Tax Amnesties and the Self-Selection of Risk-Averse Taxpayers

2004 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 319-341 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carla Marchese ◽  
Fabio Privileggi
1959 ◽  
Vol 85 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-210 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hilary L. Seal

The theory of ‘temporary selection’ is concerned with the variation, for fixed x, of q[x–t]+t the observed rate of mortality at age x during the t+1th year after the issue of an assurance or annuity contract. The classical view is that—apart from chance variations—q[x–t]+t increases gradually with increasing t until the effects of selection have disappeared after which time q[xx–t]+t is a constant depending on x only.Various reasons have been suggested for the persistence of temporary selection in an observed series of values of q[xx–t]+t. The chief of these are:(1) The continuing effects of an initial selection on the part of the assurance company or by the annuitant (Morgan, 1834);(2) The gradual withdrawal from assurance of healthy lives (Higham, 1851); and(3) Secular improvements in medicals election or in the self-selection of annuitants (Karup, 1903).


2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luc Behaghel ◽  
Bruno Crépon ◽  
Thomas Le Barbanchon

We evaluate an experimental program in which the French public employment service anonymized résumés for firms that were hiring. Firms were free to participate or not; participating firms were then randomly assigned to receive either anonymous résumés or name-bearing ones. We find that participating firms become less likely to interview and hire minority candidates when receiving anonymous résumés. We show how these unexpected results can be explained by the self-selection of firms into the program and by the fact that anonymization prevents the attenuation of negative signals when the candidate belongs to a minority. (JEL J15, J68, J71)


2012 ◽  
Vol 94 (3) ◽  
pp. 786-800 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Burton ◽  
Dan Rigby

Empirica ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 371-395 ◽  
Author(s):  
Herbert Brücker ◽  
Parvati Trübswetter

2008 ◽  
Vol 47 (13) ◽  
pp. 2475-2479 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giulio Gasparini ◽  
Leonard J. Prins ◽  
Paolo Scrimin

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