The United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons of 1980: Its Recent Development and Increasing Significance

Author(s):  
Steven A. Solomon
2020 ◽  
Vol 102 (913) ◽  
pp. 235-259
Author(s):  
Frank Sauer

AbstractThis article explains why regulating autonomy in weapons systems, entailing the codification of a legally binding obligation to retain meaningful human control over the use of force, is such a challenging task within the framework of the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. It is difficult because it requires new diplomatic language, and because the military value of weapon autonomy is hard to forego in the current arms control winter. The article argues that regulation is nevertheless imperative, because the strategic as well as ethical risks outweigh the military benefits of unshackled weapon autonomy. To this end, it offers some thoughts on how the implementation of regulation can be expedited.


2003 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 345-365
Author(s):  
Steven A. Solomon

Efforts to regulate warfare, including the use of particular weapons, have a long history, dating back, according to some scholars, thousands of years. But international codification of the rules of war in binding multilateral legal instruments only began in the second half of the nineteenth century. Among the first such efforts was one devoted to the prohibition of the use of a particular weapon in wartime. The St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868 on exploding bullets banned the use of explosive projectiles under 400 grammes in weight and is generally recognised as constituting the first significant international instrument prohibiting a specific weapon. It also incorporated into the conventional law of armed conflict the customary principle prohibiting the use of weapons ‘of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering’ — a tenet of international humanitarian law and a touchstone for many important international agreements on the use of weapons that have since followed, including the Hague Declaration of 1899 on expanding bullets, the Geneva Gas Protocol of 1925 and, most recently, the United Nations Convention on Conventional Weapons of 1980 (hereafter, CCW).


1983 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 109-121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Malcolm Shaw

It may come as a surprise to many that the international community through the mechanisms and methods of international law should seek to involve itself in the techniques of war-making to the extent that it does. We all accept that international law is deeply concerned with the prevention of the use of armed force and most people are aware, if in a rudimentary fashion, of the categories of aggression, self-defence, use of force to protect nationals and so forth. It would be a cause of great amazement should the rules and techniques of international law not be heavily engaged in constraining as far as possible the impulses of states to resort to the use of force. It is rather different to find international law actually descending to the battlefield, tacitly acknowledging its own failures, and attempting to pontificate on the types of weapons to be used in the destruction of life and property. Or is it? The same general concerns that impel international law to restrain states from using violence against each other are also operative when one considers the methods of warfare, despite the irony.


Author(s):  
Caroline Fleay

Throughout the past forty years various leaders from both major political parties in Australia have categorized the arrival by boat of people seeking asylum as a “crisis” and the people themselves as “illegal.” This is despite Australia being a signatory to the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, and receiving relatively few people who seek asylum compared with many other countries. Punitive government policies and processes have further reinforced these representations, such that “crisis” and “illegal” can now be understood as both categories of analysis and practice. The repeated use of such categories may be helping to produce and reproduce prejudice and racism and obscure the needs and experiences of people seeking asylum.


2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 355-383 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Serdy

AbstractCreated by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to apply the rules in Article 76 on the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from States’ territorial sea baselines, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf has on several occasions introduced new requirements for States not supported by Article 76, or impermissibly qualifying the rights Article 76 accords them. This article focuses on several such instances, one to the coastal State’s advantage (though temporally rather than spatially), another neutral (though requiring unnecessary work of States), but the remainder all tending to reduce the area of continental shelves. The net effect has been to deprive States of areas of legal continental shelf to which a reasonable interpretation of Article 76 entitles them, and in one case even of their right to have their submissions examined on their merits, even though, paradoxically, the well-meaning intention behind at least some of the Commission’s pronouncements was to avoid other controversies.


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