Interpreting published effect sizes in behavioral science: a thought-experiment

Standardized effect size measures (e.g., Cohen’s d) state the observed mean difference, m1-m0, relative to the observed standard deviation, s. These measures are commonly used in behavioral science today in meta-analytical research to quantify the observed m1-m0 across object-level studies that use different measurement-scales, as well as in theory-construction research to point-specify m1-m0 as a theoretically predicted parameter. Since standardization conceptually relates to the quality of measurement, m1-m0 can be interpreted fully only relative to whichever error-theory determines s. The error-theory, however, is what behavioral scientists must typically choose freely, because a theoretically motivated measurement-scale is normally unavailable. Using a thought-experiment, we show that differentially sophisticated error-theories let the observed m1-m0 vary massively given identical observations. This lets the common praxis of publishing m1-m0 “nakedly”—without a transparent error-theory—appear problematic, because it undermines the goals of a cumulative science of human behavior. We advocate reporting standardized effect sizes along with a transparent error-theory.

Folk Intuitions and the Failure to Comprehend Determinism

Theories of free will are often measured against how well they capture everyday intuitions about free will. But what are these everyday intuitions, and what theoretical commitments do they express? Empirical methods have delivered mixed messages. In response, some free will theorists have developed error theories to undermine the credentials of countervailing intuitions. These efforts are predicated on the idea that people might misunderstand determinism in any of several ways. This paper sheds light on the comprehension problem. We first discuss recent efforts to explain systematic errors in how people interpret determinism. Then, we present the alarming results of two new preregistered studies exploring three types of comprehension failure: (a) epiphenomenal bypassing, (b) fatalistic bypassing, and (c) indeterministic intrusion. Our findings suggest that misunderstanding runs deeper than others have supposed. This casts doubt on existing models of commonsense thinking about free will. Unless and until researchers properly control for the kinds of misunderstandings we identify, research on free will intuitions cannot shed light on whether ordinary thinking reflects commitments to compatibilism or incompatibilism.

Wading in the Shallows

One understanding of naturalism about perception allows that results in the sciences bearing on the senses may have an impact upon philosophical theorizing on perception. Its opponents reject or, at least, are much more wary about this possibility. I consider two cases: the implications of prediction error theories for naïve realism and the latest empirical research on cross modal illusions, and taste, for the traditional division of the senses into five. Although in neither case are the implications straightforward, I argue that there is a tension in the first case, relating to naïve realism, given the structure of the debate against representationalism, what naïve realists say about hallucination, and assertion of the significant differences between perception and cognition. In the second, the conflict is avoided by recognizing distinctive features of how senses are integrated and realized, and a new personal level of explanation.

An Old Question Revisited: Current Understanding of Aging Theories

“Why we age” is no longer a solely philosophical question. In parallel with the risingawareness of the social ramifications of an aging population, basic research has expanded our understanding of the intricate nature of biological aging. The present paper aims at discussing our current understanding of the molecular and cellular alterations that accompany aging. To this end, the main theories on the mechanisms of aging, error theories and program theories, will be discussed. Special focus on neuronal aging is also presented to provide illustrative examples of these aging mechanisms.

Hume as an Error Theorist

Neste artigo considero e rejeito uma leitura não-cognitivista do sentimentalismo moral de Hume (segundo a qual ele identifica convicções morais com impressões de um tipo particular) bem como uma leitura disposicionalista (segundo a qual Hume concebe convicções morais como crenças causais a respeito do poder de traços de caráter de produzir certos sentimentos em espectadores apropriados). Sustento que as falhas dessas leituras mostram que Hume é mais bem compreendido como um teórico do erro, de acordo com quem embora convicções morais sejam crenças elas jamais são verdadeiras. Em contraste com teorias do erro contemporâneas, contudo, a tese de Hume não se baseia em uma alegação metafísica para efeito de que não há propriedades morais. Antes, ele sustenta que ideias morais não são ideias de qualidades que possam ser corretamente predicadas de ações ou traços de caráter, mas ideias de sentimentos e que, portanto, crenças morais incorporam sistematicamente um erro categorial. AbstractIn this paper I consider and reject a noncognitivist reading of Hume’ s moral sentimentalism (according to which he identifies moral convictions with impressions of particular kind) as well as a dispositional reading (according to which Hume takes moral convictions to be causal beliefs about the power of character traits to produce certain feelings in suitable spectators). I argue that the shortcomings of these views show that Hume is best understood as an error theorist, according to whom although moral convictions are beliefs they are never true. In contrast with contemporary error theories, however, Hume’s view is not grounded on a metaphysical claim to the effect that there are no moral properties. He holds instead that moral ideas are not at all ideas of qualities that could be truthfully predicated of actions or character traits but rather ideas of feelings and, therefore, that moral beliefs systematically incorporate a category error.

Global Expressivism by the Method of Differences

In this piece I characterise global expressivism, as I understand it, by contrasting it with five other views: the so-called Canberra Plan; Moorean non-naturalism and platonism; ‘relaxed realism’ and quietism; local expressivism; and response-dependent realism. Some other familiar positions, including fictionalism, error theories, and idealism, are also mentioned, but as sub-cases to one of these five.

“Putting the Linguistic Method in its Place”

Early in his career and in critical engagement with ordinary language philosophy, John Mackie developed the roots of a methodology that would be fundamental to his thinking: Mackie argues that we need to clearly separate the conceptual analysis which determines the meaning of an ordinary term and the factual analysis which is concerned with the question what, if anything, our language corresponds to in the world. I discuss how Mackie came to develop this distinction and how central ideas of his philosophy are based on it. Using the examples of Mackie’s moral skepticism and his work on Locke’s theory of perception I show how his methodology opens the door to error theories but can also support more positive claims. Finally, I put Mackie’s methodology in a historical perspective and argue that in cases like the Gettier debate, we can use it to cast light on the vagueness of the underlying methodology in some philosophical debates.