Grand Strategies of Weak States and Great Powers

Author(s):  
Hanna Samir Kassab
2020 ◽  
Vol 165 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 123-124
Author(s):  
Peter Layton

2021 ◽  
pp. 720-736
Author(s):  
Mark L. Haas

This chapter examines the effects of population aging on states’ grand strategies. Due to major reductions in fertility levels and significant increases in life expectancies over the course of the last century, a majority of countries are growing older, many at fantastic rates and extent. The number of seniors, both absolutely and as a share of states’ overall population, is reaching unprecedented levels. This worldwide demographic trend is likely to affect all dimensions of states’ grand strategies, including in the great powers, which are among the world’s oldest countries. Population aging is likely to reduce states’ military capabilities, push leaders to adopt more isolationist and peaceful foreign policies, reshape states’ core international interests to place greater emphasis on the advancement of citizens’ quality of life and the protection of particular ethnocultural identities, and increase the perceived threat posed by immigration and multicultural ideologies.


2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hugo Meijer ◽  
Benjamin Jensen

AbstractCombining the English School of International Relations and the study of grand strategy decision-making processes, this article investigates how dynamic density – growing volume, velocity, and diversity of interactions within international society – alters states’ strategy formation processes. By contrasting the perspectives of structural realism and the English School on the role of dynamic density in world politics, the piece illustrates the strategist’s dilemma: as global dynamic density in the international society increases, the ability of great powers to formulate coherent grand strategies and policies potentially decreases. Specifically, it contends that growing global dynamic density generates processual and substantive fragmentation in strategy formation. Building on a large body of elite interviews, US policy toward China – and the so-called US ‘rebalance’ to Asia – is used as a probability probe of the central idea of the strategist’s dilemma. In conclusion, we contrast our findings with complex interdependence theory and examine their implications for ‘great power management’ (GPM) as a primary institution of international society. We argue that, by generating processual and substantive fragmentation in strategy formation, global dynamic density complicates GPM by hindering the capacity of great powers to manage and calibrate the competitive and cooperative dynamics at play in a bilateral relationship.


Author(s):  
Anand Toprani

The struggle for oil has been at the center of international politics since the beginning of the twentieth century. Securing oil—or, more precisely, access to it—has also been at the heart of many great powers’ grand strategies during that time, particularly those in oil-poor Europe. The Continent’s geographical and geological endowments, particularly its rich coal seams, had facilitated its rise to global predominance following the conquest of the New World and the start of the Industrial Revolution, but they conspired against it during the Age of Oil. Rather than accept their relegation to second-tier status, Britain and Germany developed elaborate strategies to restore their energy independence. These efforts wound up compromising their security by inducing strategic overextension—for Britain in the Middle East, and for Germany in the Soviet Union—thereby hastening their demise as great powers. For these reasons, the history of oil is also a chapter in the story of Europe’s geopolitical decline....


2021 ◽  
pp. 369-388
Author(s):  
Bryan R. Early ◽  
Keith Preble

Economic statecraft provides great powers with a set of valuable tools they can employ in pursuing grand strategies, but the importance of its contribution is often overlooked. This chapter provides a conceptual framework for understanding how policymakers can leverage the tools of economic statecraft to achieve major objectives in pursuit of their grand strategies, including: bargaining, balancing, generating power and prosperity, signaling and norms promotion, and influencing nonstate actors. It then maps how economic sanctions, foreign aid, strategic commercial policy, and institutionalized economic cooperation can best contribute to the realization of these objectives. The analysis reveals that the flexibility of economic sanctions and foreign aid in achieving numerous objectives helps explain why great powers rely so heavily upon them.


1992 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 355-375
Author(s):  
Raymond Taras ◽  
Marshal Zeringue

All great powers have a grand strategy—including great powers on the verge of collapse. Each power develops its code of national security ends and means differently. Among the myriad factors which explain particular grand strategies, the most important consideration is the distribution of power capabilities in the international system. Regardless of each state's desire to operate independently—to be master of its own grand strategy—the structure of world politics offers little latitude to do so. As in the case of decision-making processes in organizations and bureaucracies, the international system imposes its own constraints and incentives on the security goals of individual states. Primarily addressing the international environment, however, systems theory ‘provides criteria for differentiating between stable and unstable political configurations.’ The first objective of this essay is to explore the role of structure as an indirect influence on the behaviour of its constituent actors, in this case, states. ‘The effects [of structure] are produced in two ways: through socialization of the actors and through competition among them.’


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