Chapter 6 Moral Virtue and the Principles of Practical Reason

Author(s):  
Adriana Warmbier
2020 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-216
Author(s):  
Edward Uzoma Ezedike

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to critically evaluate Kant’s idea of grounding morality within the limits of practical reason. Kant argues that morality must be devoid of emotions if the authors must make the right decisions. His idea of morality is basically ratiocentric. This paper, therefore, seeks a justification of Kant’s ratiocentricism, which excludes subjective emotional dimensions in moral actions and judgements. Design/methodology/approach This paper adopts a critical and analytic method of research. It is not empirical research, and hence, does not make use of tables and quantifiable data. The methodology is exclusively qualitative in nature. Findings The major finding of this research work is that an application of practical reason is necessary for the moral agency but it is not a sufficient condition for moral agency. The existential realities demand a synthetic application of reason and emotion in moral issues. So then, a good will is determined by the rational principle. The reason is an organic whole that is capable of functioning both practically and theoretically. The practical reason is not reasoned functioning to acquire knowledge but reason operating as a guide and as the directing force of the will. The application of pure, practical reason and relevant emotional considerations is both necessary and sufficient for moral agency. Originality/value This paper is the outcome of deep critical reflections on Kant’s moral philosophy by the author.


2002 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 324-344 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa Sowle Cahill

[Several earlier essays in this journal have explored questions such as whether it is possible to speak of intercultural dialogue about the common good in an era of globalization, or whether one can even seek a “global ethics.” These questions are more poignant and critical since the tragic events of September 11, 2001. The author here argues that a revised concept of the common good can still be useful. She brings to bear on global ethics some aspects of Aquinas's view of practical reason, especially its historical contextuality and its interdependence with moral virtue.]


Philosophy ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 88 (3) ◽  
pp. 411-432
Author(s):  
Donald Beggs

AbstractThe conscientious are morally conflicted when their moral dilemmas or incommensurabilities, real or apparent, have not been resolved. But such doublemindedness need not lead to ethical disintegration or moral insensitivity. For one may develop the moral virtue of doublemindedness, the settled power to deliberate and act well while morally conflicted. Such action will be accompanied by both moral loss (perhaps ‘dirty hands’) and ethical gain (salubrious agental stability). In explaining the virtue's moral psychology I show, among other things, its consistency with wholeheartedness and the unity of the virtues. To broaden its claim to recognition, I show the virtue's consistency with diverse models of practical reason. In conclusion, Michael Walzer's interpretation of Hamlet's attitude toward Gertrude exemplifies this virtue in a fragmentary but nonetheless praiseworthy form.


2020 ◽  
Vol 118 (3) ◽  
pp. 501-531 ◽  
Author(s):  
Feng Bai ◽  
Grace Ching Chi Ho ◽  
Jin Yan

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 32
Author(s):  
Itmam Aulia Rakhman

Ath-Thusi uses Aristotle's understanding of the practical reason of the theory of surgery. According to Ath-Thusi, the cause of deviation is anything excessive. Thus, the unbalanced state of the soul is caused by the advantages, disadvantages, or morbidity of the mind. Diversity in a society is a necessity, a household, as the smallest community of a complex society and full of differences, it is certainly necessary to be based on the building of togetherness and mutual respect between one another. This article will describe the creative ideas of Khawajah Nashiruddin Ath-Thusi related to the philosophy of the household in order to answer the present-day problematic of the family.


Author(s):  
Aurelian Craiutu

Political moderation is the touchstone of democracy, which could not function without compromise and bargaining, yet it is one of the most understudied concepts in political theory. How can we explain this striking paradox? Why do we often underestimate the virtue of moderation? Seeking to answer these questions, this book examines moderation in modern French political thought and sheds light on the French Revolution and its legacy. The book begins with classical thinkers who extolled the virtues of a moderate approach to politics, such as Aristotle and Cicero. It then shows how Montesquieu inaugurated the modern rebirth of this tradition by laying the intellectual foundations for moderate government. The book looks at important figures such as Jacques Necker, Germaine de Staël, and Benjamin Constant, not only in the context of revolutionary France but throughout Europe. It traces how moderation evolves from an individual moral virtue into a set of institutional arrangements calculated to protect individual liberty, and explores the deep affinity between political moderation and constitutional complexity. The book demonstrates how moderation navigates between political extremes, and it challenges the common notion that moderation is an essentially conservative virtue, stressing instead its eclectic nature. Drawing on a broad range of writings in political theory, the history of political thought, philosophy, and law, the book reveals how the virtue of political moderation can address the profound complexities of the world today.


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