The Man Who Wasn’t There: Cordell Hull, Bretton Woods, and the Creation of the GATT

Author(s):  
David B. Woolner
Keyword(s):  
2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rod Oram

Humankind has been searching for millennia for ways to govern itself at large scale and over great distances. Overwhelmingly, the dominant solution had been the creation of empires, defined as multi-ethnic or multinational states with political and/or military dominion over populations who are culturally and ethnically distinct from the ruling imperial ethnic group and its culture. In the modern Westphalian era of the past several centuries, a hybrid system of governance around the world emerged, comprising the nation state (in Europe and the Americas) and international empires (across Africa, Asia and Oceania).


Author(s):  
Oksana G. Lekarenko ◽  

The article aims to identify the impact of the crisis of the Bretton Woods monetary system on the beginning of European monetary cooperation. Russian scholars' publications on European monetary integration usually examine in detail the internal prerequisites for the emergence of the Werner Plan and only sketch the external environment. Drawing on available European and American sources, this research provides a more nuanced picture of the origins of European monetary cooperation in the context of a general collapse of the post-war international monetary order. The article begins with the characteristic of the main features of the Bretton Woods monetary system. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the intrinsic contradictions of the Bretton Woods mechanism, such as the problem of liquidity, confidence in the key currencies, and the adjustment mechanism, generated numerous monetary crises. All efforts to reform the international monetary system stalled because of disagreements between countries with surplus and deficit payment balances. The research also focuses on the US monetary policy. As the US dollar was the main reserve currency, the stability of the entire monetary system depended on its position. Since the late 1960s, conflicts over monetary issues developed between the United States and Western European countries, culminating in the Nixon administration's unilateral decision to abolish the gold standard in August 1971. Monetary crises and the weakness of the dollar pushed the countries of the European Economic Community to develop their own currency grouping. The article analyses the Werner Plan of 1970 that proposed the creation of an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) with a single European currency as the ultimate goal. Based on fixed exchange rates between European currencies, the EMU represented a regional replica of the Bretton Woods system. The single European currency was seen by Europeans as an alternative to the dollar and the unpredictable American policy. The author concludes that the end of transatlantic monetary cooperation gave an additional impetus to the development of European monetary integration. Although first European efforts to create the EMU had failed because of the different approaches of France and the Federal Republic of Germany as well as the economic crisis of the early 1970s, the Werner Plan marked a crucial phase in the history of European integration. The Werner Report became a blueprint for the European Monetary System (EMS) of the late 1970s. The success of the EMS paved the way for the creation of the European Monetary Union envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 establishing the European Union and the adoption of a single European currency - the euro.


2005 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 465-492 ◽  
Author(s):  
PATRICIA CLAVIN ◽  
JENS-WILHELM WESSEL

This article explores the work of the little-studied Economic and Financial Organisation of the League of Nations. It offers a sustained investigation into how this international organisation operated that assesses the transnational aspects of its work in relation to its inter-governmental responsibilities, and demonstrates the wide-ranging contribution of the organisation's secretariat. The second part of the article establishes the way in which transnationalism enabled the United States, the League's most influential non-member, to play a crucial role in shaping the policy agenda of the League. It also shows how a growing sense of frustration in its work prompted EFO to attempt to free itself from inter-governmental oversight and become an independent organisation to promote economic and financial co-operation in 1940 – a full four years before the creation of the Bretton Woods agreements.


2018 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-94
Author(s):  
Aditya Balasubramanian ◽  
Srinath Raghavan

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefen Beeler-Duden ◽  
Meltem Yucel ◽  
Amrisha Vaish

Abstract Tomasello offers a compelling account of the emergence of humans’ sense of obligation. We suggest that more needs to be said about the role of affect in the creation of obligations. We also argue that positive emotions such as gratitude evolved to encourage individuals to fulfill cooperative obligations without the negative quality that Tomasello proposes is inherent in obligations.


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