Modal and tense predicate logic: Models in presheaves and categorical conceptualization

Author(s):  
S. Ghilardi ◽  
G. C. Meloni
Keyword(s):  
Informatica ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Javier Albadán ◽  
Paulo Gaona ◽  
Carlos Montenegro ◽  
Rubén González-Crespo ◽  
Enrique Herrera-Viedma

Author(s):  
N. Kuji ◽  
T. Takeda ◽  
S. Nakamura ◽  
Y. Komine

Abstract A new logic-model derivation method for leak faults observed by light-emission microscopy (LEM) or in liquid-crystal analysis (LCA) has been developed to verify those faults by comparing them with failures observed on an LSI tester. Since CMOS devices display various kinds of faulty behavior depending on leak resistance, it is essential to include the effects of this resistance in logic models. Considering that the resistance of leaks observed in LEM and LCA ranges from 10 to 10,000 ohm, the new logic models have been derived so that the leak fault could be easily incorporated into logic simulators without SPICE simulation. The feasibility of the proposed method has been demonstrated by using it to diagnose LEM and LCA faults causing logic failure in a 20k-gate logic LSI circuit.


Author(s):  
Antonio J. Carrion ◽  
Jovan D. Miles ◽  
Michael D. Thompson ◽  
Briana Journee ◽  
Eboni Nelson

2010 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 262-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
KLAUS GLASHOFF

Since Frege’s predicate logical transcription of Aristotelian categorical logic, the standard semantics of Aristotelian logic considers terms as standing for sets of individuals. From a philosophical standpoint, this extensional model poses problems: There exist serious doubts that Aristotle’s terms were meant to refer always to sets, that is, entities composed of individuals. Classical philosophy up to Leibniz and Kant had a different view on this question—they looked at terms as standing for concepts (“Begriffe”). In 1972, Corcoran presented a formal system for Aristotelian logic containing a calculus of natural deduction, while, with respect to semantics, he still made use of an extensional interpretation. In this paper we deal with a simple intensional semantics for Corcoran’s syntax—intensional in the sense that no individuals are needed for the construction of a complete Tarski model of Aristotelian syntax. Instead, we view concepts as containing or excluding other, “higher” concepts—corresponding to the idea which Leibniz used in the construction of his characteristic numbers. Thus, this paper is an addendum to Corcoran’s work, furnishing his formal syntax with an adequate semantics which is free from presuppositions which have entered into modern interpretations of Aristotle’s theory via predicate logic.


1962 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy Smiley

Anyone who reads Aristotle, knowing something about modern logic and nothing about its history, must ask himself why the syllogistic cannot be translated as it stands into the logic of quantification. It is now more than twenty years since the invention of the requisite framework, the logic of many-sorted quantification.In the familiar first-order predicate logic generality is expressed by means of variables and quantifiers, and each interpretation of the system is based upon the choice of some class over which the variables may range, the only restriction placed on this ‘domain of individuals’ being that it should not be empty.


1999 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 335-359 ◽  
Author(s):  
HERMAN GEUVERS ◽  
ERIK BARENDSEN

We look at two different ways of interpreting logic in the dependent type system λP. The first is by a direct formulas-as-types interpretation à la Howard where the logical derivation rules are mapped to derivation rules in the type system. The second is by viewing λP as a Logical Framework, following Harper et al. (1987) and Harper et al. (1993). The type system is then used as the meta-language in which various logics can be coded.We give a (brief) overview of known (syntactical) results about λP. Then we discuss two issues in some more detail. The first is the completeness of the formulas-as-types embedding of minimal first-order predicate logic into λP. This is a remarkably complicated issue, a first proof of which appeared in Geuvers (1993), following ideas in Barendsen and Geuvers (1989) and Swaen (1989). The second issue is the minimality of λP as a logical framework. We will show that some of the rules are actually superfluous (even though they contribute nicely to the generality of the presentation of λP).At the same time we will attempt to provide a gentle introduction to λP and its various aspects and we will try to use little inside knowledge.


2013 ◽  
Vol 29 (18) ◽  
pp. 2320-2326 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carito Guziolowski ◽  
Santiago Videla ◽  
Federica Eduati ◽  
Sven Thiele ◽  
Thomas Cokelaer ◽  
...  

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