An evolutionary game on compliant and non-compliant firms in groundwater exploitation

Author(s):  
Marta Biancardi ◽  
Gianluca Iannucci ◽  
Giovanni Villani
1999 ◽  
Vol 39 (10-11) ◽  
pp. 353-356 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gideon Tredoux ◽  
Peter King ◽  
Lisa Cavé

The Atlantis Water Resource Management Scheme uses artificial recharge of urban stormwater and treated wastewater to augment the natural groundwater resource. The key to the success of the scheme is the fractionation of the stormwater into components of distinctly different quality, and the separate treatment of domestic and industrial wastewater for different end-uses. The groundwater exploitation strategy is largely controlled by water quality requirements. Reuse of domestic and industrial wastewater depends on quality parameters. Tertiary treated domestic effluent is destined for indirect reuse via the aquifer, while treated industrial wastewater is used together with spent regenerant brine and stormwater from the noxious trade area for preventing seawater intrusion. Both residential and industrial stormwater is separated into the base flow and storm flow components and utilised for various purposes. The sustainable operation of the water resource scheme serves as a prototype for the optimal use of water and protection of the environment.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Zhu Bai ◽  
Mingxia Huang ◽  
Shuai Bian ◽  
Huandong Wu

The emergence of online car-hailing service provides an innovative approach to vehicle booking but has negatively influenced the taxi industry in China. This paper modeled taxi service mode choice based on evolutionary game theory (EGT). The modes included the dispatching and online car-hailing modes. We constructed an EGT framework, including determining the strategies and the payoff matrix. We introduced different behaviors, including taxi company management, driver operation, and passenger choice. This allowed us to model the impact of these behaviors on the evolving process of service mode choice. The results show that adjustments in taxi company, driver, and passenger behaviors impact the evolutionary path and convergence speed of our evolutionary game model. However, it also reveals that, regardless of adjustments, the stable states in the game model remain unchanged. The conclusion provides a basis for studying taxi system operation and management.


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