Specification and Estimation of Demographic Demand Systems, Equivalence Scales with Selective Empirical Evidence

2018 ◽  
pp. 9-33
Author(s):  
Ranjan Ray
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Demand Systems ◽  
Equivalence Scales

Income-(in)dependent equivalence scales and inequality measurement

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Dudel ◽  
Jan Marvin Garbuszus ◽  
Notburga Ott ◽  
Martin Werding
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Transfer Principle ◽  
Equivalence Scales ◽  
Inequality Measurement

AbstractMost equivalence scales that are applied in research on inequality do not depend on income, even though there is strong empirical evidence that equivalence scales are actually income-dependent. This paper explores the consistency of results derived from income-independent and income-dependent scales. We show that applying income-independent scales when income-dependent scales would be appropriate leads to violations of the transfer principle. Surprisingly, there are some exceptions, but these require unrealistic and strong assumptions. Thus, the use of income-dependent equivalence scales almost always leads to different assessments of inequality than the use of income-independent equivalence scales. Two examples illustrate our findings.

Challenges to the social motivation theory of autism: The dangers of counteracting an imprecise theory with even more imprecision

2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mirko Uljarević ◽  
Giacomo Vivanti ◽  
Susan R. Leekam ◽  
Antonio Y. Hardan
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Social Motivation ◽  
Motivation Theory ◽  
The Social

Abstract The arguments offered by Jaswal & Akhtar to counter the social motivation theory (SMT) do not appear to be directly related to the SMT tenets and predictions, seem to not be empirically testable, and are inconsistent with empirical evidence. To evaluate the merits and shortcomings of the SMT and identify scientifically testable alternatives, advances are needed on the conceptualization and operationalization of social motivation across diagnostic boundaries.

Integrating perspectives: How the development of second-personal competence lays the foundation for a second-personal morality

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Corbit ◽  
Chris Moore
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Developmental Process ◽  
Focal Point ◽  
Personal Information ◽  
Personal Competence ◽  
Triadic Interactions ◽  
Personal Morality ◽  
Integrative Process

Abstract The integration of first-, second-, and third-personal information within joint intentional collaboration provides the foundation for broad-based second-personal morality. We offer two additions to this framework: a description of the developmental process through which second-personal competence emerges from early triadic interactions, and empirical evidence that collaboration with a concrete goal may provide an essential focal point for this integrative process.

Men Are Hierarchical, Women Are Egalitarian: An Implicit Gender Stereotype

2004 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marianne Schmid Mast
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Implicit Association Test ◽  
Gender Stereotype ◽  
Association Test ◽  
Implicit Association ◽  
Two Samples

The goal of the present study was to provide empirical evidence for the existence of an implicit hierarchy gender stereotype indicating that men are more readily associated with hierarchies and women are more readily associated with egalitarian structures. To measure the implicit hierarchy gender stereotype, the Implicit Association Test (IAT, Greenwald et al., 1998) was used. Two samples of undergraduates (Sample 1: 41 females, 22 males; Sample 2: 35 females, 37 males) completed a newly developed paper-based hierarchy-gender IAT. Results showed that there was an implicit hierarchy gender stereotype: the association between male and hierarchical and between female and egalitarian was stronger than the association between female and hierarchical and between male and egalitarian. Additionally, men had a more pronounced implicit hierarchy gender stereotype than women.

Socially Shared Regulation of Learning: A Review

2015 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 190-203 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernesto Panadero ◽  
Sanna Järvelä
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Learning Theory ◽  
Qualitative Data ◽  
Social Regulation ◽  
Observation Data ◽  
Optimal Form ◽  
Self Regulated Learning ◽  
The Past ◽  
Recorded Observation ◽  
Socially Shared Regulation

Abstract. Socially shared regulation of learning (SSRL) has been recognized as a new and growing field in the framework of self-regulated learning theory in the past decade. In the present review, we examine the empirical evidence to support such a phenomenon. A total of 17 articles addressing SSRL were identified, 13 of which presented empirical evidence. Through a narrative review it could be concluded that there is enough data to maintain the existence of SSRL in comparison to other social regulation (e.g., co-regulation). It was found that most of the SSRL research has focused on characterizing phenomena through the use of mixed methods through qualitative data, mostly video-recorded observation data. Also, SSRL seems to contribute to students’ performance. Finally, the article discusses the need for the field to move forward, exploring the best conditions to promote SSRL, clarifying whether SSRL is always the optimal form of collaboration, and identifying more aspects of groups’ characteristics.

Neuroscience and Ethics

2017 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 82-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Matthew Liao
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Empirical Results ◽  
Joshua Greene

Abstract. A number of people believe that results from neuroscience have the potential to settle seemingly intractable debates concerning the nature, practice, and reliability of moral judgments. In particular, Joshua Greene has argued that evidence from neuroscience can be used to advance the long-standing debate between consequentialism and deontology. This paper first argues that charitably interpreted, Greene’s neuroscientific evidence can contribute to substantive ethical discussions by being part of an epistemic debunking argument. It then argues that taken as an epistemic debunking argument, Greene’s argument falls short in undermining deontological judgments. Lastly, it proposes that accepting Greene’s methodology at face value, neuroimaging results may in fact call into question the reliability of consequentialist judgments. The upshot is that Greene’s empirical results do not undermine deontology and that Greene’s project points toward a way by which empirical evidence such as neuroscientific evidence can play a role in normative debates.

Empirical Evidence About Legal Evidence

1982 ◽  
Vol 27 (7) ◽  
pp. 535-536
Author(s):  
Lawrence S. Wrightsman
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Legal Evidence
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