A Normative Account of Temperance

2001 ◽  
pp. 61-73
Author(s):  
Mark F. Carr
Keyword(s):  
Normative Account

scholarly journals The Rights of Science and the Rights of Politics: Lessons from the Long-form Census Controversy

2012 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 295-318 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Yeo
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Policy Decisions ◽  
Long Form ◽  
Science And Politics ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Normative Account ◽  
Made In ◽  
Conceptual Resources

One of the main issues in the long-form census controversy concerned the relationship between science and politics. Through analysis of the arguments and underlying assumptions of four influential and exemplary interventions that were made in the name of science, this paper outlines a normative account of this relationship. The paper nuances the science-protective ideals that critics invoked and argues that such conceptual resources are needed if science is to be protected from undue political encroachment. However, in their zeal to defend the rights of science critics claimed for it more than its due, eclipsing the value dimension of policy decisions and failing to respect the role of politics as the rightful locus of decision making for value issues. An adequate normative account of the relationship between science and politics in public policy must be capable not only of protecting science from politics but also of protecting politics from science.

Ignorance and Its Disvalue

2020 ◽  
Vol 97 (3) ◽  
pp. 433-447
Author(s):  
Anne Meylan
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Explanation ◽  
True Belief ◽  
Daily Life ◽  
True Proposition ◽  
Cognitive State ◽  
Philosophical Literature ◽  
Knowledge Account ◽  
Normative Account

Abstract It is commonly accepted – not only in the philosophical literature but also in daily life – that ignorance is a failure of some sort. As a result, a desideratum of any ontological account of ignorance is that it must be able to explain why there is something wrong with being ignorant of a true proposition. This article shows two things. First, two influential accounts of ignorance – the Knowledge Account and the True Belief Account – do not satisfy this requirement. They fail to provide a satisfying normative account of the badness of ignorance. Second, this article suggests an alternative explanation of what makes ignorance a bad cognitive state. In a nutshell, ignorance is bad because it is the manifestation of a vice, namely, of what Cassam calls “epistemic insouciance”.

A perfectionist basic structure

2019 ◽  
Vol 45 (7) ◽  
pp. 862-882 ◽  
Author(s):  
Avigail Ferdman
Keyword(s):  
Life Experiences ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Basic Structure ◽  
Opportunity Structure ◽  
Unfair Advantage ◽  
Diversity Of Life ◽  
Normative Account

When philosophers talk about perfectionism, it is usually as a view of well-being, of developing characteristically human capacities. Yet perfectionism can also be a normative account of what we owe to each other. This article argues that perfectionists have reason to endorse a perfectionist basic structure such that enables persons to develop and exercise their human capacities in meaningful ways. This basic structure has two complementary features: First, it enables a diversity of life experiences. Second, it provides a spatial opportunity structure that creates open-minded environments. Absent these features, rich or lucky individuals gain an unfair advantage in the sphere of opportunities for developing their capacities in meaningful ways.

scholarly journals Narrative Devices: Neurotechnologies, Information, and Self-Constitution

Neuroethics ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emily Postan
Keyword(s):  
Third Parties ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Access To Information ◽  
Normative Framework ◽  
Embodied Self ◽  
Normative Foundations ◽  
Normative Account

Abstract This article provides a conceptual and normative framework through which we may understand the potentially ethically significant roles that information generated by neurotechnologies about our brains and minds may play in our construction of our identities. Neuroethics debates currently focus disproportionately on the ways that third parties may (ab)use these kinds of information. These debates occlude interests we may have in whether and how we ourselves encounter information about our own brains and minds. This gap is not yet adequately addressed by most allusions in the literature to potential identity impacts. These lack the requisite conceptual or normative foundations to explain why we should be concerned about such effects or how they might be addressed. This article seeks to fill this gap by presenting a normative account of identity as constituted by embodied self-narratives. It proposes that information generated by neurotechnologies can play significant content-supplying and interpretive roles in our construction of our self-narratives. It argues, to the extent that these roles support and detract from the coherence and inhabitability of these narratives, access to information about our brains and minds engages non-trivial identity-related interests. These claims are illustrated using examples drawn from empirical literature reporting reactions to information generated by implantable predictive BCIs and psychiatric neuroimaging. The article concludes by highlighting ways in which information generated by neurotechnologies might be governed so as to protect information subjects’ interests in developing and inhabiting their own identities.

Genocide: a normative account

2010 ◽  
Vol 48 (02) ◽  
pp. 48-1129-48-1129
Keyword(s):  
Normative Account
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