scholarly journals On security of collateral in Danish mortgage finance: a formula of property rights, incentives and market mechanisms

2014 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karin Haldrup
2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 404-424 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aleksandar D Slaev

Current social and economic theory has yet to explain why, despite the many advantages of the market mechanism, planning is employed at all levels of market economy. Like other studies, this research proposes an explanation based on the form of property rights; however, it uses specific definitions of market, private planning and collective planning that establish unambiguous links between them and the structure of ownership. Thus, the article supports the position that the employment of planning or market mechanisms in economic and social activities depends solely on the structure of property rights. The contribution of this article is the formulation of two criteria for the allocation of property rights derived from Coase’s seminal works, termed in this text as Coase’s criterion of institutional optimisation and Coase’s market cost criterion. An important aspect of this proposal is the suggestion that Coase’s theory can be a powerful tool with which to study shared/common entitlements. It illuminates the nature and the mechanisms of private and collective planning and their relationship to the market. The article concludes that private planning may exist only if it is good enough to improve the efficiency of the market. Collective planning is indispensable when markets employ shared/collectively owned resources.


2017 ◽  
Vol 232 ◽  
pp. 1026-1049 ◽  
Author(s):  
Loren Brandt ◽  
Susan H. Whiting ◽  
Linxiu Zhang ◽  
Tonglong Zhang

AbstractThrough two rounds of land contracting, rural households have been allocated a bundle of rights in land. We observe significant differences across villages in the amount of land to which villagers retain a claim and the institutional mechanisms governing the exchange of land rights. This study reveals the perpetuation and expansion of non-market mechanisms accruing to the benefit of village cadres and state officials and only limited emergence of market mechanisms in which households are primary beneficiaries. It identifies factors in economic, political and legal domains that incentivize and enable state officials and local cadres to capture returns from use of land. Relatedly, the study finds differences in conflict over property-rights regimes. Drawing on a pilot survey carried out by the authors in November of 2011 in Shaanxi and Jiangsu provinces (192 households in 24 villages), this paper seeks to explain heterogeneity and change in property-rights regimes over time and across space.


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-140
Author(s):  
Sjur Flam ◽  

Motivated by management problems in national fisheries, we examine management of renewable resources in local or regional commons. This paper suggests that property rights, or lack thereof, be replaced by well-defined user rights. It shows that the use of commons can be conditioned, paid for, or valued, via market mechanisms. To that end, direct deals and double auctions are expedient. Either institution can distribute, restore and secure resource rent. Either can also focalize debates as to which assignments, regulations or taxation of rights might be fair or legitimate.


1996 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 87-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrzej Rapaczynski

Using the experiences of Eastern Europe as an example, this article argues that, contrary to the economists’ assumption that property rights are a precondition of a market economy, market institutions are often a prerequisite for a viable private property regime. Progress in the development of complex property rights in Eastern Europe, thus, cannot be expected to come primarily from a perfection of the legal system. Instead, it is more likely to arise as a market response to the demand for property rights. Indeed, legal entitlements can only be expected to become effective against a background of self-enforcing market mechanisms.


Author(s):  
David Miller

Markets are systems of exchange in which people with money or commodities to sell voluntarily trade these for other items which they prefer to have. Most economic transactions in advanced societies are of this kind, and any attempt to replace markets wholesale with a different form of economic coordination seems destined to fail. But questions about the ethics of markets are still of considerable practical concern, for two reasons at least. First, we need to make collective decisions about the proper scope of markets: are there goods and services which in principle should not be distributed and exchanged through market mechanisms – medical care, for instance? Second, markets work within a framework of property rights which sets the terms on which people can exchange with one another, and this too is subject to collective decision: for instance, should a person’s labour be regarded as a commodity like any other, to be bought and sold on whatever terms the parties can agree, or does labour carry special rights that set limits to these terms? Are employees morally entitled to a share of the profits of the companies they work in, to take a concrete issue? To guide such decisions, we need to apply general ethical principles to market transactions. First, are markets justified on grounds of efficiency, as is often claimed? What criterion of efficiency is being used when such claims are made? Second, can we regard the outcome of market exchanges as just, or, at the other extreme, should we see them as necessarily exploitative? Third, do market exchanges necessarily alienate people from one another and destroy their sense of community? These are very different questions, but an overall assessment of market ethics needs to address each of them, and perhaps others besides.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Harris ◽  
Meina Cai ◽  
Ilia Murtazashvili ◽  
Jennifer Murtazashvili
Keyword(s):  

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