
European Institutions ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Political Economic ◽  
National Governments ◽  
Academic Debate

AbstractThe establishment of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM) is one of the important issues in the academic debate on a viable constitution for the European Monetary Union (EMU). Yet the topic seems to be taboo in official reform contributions to the debate. Against this backdrop, the article identifies the SDRM interests of key players, including the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Central Bank and national governments. The empirical section takes advantage of the recently established EMU Positions Database. The findings confirm political economy expectations: Low-debt countries support an EMU constitution that includes an insolvency procedure whereas a coalition of high-debt countries and European institutions oppose it. The analysis points towards a possible political-economic equilibrium for coping with sovereign insolvencies: an institutional set-up without an SDRM and with hidden transfers. Recent European fiscal innovations in response to the Covid-19 solvency shock confirm this prediction.

The Political Economy of European Monetary Unification

2018 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Barry Eichengreen ◽  
Jeffry A. Frieden
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
The Political ◽  
European Monetary ◽  
Monetary Unification
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