scholarly journals Mīmāṃsā deontic reasoning using specificity: a proof theoretic approach

Author(s):  
Björn Lellmann ◽  
Francesca Gulisano ◽  
Agata Ciabattoni

Abstract Over the course of more than two millennia the philosophical school of Mīmāṃsā has thoroughly analyzed normative statements. In this paper we approach a formalization of the deontic system which is applied but never explicitly discussed in Mīmāṃsā to resolve conflicts between deontic statements by giving preference to the more specific ones. We first extend with prohibitions and recommendations the non-normal deontic logic extracted in Ciabattoni et al. (in: TABLEAUX 2015, volume 9323 of LNCS, Springer, 2015) from Mīmāṃsā texts, obtaining a multimodal dyadic version of the deontic logic $$\mathsf {MD}$$ MD . Sequent calculus is then used to close a set of prima-facie injunctions under a restricted form of monotonicity, using specificity to avoid conflicts. We establish decidability and complexity results, and investigate the potential use of the resulting system for Mīmāṃsā philosophy and, more generally, for the formal interpretation of normative statements.

Author(s):  
Jens Claßen ◽  
James Delgrande

With the advent of artificial agents in everyday life, it is important that these agents are guided by social norms and moral guidelines. Notions of obligation, permission, and the like have traditionally been studied in the field of Deontic Logic, where deontic assertions generally refer to what an agent should or should not do; that is they refer to actions. In Artificial Intelligence, the Situation Calculus is (arguably) the best known and most studied formalism for reasoning about action and change. In this paper, we integrate these two areas by incorporating deontic notions into Situation Calculus theories. We do this by considering deontic assertions as constraints, expressed as a set of conditionals, which apply to complex actions expressed as GOLOG programs. These constraints induce a ranking of "ideality" over possible future situations. This ranking in turn is used to guide an agent in its planning deliberation, towards a course of action that adheres best to the deontic constraints. We present a formalization that includes a wide class of (dyadic) deontic assertions, lets us distinguish prima facie from all-things-considered obligations, and particularly addresses contrary-to-duty scenarios. We furthermore present results on compiling the deontic constraints directly into the Situation Calculus action theory, so as to obtain an agent that respects the given norms, but works solely based on the standard reasoning and planning techniques.


Author(s):  
Lew Gordeev ◽  
Edward Hermann Haeusler

We upgrade [3] to a complete proof of the conjecture NP = PSPACE that is known as one of the fundamental open problems in the mathematical theory of computational complexity; this proof is based on [2]. Since minimal propositional logic is known to be PSPACE complete, while PSPACE to include NP, it suffices to show that every valid purely implicational formula ρ has a proof whose weight (= total number of symbols) and time complexity of the provability involved are both polynomial in the weight of ρ. As in [3], we use proof theoretic approach. Recall that in [3] we considered any valid ρ in question that had (by the definition of validity) a "short" tree-like proof π in the Hudelmaier-style cutfree sequent calculus for minimal logic. The "shortness" means that the height of π and the total weight of different formulas occurring in it are both polynomial in the weight of ρ. However, the size (= total number of nodes), and hence also the weight, of π could be exponential in that of ρ. To overcome this trouble we embedded π into Prawitz's proof system of natural deductions containing single formulas, instead of sequents. As in π, the height and the total weight of different formulas of the resulting tree-like natural deduction ∂1 were polynomial, although the size of ∂1 still could be exponential, in the weight of ρ. In our next, crucial move, ∂1 was deterministically compressed into a "small", although multipremise, dag-like deduction ∂ whose horizontal levels contained only mutually different formulas, which made the whole weight polynomial in that of ρ. However, ∂ required a more complicated verification of the underlying provability of ρ. In this paper we present a nondeterministic compression of ∂ into a desired standard dag-like deduction ∂0 that deterministically proves ρ in time and space polynomial in the weight of ρ. Together with [3] this completes the proof of NP = PSPACE. Natural deductions are essential for our proof. Tree-to-dag horizontal compression of π merging equal sequents, instead of formulas, is (possible but) not sufficient, since the total number of different sequents in π might be exponential in the weight of ρ − even assuming that all formulas occurring in sequents are subformulas of ρ. On the other hand, we need Hudelmaier's cutfree sequent calculus in order to control both the height and total weight of different formulas of the initial tree-like proof π, since standard Prawitz's normalization although providing natural deductions with the subformula property does not preserve polynomial heights. It is not clear yet if we can omit references to π even in the proof of the weaker result NP = coNP.


2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Fjellstad

This paper concerns the relationship between transitivity of entailment, omega-inconsistency and nonstandard models of arithmetic. First, it provides a cut-free sequent calculus for non-transitive logic of truth STT based on Robinson Arithmetic and shows that this logic is omega-inconsistent. It then identifies the conditions in McGee (1985) for an omega-inconsistent logic as quantified standard deontic logic, presents a cut-free labelled sequent calculus for quantified standard deontic logic based on Robinson Arithmetic where the deontic modality is treated as a predicate, proves omega-inconsistency and shows thus, pace Cobreros et al.(2013), that the result in McGee (1985) does not rely on transitivity. Finally, it also explains why the omega-inconsistent logics of truth in question do not require nonstandard models of arithmetic.


Author(s):  
Joyce Mak

Deontic reasoning is the understanding of what may, must, or ought (not) to be done under given circumstances (Wellman & Miller, 2008).  Deontic logic is often applied to social‐conventional rules (such as "set the table with the fork on the left") to give those social‐ conventions moral force, even though most people would agree that  arbitrary social conventions are morally neutral. A critical question concerns whether the connection between social‐conventions and deontic logic is present in young children, or learned more slowly over time.  To examine this, we provided forty‐eight (24 male; 24 female) 3‐year‐ old children with an arbitrary rule for a game involving yellow and orange balls. For half the children the rule was provided with deontic language (e.g., "you should use the orange balls"), and half were not (e.g., "use the orange balls"). Additionally, half the children were given a social‐ conventional rationale (e.g., "everyone does it that way"), while the other half were given a moral rationale (e.g., "it's the right thing to do"). If children understand that deontic logic applies even to social‐ conventional rules, then we expect that they will comply with the arbitrary game rule most when the rule is provided with deontic language and a moral rationale. This research will help parents and early childhood caregivers to better understand how young children view social‐conventional rules. This in turn will provide insight into how these social conventional rules, which are highly valued and critical to learn, might best be taught within families, day cares, and classrooms.


1994 ◽  
Vol 110 (1) ◽  
pp. 164-182 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. Diekert ◽  
E. Ochmanski ◽  
K. Reinhardt

Author(s):  
Guido Governatori ◽  
Antonino Rotolo

Free Choice Permission is one of the challenges for the formalisation of norms. In this paper, we follow a novel approach that accepts Free Choice Permission in a restricted form. The intuition behind the guarded form is strongly aligned with the idea of defeasibility. Accordingly, we investigate how to model the guarded form in Defeasible Deontic Logic extended with disjunctive permissions.


2014 ◽  
Vol 26 (6) ◽  
pp. 993-1021 ◽  
Author(s):  
DIEGO FIGUEIRA ◽  
PIOTR HOFMAN ◽  
SŁAWOMIR LASOTA

Timed and register automata are well-known models of computation over timed and data words, respectively. The former has clocks that allow to test the lapse of time between two events, whilst the latter includes registers that can store data values for later comparison. Although these two models behave differently in appearance, several decision problems have the same (un)decidability and complexity results for both models. As a prominent example, emptiness is decidable for alternating automata with one clock or register, both with non-primitive recursive complexity. This is not by chance.This work confirms that there is indeed a tight relationship between the two models. We show that a run of a timed automaton can be simulated by a register automaton over ordered data domain, and conversely that a run of a register automaton can be simulated by a timed automaton. These are exponential time reductions hold both in the finite and infinite words settings. Our results allow to transfer decidability results back and forth between these two kinds of models, as well complexity results modulo an exponential time reduction. We justify the usefulness of these reductions by obtaining new results on register automata.


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