Option Game Model of Low-Carbon Residential Investment Decision-Making Under Imperfect Competition

Author(s):  
Kai Guo ◽  
Dezhi Li ◽  
Yanchao Chen
2010 ◽  
Vol 39 ◽  
pp. 568-574
Author(s):  
Jun Fei Chen ◽  
Jian Qiao Lin

As a new economical development mode, “low-carbon economic” is attracting more and more attention all over the world. In this paper, associating with the development background of the low-carbon industry, we applied the uncertainty set pair analysis (SPA) into the investment decision-making of the listed company, and established the investment decision model based on the uncertainty SPA. As a case, we made investment decision analysis to 12 typical low-carbon industrial listed companies selected. The results show that it is effective and applicable, and the research is helpful for the investors conducting decision-making.


Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Shaobo Wu ◽  
Xun Yao ◽  
Guangdong Wu

The uncertainty of eco-friendly intermediate components has an important impact on green supply chain decisions. In this paper, the Stackelberg game model of green investment decision-making among enterprises is established by considering the case of the supplier’s green investment alone and the case of the manufacturer and the supplier’s joint green investment. The influence of green uncertainty on enterprise’s decision-making is analyzed, and the green investment decision-making strategies of both sides in two cases are compared. There are four main conclusions derived from the results: (i) with the increase in the supplier’s green cost coefficient, the supplier will reduce the green investment and the manufacturer will reduce the share of the green costs; (ii) with a decrease in uncertainty for eco-friendly intermediate components and the increase in their feasibility factor, the supplier will increase the greenness of intermediate components and increase the investment in environment, and the manufacturer will reduce the share of the green costs; (iii) the increase in the manufacturer’s share of green costs will promote the supplier to increase the greenness of intermediate components and increase its green investment, which shall increase the supplier’s optional choice space of for green investment; (iv) in the case of the manufacturer and the supplier jointly making a green investment, the threshold value for the environmental input of the supply chain members (i.e., the manufacturer and the supplier) is lower, and the supply chain members will have more choice space. At the same time, the care for environment in the case of a cooperative is higher than that in the case of a supplier investing alone.


2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Enrico Rubaltelli ◽  
Giacomo Pasini ◽  
Rino Rumiati ◽  
Paul Slovic

2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (4) ◽  
pp. 3-14
Author(s):  
Abby Joseph Cohen

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