Conciliatory Views on Peer Disagreement and the Order of Evidence Acquisition
Abstract The evidence that we get from peer disagreement is especially problematic from a Bayesian point of view since the belief revision caused by a piece of such evidence cannot be modelled along the lines of Bayesian conditionalisation. This paper explains how exactly this problem arises, what features of peer disagreements are responsible for it, and what lessons should be drawn for both the analysis of peer disagreements and Bayesian conditionalisation as a model of evidence acquisition. In particular, it is pointed out that the same characteristic of evidence from disagreement that explains the problems with Bayesian conditionalisation also suggests an interpretation of suspension of belief in terms of imprecise probabilities.
2021 ◽
pp. 115-129
1962 ◽
Vol 14
◽
pp. 169-257
◽
Keyword(s):
1984 ◽
Vol 75
◽
pp. 331-337
1983 ◽
Vol 41
◽
pp. 174-177
Keyword(s):
1982 ◽
Vol 40
◽
pp. 600-603
1978 ◽
Vol 36
(2)
◽
pp. 412-413
1978 ◽
Vol 36
(1)
◽
pp. 484-485
Keyword(s):