Kinetic Consistency and Relevance in Belief Revision

2016 ◽  
pp. 401-414 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pavlos Peppas ◽  
Mary-Anne Williams
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision

Knowing-it-all but still learning: Perceptions of one’s own knowledge and belief revision.

2017 ◽  
Vol 53 (12) ◽  
pp. 2319-2332 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sara Hagá ◽  
Kristina R. Olson
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Learning Perceptions

Children change their answers in response to neutral follow-up questions by a knowledgeable asker

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Bonawitz ◽  
Patrick Shafto ◽  
Yue Yu ◽  
Sophie Elizabeth Colby Bridgers ◽  
Aaron Gonzalez
Keyword(s):  
Social Learning ◽  
Belief Revision ◽  
Correct Answer ◽  
New Information ◽  
Common Practices ◽  
Parent Child

Burgeoning evidence suggests that when children observe data, they use knowledge of the demonstrator’s intent to augment learning. We propose that the effects of social learning may go beyond cases where children observe data, to cases where they receive no new information at all. We present a model of how simply asking a question a second time may lead to belief revision, when the questioner is expected to know the correct answer. We provide an analysis of the CHILDES corpus to show that these neutral follow-up questions are used in parent-child conversations. We then present three experiments investigating 4- and 5-year-old children’s reactions to neutral follow-up questions posed by ignorant or knowledgeable questioners. Children were more likely to change their answers in response to a neutral follow-up question from a knowledgeable questioner than an ignorant one. We discuss the implications of these results in the context of common practices in legal, educational, and experimental psychological settings.

Positive versus Negative Undermining in Belief Revision

Noûs ◽  
1984 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gilbert Harman
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision

Conciliatory Views on Peer Disagreement and the Order of Evidence Acquisition

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Andree Weber
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Imprecise Probabilities ◽  
Peer Disagreement

Abstract The evidence that we get from peer disagreement is especially problematic from a Bayesian point of view since the belief revision caused by a piece of such evidence cannot be modelled along the lines of Bayesian conditionalisation. This paper explains how exactly this problem arises, what features of peer disagreements are responsible for it, and what lessons should be drawn for both the analysis of peer disagreements and Bayesian conditionalisation as a model of evidence acquisition. In particular, it is pointed out that the same characteristic of evidence from disagreement that explains the problems with Bayesian conditionalisation also suggests an interpretation of suspension of belief in terms of imprecise probabilities.

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