A General Framework for Modal Correspondence in Dynamic Epistemic Logic

2015 ◽  
pp. 282-294 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shota Motoura
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
General Framework ◽  
Dynamic Epistemic Logic

scholarly journals Dynamic epistemic logics for abstract argumentation

Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlo Proietti ◽  
Antonio Yuste-Ginel
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
Propositional Logic ◽  
General Framework ◽  
Strategic Communication ◽  
Dynamic Epistemic Logic ◽  
Abstract Argumentation ◽  
Information Update ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Event Models ◽  
Different Levels

AbstractThis paper introduces a multi-agent dynamic epistemic logic for abstract argumentation. Its main motivation is to build a general framework for modelling the dynamics of a debate, which entails reasoning about goals, beliefs, as well as policies of communication and information update by the participants. After locating our proposal and introducing the relevant tools from abstract argumentation, we proceed to build a three-tiered logical approach. At the first level, we use the language of propositional logic to encode states of a multi-agent debate. This language allows to specify which arguments any agent is aware of, as well as their subjective justification status. We then extend our language and semantics to that of epistemic logic, in order to model individuals’ beliefs about the state of the debate, which includes uncertainty about the information available to others. As a third step, we introduce a framework of dynamic epistemic logic and its semantics, which is essentially based on so-called event models with factual change. We provide completeness results for a number of systems and show how existing formalisms for argumentation dynamics and unquantified uncertainty can be reduced to their semantics. The resulting framework allows reasoning about subtle epistemic and argumentative updates—such as the effects of different levels of trust in a source—and more in general about the epistemic dimensions of strategic communication.

Topo-Logic as a Dynamic-Epistemic Logic

2017 ◽  
pp. 330-346 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexandru Baltag ◽  
Aybüke Özgün ◽  
Ana Lucia Vargas Sandoval
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
Dynamic Epistemic Logic

scholarly journals The Dynamic Epistemic Logic for Actual Knowledge

2020 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Arkadiusz Wójcik
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
Dynamic Epistemic Logic ◽  
Logical Omniscience ◽  
Actual Knowledge ◽  
Knowledge Change ◽  
The Past ◽  
Knowledge Models ◽  
Complete Axiomatization ◽  
New Information

The dynamic epistemic logic for actual knowledge models the phenomenon of actual knowledge change when new information is received. In contrast to the systems of dynamic epistemic logic which have been discussed in the past literature, our system is not burdened with the problem of logical omniscience, that is, an idealized assumption that the agent explicitly knows all classical tautologies and all logical consequences of his or her knowledge. We provide a sound and complete axiomatization for this logic.

scholarly journals Playing cards with Hintikka An introduction to dynamic epistemic logic

2005 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. P. Ditmarsch ◽  
W. Van Der Hoek ◽  
B. P. Kooi
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Dynamic Epistemic Logic ◽  
Knowledge And Beliefs ◽  
Public Announcements

This contribution is a gentle introduction to so-called dynamic epistemic logics, that can describe how agents change their knowledge and beliefs. We start with a concise introduction to epistemic logic, through the example of one, two and finally three players holding cards; and, mainly for the purpose of motivating the dynamics, we also very summarily introduce the concepts of general and common knowledge. We then pay ample attention to the logic of public announcements, wherein agents change their knowledge as the result of public announcements. One crucial topic in that setting is that of unsuccessful updates: formulas that become false when announced. The Moore-sentences that were already extensively discussed at the conception of epistemic logic in Hintikka’s ‘Knowledge and Belief ’ (1962) give rise to such unsuccessful updates. After that, we present a few examples of more complex epistemic updates.

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