On the formal analysis of PKCS authentication protocols

2006 ◽  
pp. 105-121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Klaus Gaarder ◽  
Einar Snekkenes
Keyword(s):  
Formal Analysis ◽  
Authentication Protocols

scholarly journals An Extensive Formal Analysis of Multi-factor Authentication Protocols

2021 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
Charlie Jacomme ◽  
Steve Kremer
Keyword(s):  
Communication Network ◽  
Protocol Analysis ◽  
Formal Analysis ◽  
Authentication Protocols ◽  
Laboratory Environment ◽  
Threat Model ◽  
Extensive Analysis ◽  
Pi Calculus ◽  
Automated Protocol ◽  
Classical Protocol

Passwords are still the most widespread means for authenticating users, even though they have been shown to create huge security problems. This motivated the use of additional authentication mechanisms in so-called multi-factor authentication protocols. In this article, we define a detailed threat model for this kind of protocol: While in classical protocol analysis attackers control the communication network, we take into account that many communications are performed over TLS channels, that computers may be infected by different kinds of malware, that attackers could perform phishing, and that humans may omit some actions. We formalize this model in the applied pi calculus and perform an extensive analysis and comparison of several widely used protocols—variants of Google 2-step and FIDO’s U2F (Yubico’s Security Key token). The analysis is completely automated, generating systematically all combinations of threat scenarios for each of the protocols and using the P ROVERIF tool for automated protocol analysis. To validate our model and attacks, we demonstrate their feasibility in practice, even though our experiments are run in a laboratory environment. Our analysis highlights weaknesses and strengths of the different protocols. It allows us to suggest several small modifications of the existing protocols that are easy to implement, as well as an extension of Google 2-step that improves security in several threat scenarios.

Formal Analysis and Design of Authentication Protocols

2009 ◽  
pp. 240-253
Author(s):  
Siraj Ahmed Shaikh
Keyword(s):  
Process Algebra ◽  
Formal Analysis ◽  
Research Area ◽  
Authentication Protocol ◽  
Rank Function ◽  
Function Approach ◽  
Authentication Protocols ◽  
Analysis And Design ◽  
Ongoing Work ◽  
History Of

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the reader to the research area of formal analysis of authentication protocols. It briefly introduces the basic notions of cryptography and its use in authentication protocols. The chapter looks at the Needham-Schroeder (1978) protocol as an example of an authentication protocol, and examines the history of the protocol as a stimulus to the formal analysis of such protocols. We then introduce the process algebra CSP (Hoare, 1985) to model authentication protocols and present Schneider’s (1998) rank function approach to analysing such protocols. The chapter concludes by describing related ongoing work in this area of research and highlight some of the challenges posed by the problem of analysing and designing protocols.

A formal analysis of entailment

1960 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nuel D. Belnap
Keyword(s):  
Formal Analysis
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