Controlled-Error Theories of Proximity and Dominance

1984 ◽  
pp. 51-74
Author(s):  
Michael Katz
Keyword(s):  
Error Theories

Application of human error theories for the process improvement of Requirements Engineering

2013 ◽  
Vol 250 ◽  
pp. 142-161 ◽  
Author(s):  
Milene Elizabeth Rigolin Ferreira Lopes ◽  
Carlos Henrique Quartucci Forster
Keyword(s):  
Requirements Engineering ◽  
Process Improvement ◽  
Human Error ◽  
Error Theories

Global Expressivism by the Method of Differences

2019 ◽  
Vol 86 ◽  
pp. 133-154
Author(s):  
Huw Price
Keyword(s):  
Global Expressivism ◽  
Canberra Plan ◽  
Error Theories

AbstractIn this piece I characterise global expressivism, as I understand it, by contrasting it with five other views: the so-called Canberra Plan; Moorean non-naturalism and platonism; ‘relaxed realism’ and quietism; local expressivism; and response-dependent realism. Some other familiar positions, including fictionalism, error theories, and idealism, are also mentioned, but as sub-cases to one of these five.

Wright's argument against error-theories

Analysis ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 98-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Miller
Keyword(s):  
Error Theories

The Error Theory

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bart Streumer
Keyword(s):  
Error Theory ◽  
Reasons For Belief ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
Error Theories

This chapter asks to which judgements the error theory applies, what the error theory entails, and whether what the error theory entails can be true. It argues that the error theory does not apply to judgements about standards, but does apply to instrumental normative judgements and judgements about reasons for belief. It then compares the error theory that this book defends to the moral error theories that have been defended by J.L. Mackie, Richard Joyce, and Jonas Olson. The chapter argues that Mackie, Joyce, and Olson underestimate the generality of their own arguments. It ends by arguing that the error theory entails that all normative judgements are false, and that it can be true that all normative judgements are false.

scholarly journals Software defect prevention based on human error theories

2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 1054-1070 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fuqun HUANG ◽  
Bin LIU
Keyword(s):  
Human Error ◽  
Software Defect ◽  
Defect Prevention ◽  
Error Theories

Error theories and values

1998 ◽  
Vol 76 (4) ◽  
pp. 534-552 ◽  
Author(s):  
John A. Burgess
Keyword(s):  
Error Theories

McDowell on Transcendental Arguments, Scepticism and “Error Theory”

2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 109-124
Author(s):  
Alan Thomas
Keyword(s):  
External World ◽  
Error Theory ◽  
Perceptual Content ◽  
Transcendental Argument ◽  
John Mcdowell ◽  
Transcendental Arguments ◽  
Error Theories ◽  
Philosophical Scepticism

John McDowell has recently changed his line of response to philosophical scepticism about the external world. He now claims to be in a position to use the strategy of transcendental argumentation in order to show the falsity of the sceptic’s misrepresentation of our ordinary epistemic standpoint. Since this transcendental argument begins from a weak and widely shared assumption shared with the sceptic herself the falsity of external world scepticism is now demonstrable even to her. Building on the account of perceptual intentionality defended in the Woodbridge lectures, McDowell argues that the idea of narrow perceptual content is unavailable to anyone, including the sceptic. This argument is assessed by drawing out an analogy with parallel responses to error theories in ethics.

scholarly journals Interpreting published effect sizes in behavioral science: a thought-experiment

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erich H. Witte ◽  
Frank Zenker
Keyword(s):  
Behavioral Science ◽  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Error Theory ◽  
Effect Sizes ◽  
Measurement Scale ◽  
Measurement Scales ◽  
Standardized Effect Sizes ◽  
Analytical Research ◽  
Error Theories

Standardized effect size measures (e.g., Cohen’s d) state the observed mean difference, m1-m0, relative to the observed standard deviation, s. These measures are commonly used in behavioral science today in meta-analytical research to quantify the observed m1-m0 across object-level studies that use different measurement-scales, as well as in theory-construction research to point-specify m1-m0 as a theoretically predicted parameter. Since standardization conceptually relates to the quality of measurement, m1-m0 can be interpreted fully only relative to whichever error-theory determines s. The error-theory, however, is what behavioral scientists must typically choose freely, because a theoretically motivated measurement-scale is normally unavailable. Using a thought-experiment, we show that differentially sophisticated error-theories let the observed m1-m0 vary massively given identical observations. This lets the common praxis of publishing m1-m0 “nakedly”—without a transparent error-theory—appear problematic, because it undermines the goals of a cumulative science of human behavior. We advocate reporting standardized effect sizes along with a transparent error-theory.

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