From Theory of Rhetoric to the Practice of Language Use: The Case of Appeals to Ethos Elements

In their book Commitment in Dialogue, Walton and Krabbe claim that formal dialogue systems for conversational argumentation are “not very realistic and not easy to apply”. This difficulty may make argumentation theory less well adapted to be employed to describe or analyse actual argumentation practice. On the other hand, the empirical study of real-life arguments may miss or ignore insights of more than the two millennia of the development of philosophy of language, rhetoric, and argumentation theory. In this paper, we propose a novel methodology for adapting such theories to serve as applicable tools in the study of argumentation phenomena. Our approach is both theoretically-informed and empirically-grounded in large-scale corpus analysis. The area of interest are appeals to ethos, the character of the speaker, building upon Aristotle’s rhetoric. Ethotic techniques are used to influence the hearers through the communication, where speakers might establish, but also emphasise, weaken or undermine their own or others’ credibility and trustworthiness. Specifically, we apply our method to Aristotelian theory of ethos elements which identifies practical wisdom, moral virtue and goodwill as components of speakers’ character, which can be supported or attacked. The challenges we identified in this case and the solutions we proposed allow us to formulate general guidelines of how to exploit rich theoretical frameworks to the analysis of the practice of language use.

Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism as a political economic philosophy emerged from a long history of over fifty years of debate within a transnational “thought collective” of scholars, think tank researchers, business and political leaders, and journalists most notably associated with the Mont Pèlerin Society (see Mirowski and Plehwe 2015 under Historical Works). Over time, their deliberations resulted in principles and associated policy instruments designed to produce and protect a stable global market. Key tenets of neoliberalism include an emphasis on competition, free trade, flexible labor, the reorganization of the state based on techno-managerial approaches to governance, the privatization of state enterprises, the legal protection of property rights, and the moral virtue of self-governance based in individual freedom and “choice.” These principles crystallized in the “free-market revolution” of the 1980s that followed the global macroeconomic crises of the late 1970s. Neoliberal doctrines were embraced and enshrined in Ronald Reagan’s and Margaret Thatcher’s national policies and in “Washington Consensus” development strategies, which the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank introduced worldwide. The “triumph of global capitalism” after the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the Soviet Union in 1991 further fueled the global circulation and influence of market fundamentalist principles, policies, and projects as well as the anthropological study of these transformations. The concept of neoliberalism has been ubiquitous in anthropological research for nearly thirty years. This bibliography, then, is necessarily selective, presenting only a sampling of work representing central approaches and key topics found in this literature. What is most evident, perhaps, across this vast body of work is the absence of a single definition of or referent for neoliberalism as well as a lack of consensus on what an “anthropology of neoliberalism” might entail. The term neoliberal often appears in anthropological work, not as an object of analysis, but rather as a label marking a historical period (i.e., the neoliberal era). As an object of study, neoliberalism can variously refer to an ideology, policy, or form of governance that elevates the role of the market in relation to the state in political economic processes and approaches to reform. The concept “neoliberalization” captures the dynamic and unfinished nature of neoliberal projects. Given controversies over the concept’s analytic value as well as conflicting ideological assessments of neoliberal reforms, some anthropologists avoid the concept altogether, using terms such as late capitalism or advanced capitalism in analyzing similar phenomena.

Law as Standing

This article addresses a basic question of general jurisprudence, namely, what difference law makes in moral space. It argues that the difference at issue does not necessarily come to telling us what morality (or justice) might dictate but rather to establishing a way of attributing decisions to all of us and not to any one of us in particular. This also means that law’s distinctive moral virtue is not justice but legitimacy. What renders this possible is the emergence of public officials whose value lies in being public officials. In that, the article defends the standing conception of law, according to which law’s most basic moral contribution is that of establishing an entity whose normative pronouncements could count as made in the name of (or even by) the citizens.

Gotta know why! Preliminary evidence supporting a theory of virtue learning as applied to intellectual curiosity

Virtue education is gaining popularity in institutions of higher education. Given this growing interest, several theoretical accounts explaining the process of virtue learning have emerged. However, there is scant empirical evidence supporting their applicability for intellectual virtue. In this study, we apply a theory of virtue learning to the development of intellectual curiosity among undergraduates. We find that learning why virtue is relevant and important to one’s education is consistently and moderately correlated with increases in intellectual curiosity across time points and analytic approaches. A weaker yet still positive association is found with increases in knowledge of intellectual curiosity. The implications of these results connect with pedagogical recommendations stressed across intellectual and moral virtue education.

Epicureanism

The chapter argues that ancient Epicureanism (mainly Epicurus, Lucretius, and Philodemus) is plausibly interpreted as a self-cultivation philosophy. The existential starting point is a life of irrational fears and frustrated desires. The ideal state of well-being is a life of pleasure, understood primarily as the absence of physical pain and mental distress (more tranquilism than hedonism). This ideal life is free of fear of death and the gods, and it is devoted to friendship, moral virtue, and the pursuit of desires only if they are natural and necessary. The philosophical foundation is a materialist, atomistic theory of nature and human nature that entails that death is nothing to fear, the gods are unconcerned with us, and only natural and necessary desires are important. We achieve this ideal through spiritual exercises that involve learning Epicurean philosophy, modifying desires, and cultivating virtue in a community of like-minded people.

Moral Virtue as a Requisite for Illumination in the Platonic Tradition

This paper traces the development of the idea that we must cultivate moral virtue in order to attain some degree of illumination regarding the nature of reality. I use the term “illumination” to cover a range of meanings intended by the philosophers I discuss, such as the “acquisition of wisdom” (Phaedo, 65a), the “sight” of divine beauty (Symposium, 210d–212b), or a mystical experience involving God or divine reality. Although this theme appears in many texts from the Platonic tradition, I focus on three major stages of its development. First, I show how Plato provides the basic framework of the idea that moral virtue is necessary for illumination, especially in his Phaedo and Symposium. Then, I explain how Plotinus synthesizes and substantially develops Plato’s discussions of this idea. Finally, I discuss the Cappadocian Fathers’ (Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, and Gregory Nazianzen) Christianization of this Platonic theme. In other words, Plotinus develops the basic framework of this argument first set forth by Plato, and the Cappadocians then adapt and modify Plotinus’ views to fit their Christian commitments.

The Moral Virtue of Being Understanding

Being understanding is a moral virtue. But what exactly is it that an understanding person does excellently? And what exactly makes it a moral virtue, rather than (merely) an intellectual one? Stephen Grimm suggests that an understanding person judges other people’s moral failings accurately without being too permissive or too judgemental. I argue against this view and develop an alternative one. First I demonstrate that judging other people’s failures accurately is neither necessary nor sufficient for being understanding and that Grimm leaves the moral nature of being understanding underexplored. I then draw on a related discussion on the moral virtue of open-mindedness and argue that a virtue is a moral one when it is a corrective to selfish and other weak inclinations that pull us away from feeling and acting as the situation demands. In order to fill in what this means in the case of being understanding, I turn to Iris Murdoch’s notion of attention. Being understanding, I argue, is the virtue of appropriately attending to others who are in a difficult situation.

Morality from Compassion

According to Arthur Schopenhauer, compassion is the basis of morality. He sees concern for justice as a negative form of compassion, directed at not harming anyone, as opposed to the more far-reaching, positive form of benefiting. He thinks a higher degree of compassion involves realizing that the spatio-temporal separation of individuals is illusory and that in reality they are all identical. Such compassion is impartial and all-encompassing. Compassion is suited to be the centre of morality because its object are negative feelings, and only these are real. Contrary to these Schopenhauerian claims, it is here argued that compassion must be supplemented with attitudes like sympathy and benevolence because positive feelings exist alongside negative feelings; that a concern for justice, though morally essential, is independent of these attitudes which are based on empathy; that these attitudes involve not identifying oneself with others, but taking personal identity as insignificant in empathically imagining how others feel. Schopenhauer is, however, right that, though these attitudes are spontaneously partial, this can be corrected. His morality is also interesting in raising the question rarely discussed in philosophical ethics of how moral virtue relates to ascetic self-renunciation. Both of these ideals are highly demanding, but the book ends by arguing that this is no objection to their validity.

Exploring incivility and moral foundations toward Asians in English-speaking tweets in hate crime-reporting cities during the COVID-19 pandemic

PurposeThis study aims to explore the extent to which Twitter users engaged in uncivil and morally questionable expressions in their comments about specific Asian countries and citizens. The integrated threat theory (ITT) was used to formulate questions surrounding incivility and moral foundations within Twitter discourses related to the COVID-19 pandemic.Design/methodology/approachThe authors collected tweets and retweets posted by English-speaking Twitter users in the United States (US) across the following three phases: (1) initial discovery of COVID-19 in China, (2) high US mortality rate from COVID-19 and (3) the announcement that a vaccine would soon be available in the US.FindingsThe authors found a significant difference in uncivil tweets posted in cities with higher levels of reported hate crimes against Asians than cities with low levels. Lastly, English-speaking Twitter users tended to employ moral virtue words and moral vice words when discussing China and Chinese culture/populations.Research limitations/implicationsThe bags-of-words employed are limited in capturing nuanced and metaphorical terms. In addition, the analysis focused solely on Tweets composed in English and thus did not capture the thoughts and opinions of non-English speakers. Lastly, this study did not address all Asian countries. In this sense, the findings of this study might not be applicable to Tweets about other nations.Practical implicationsGiven that many Twitter users tend to use terms of moral virtue in support of Asians and Asian communities, the authors suggest that non-governmental organization administrators provide morally supportive social media campaigns that encourage users to engage in civil discourse.Social implicationsThese findings have theoretical implications as the frameworks of integrated threats and moral foundations were used to offer group-level explanations for online behavior. Additional research is needed to explore whether these frameworks can be used to explain negativity in other communication environments.Originality/valueThis study expands the findings of prior studies that identified the extent to which Twitter users express hate speech, focusing on general Twitter discourse across three specific periods of the pandemic: degrees of incivility and moral foundations, and comparison of incivility based on the prevalence of reported hate crimes.

“As Different . . . as Light Is from Darkness”

This chapter argues that the clergy’s overall perspective on political resistance remained consistent, even as political loyalties shifted with the Declaration of Independence in 1776. John Witherspoon, the leading clergyman to publicly support independence, remained consistent in his rejection of political absolutism and his belief in the doctrine of resistance. He did not agree with the perspective of Thomas Paine and other political radicals but argued for resistance along the lines of his own theological tradition. Support for political independence, it is argued, should not be viewed as signaling a broader shift in Witherspoon’s ethical and philosophical views. He did not embrace a secular understanding of moral virtue held by philosophers like Francis Hutcheson. His moral philosophy and approach to moral questions remained consistent with his own theological tradition, and no major shift needs to be asserted in this regard.