scholarly journals On the axiomatic approach to sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues

Author(s):  
Gustavo Bergantiños ◽  
Juan D. Moreno-Ternero

AbstractWe take the axiomatic approach to uncover the structure of the revenue-sharing problem from broadcasting sports leagues. We formalize two notions of impartiality, depending on the stance one takes with respect to the revenue generated in the games involving each pair of teams. We show that the resulting two axioms lead towards two broad categories of rules, when combined with additivity and some other basic axioms. We complement those results strengthening the impartiality notions to consider axioms of order preservation.

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duane Rockerbie ◽  
Stephen Easton

Revenue sharing is a common league policy in professional sports leagues. Several motivations for revenue sharing have been explored in the literature, including supporting small market teams, affecting league parity, suppressing player salaries, and improving team profitability. We investigate a different motivation. Risk-averse team owners, through their commissioner, are able to increase their utility by using revenue sharing to affect higher order moments of the revenue distribution. In particular, it may reduce the variance and kurtosis, as well as affecting the skewness of the league distribution of team local revenues. We first determine the extent to which revenue sharing affects these moments in theory, then we quantify the effects on utility for Major League Baseball over the period 2002–2013. Our results suggest that revenue sharing produced significant utility gains at little cost, which enhanced the positive effects noted by other studies.


2015 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 1275-1291 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Peeters

Author(s):  
David George Surdam

This conclusion discusses the aftermath of the Congressional hearings. During the hearings, the owners' general prerogatives survived essentially intact, although free agency of some sort was imminent in all sports by 1976. Legislators did not repudiate the reserve clause, the reverse-order draft, or territorial rights, despite their qualms regarding these institutions. The legislators and their aides missed some opportunities to subject the team financial data from the 1950s to analysis, which could have shed light on such questions as the effects of revenue sharing. Some fans gained when their hometown landed an expansion or existing franchise, while other fans lost when legislators did not prevent franchise relocation. Congress has held several hearings in the intervening decades since 1989. The professional sports leagues have also evolved. Technology has altered the landscape.


2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (01) ◽  
pp. 1940002 ◽  
Author(s):  
László Csató

In a generalized tournament, players may have an arbitrary number of matches against each other and the outcome of the games is measured on a cardinal scale with lower and upper bounds. An axiomatic approach is applied to the problem of ranking the competitors. Self-consistency (SC) requires assigning the same rank for players with equivalent results, while a player showing an obviously better performance than another should be ranked strictly higher. According to order preservation (OP), if two players have the same pairwise ranking in two tournaments where the same players have played the same number of matches, then their pairwise ranking is not allowed to change in the aggregated tournament. We reveal that these two properties cannot be satisfied simultaneously on this universal domain.


2014 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Salaga ◽  
Alan Ostfield ◽  
Jason A. Winfree

2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 284-308 ◽  
Author(s):  
Helmut M. Dietl ◽  
Martin Grossmann ◽  
Markus Lang

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Ehrlich ◽  
Shankar Ghimire ◽  
Shane Sanders

PurposeRevenue sharing is ubiquitous among North American professional sports leagues. Under pool revenue sharing, above-average revenue teams of a league effectively transfer revenues to below-average revenue teams. Herein, the authors find and prove that a league will vote into policy a pool revenue sharing arrangement if and only if mean team revenue is greater than presharing median revenue, where this condition is equivalent to the presence of positive nonparametric skewness in a league’s distribution of team revenues. This represents a median voter theorem for league revenue sharing.Design/methodology/approachThe authors consider the case of revenue sharing for the National Football League (NFL), a league that pools and equally shares national revenues among member teams.FindingsThe authors find evidence of positive and significant nonparametric skewness in NFL team revenue distributions for the 2004–2016 seasons. This distribution is observed amid annual majority rule votes of League owners in favor of maintaining the incumbent pool revenue sharing model (as opposed to no team revenue sharing). Distribution of revenues – namely the existence of outlying large market NFL teams – appears to consistently explain the historical popularity of NFL revenue sharing.Originality/valueThe median voter theorem uncovered in the case of NFL applies to all professional sports leagues and can be used predictively as well as descriptively.


2008 ◽  
Vol 45 (5) ◽  
pp. 535-549 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Lewis

Major League Baseball and other professional sports leagues have long been concerned with competitive imbalances caused by differences in local revenues. The fear is that in the absence of salary caps or other regulatory mechanisms, smaller-market teams will be unable to remain competitive. This research uses a structural dynamic programming model to analyze ownership's payroll investment decisions. This model estimates the relationship between optimal payrolls and local-market populations and the influence of long-term customer equity dynamics on payroll investments. In addition, the author analyzes the impact of a recent policy intervention that implemented revenue transfers from high-local-revenue markets to low-local-revenue markets. The statistical results indicate that market population has a significant impact on the value of a team's payroll investments. For example, optimal payrolls double as the population increases from 2.5 million to 7.5 million. Furthermore, rather than improving competitive balance, the adoption of revenue sharing has decreased the incentives for small-market teams to remain competitive. The author uses the estimation results to evaluate alternative approaches to managing competitive balance. Specifically, the results suggest that basing revenue-sharing payments on local-market population and (higher) attendance rates reduces payroll dispersion.


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