Bicriterion Decision-Making under Randomness and Worth of Perfect Information

The introduction of decision making under uncertainty by Ferejohn and Fiorina is an interesting addition to the literature on rational theories of citizen participation. Decision making under uncertainty assumes, however, that the actor has no knowledge of the probabilities of the various outcomes; this is obviously no more true than the assumption of perfect information about these probabilities made in the decision making under risk model. Voters have some, but not perfect, information about the probabilities of at least some of the different possible outcomes.Specifically, let us look at the two-party case. In Ferejohn's notation, (p3 + p4) is the probability of an individual's vote making a difference. We might expect a rational citizen to know that this probability is at most minuscule, even if he cannot calculate its exact value.

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Deontological Decision Theory and the Grounds of Subjective Permissibility

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 9 ◽

10.1093/oso/9780198846253.003.0010 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 204-222

Author(s):

Seth Lazar

Keyword(s):

Decision Making ◽

Decision Theory ◽

Expected Utility ◽

Imperfect Information ◽

Perfect Information ◽

Risk And Uncertainty

If we had perfect information, then we could say, for any given objectively permissible act, what makes it objectively permissible. But when we have imperfect information, when we must decide under risk and uncertainty, what then makes an act subjectively permissible or impermissible? There are two salient possibilities. The first is the “verdicts” approach. It grounds judgments of subjective permissibility in probabilistically discounted judgments of objective permissibility. The principle “minimize expected objective wrongness” takes this approach. The second is the “reasons” approach. It grounds subjective permissibility in probabilistically discounted objective reasons. “Maximize expected utility” is one example. Chapter 10 considers whether the verdicts approach or the reasons approach to grounding judgments of subjective permissibility is better suited for deontological decision-making with imperfect information. Perhaps surprisingly, the reasons approach comes out on top.

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Examining the Feasibility and Utility of Estimating Partial Expected Value of Perfect Information (via a Nonparametric Approach) as Part of the Reimbursement Decision-Making Process in Ireland: Application to Drugs for Cancer

PharmacoEconomics ◽

10.1007/s40273-017-0552-y ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 35 (11) ◽

pp. 1177-1185 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Laura McCullagh ◽

Susanne Schmitz ◽

Michael Barry ◽

Cathal Walsh

Keyword(s):

Decision Making ◽

Expected Value ◽

Perfect Information ◽

Reimbursement Decision ◽

Decision Making Process ◽

Nonparametric Approach ◽

Value Of Perfect Information

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Parties as Utility Maximizers

American Political Science Review ◽

10.2307/1958779 ◽

1973 ◽

Vol 67 (2) ◽

pp. 490-498 ◽

Cited By ~ 129

Author(s):

Donald A. Wittman

Keyword(s):

Decision Making ◽

Income Distribution ◽

Political Party ◽

Imperfect Information ◽

Political Attitudes ◽

Perfect Information ◽

The Other

The article introduces two models of political party decision making. Both models assume that the parties are solely interested in policy and that winning the election is just a means to that end. In one, the parties are competitive, while in the other the parties collude. The main result, in either case, is that the parties tend to be unresponsive to the interests of the voters.The models are analyzed in an intransitive case (an election concerned only with income distribution) and a transitive one (an election where all political attitudes can be put on a left-right continuum), and under the assumptions of perfect and imperfect information.With perfect information the intransitive case results in the parties ending up with all the income; while in the single peaked case neither party will have a position to the left (right) of the left (right) party's most preferred position whatever the attitudes of the voters.Finally it is shown that it is rational for the parties to collude and present similar platforms.

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Discarding optimality: Throwing out the baby with the bathwater?

Behavioral and Brain Sciences ◽

10.1017/s0140525x18001401 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 41 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Patrick Simen ◽

Fuat Balcı

Keyword(s):

Decision Making ◽

Perceptual Decision Making ◽

Reward Rate ◽

Perceptual Decision ◽

Standard Observer ◽

Rate Maximization ◽

Reward Rate Maximization ◽

Descriptive Standard ◽

Observer Model

AbstractRahnev & Denison (R&D) argue against normative theories and in favor of a more descriptive “standard observer model” of perceptual decision making. We agree with the authors in many respects, but we argue that optimality (specifically, reward-rate maximization) has proved demonstrably useful as a hypothesis, contrary to the authors’ claims.

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LPCD framework: Analytical tool or psychological model?

Behavioral and Brain Sciences ◽

10.1017/s0140525x18001383 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 41 ◽

Author(s):

David Danks

Keyword(s):

Decision Making ◽

Analytical Tool ◽

Mathematical Framework ◽

Bayesian Decision ◽

Perceptual Decision Making ◽

Psychological Model ◽

Psychological Reality ◽

Psychological Theories ◽

Target Article ◽

Bayesian Decision Making

AbstractThe target article uses a mathematical framework derived from Bayesian decision making to demonstrate suboptimal decision making but then attributes psychological reality to the framework components. Rahnev & Denison's (R&D) positive proposal thus risks ignoring plausible psychological theories that could implement complex perceptual decision making. We must be careful not to slide from success with an analytical tool to the reality of the tool components.

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Elaborating the role of reflection and individual differences in the study of folk-economic beliefs

Behavioral and Brain Sciences ◽

10.1017/s0140525x18000274 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 41 ◽

Author(s):

Kevin Arceneaux

Keyword(s):

Decision Making ◽

Individual Differences ◽

Cognitive Processes ◽

Evolutionary History ◽

Behavioral Responses ◽

History Of ◽

Economic Beliefs

AbstractIntuitions guide decision-making, and looking to the evolutionary history of humans illuminates why some behavioral responses are more intuitive than others. Yet a place remains for cognitive processes to second-guess intuitive responses – that is, to be reflective – and individual differences abound in automatic, intuitive processing as well.

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