scholarly journals Rights and rents in local commons

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-140
Author(s):  
Sjur Flam ◽  

Motivated by management problems in national fisheries, we examine management of renewable resources in local or regional commons. This paper suggests that property rights, or lack thereof, be replaced by well-defined user rights. It shows that the use of commons can be conditioned, paid for, or valued, via market mechanisms. To that end, direct deals and double auctions are expedient. Either institution can distribute, restore and secure resource rent. Either can also focalize debates as to which assignments, regulations or taxation of rights might be fair or legitimate.

2015 ◽  
Vol 76 ◽  
pp. 125-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nujin Suphaphiphat ◽  
Pietro F. Peretto ◽  
Simone Valente

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 404-424 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aleksandar D Slaev

Current social and economic theory has yet to explain why, despite the many advantages of the market mechanism, planning is employed at all levels of market economy. Like other studies, this research proposes an explanation based on the form of property rights; however, it uses specific definitions of market, private planning and collective planning that establish unambiguous links between them and the structure of ownership. Thus, the article supports the position that the employment of planning or market mechanisms in economic and social activities depends solely on the structure of property rights. The contribution of this article is the formulation of two criteria for the allocation of property rights derived from Coase’s seminal works, termed in this text as Coase’s criterion of institutional optimisation and Coase’s market cost criterion. An important aspect of this proposal is the suggestion that Coase’s theory can be a powerful tool with which to study shared/common entitlements. It illuminates the nature and the mechanisms of private and collective planning and their relationship to the market. The article concludes that private planning may exist only if it is good enough to improve the efficiency of the market. Collective planning is indispensable when markets employ shared/collectively owned resources.


2017 ◽  
Vol 232 ◽  
pp. 1026-1049 ◽  
Author(s):  
Loren Brandt ◽  
Susan H. Whiting ◽  
Linxiu Zhang ◽  
Tonglong Zhang

AbstractThrough two rounds of land contracting, rural households have been allocated a bundle of rights in land. We observe significant differences across villages in the amount of land to which villagers retain a claim and the institutional mechanisms governing the exchange of land rights. This study reveals the perpetuation and expansion of non-market mechanisms accruing to the benefit of village cadres and state officials and only limited emergence of market mechanisms in which households are primary beneficiaries. It identifies factors in economic, political and legal domains that incentivize and enable state officials and local cadres to capture returns from use of land. Relatedly, the study finds differences in conflict over property-rights regimes. Drawing on a pilot survey carried out by the authors in November of 2011 in Shaanxi and Jiangsu provinces (192 households in 24 villages), this paper seeks to explain heterogeneity and change in property-rights regimes over time and across space.


2005 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas R. Dalton ◽  
R. Morris Coats ◽  
Badiollah R. Asrabadi

Author(s):  
Daniel T Kaffine ◽  
Christopher Costello

Abstract Spatial connectivity of renewable resources induces a spatial externality in extraction. We explore the consequences of decentralized spatial property rights in the presence of spatial externalities. We generalize the notion of unitization—developed to enhance cooperative extraction of oil and gas fields—and apply it to renewable resources which face a similar spatial commons problem. We find that unitizing a common pool renewable resource can yield first-best outcomes even when participation is voluntary, provided profit sharing rules can vary by participant.


1996 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 87-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrzej Rapaczynski

Using the experiences of Eastern Europe as an example, this article argues that, contrary to the economists’ assumption that property rights are a precondition of a market economy, market institutions are often a prerequisite for a viable private property regime. Progress in the development of complex property rights in Eastern Europe, thus, cannot be expected to come primarily from a perfection of the legal system. Instead, it is more likely to arise as a market response to the demand for property rights. Indeed, legal entitlements can only be expected to become effective against a background of self-enforcing market mechanisms.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
teshager asratie

Abstract Though east Africa has ample resource endowments for electricity production, the region has the lowest performance in generating electricity and millions of people are living without access to electricity. To fill the electricity gap countries used fossil fuels as the major source of energy, but electricity production from renewable resource is lower. Therefore, this study aimed to identify determinant factors of electricity production from renewable resources excluding hydropower sources. Panel data for five east African countries for the period 1998 to 2019 was used and it was examined by pooled mean group panel ARDL estimation technique. The estimation result revealed that that in both long and short run GDP per capita growth, population growth, energy consumption per capita and energy import have positive significant effect on electricity production from renewable resources other than hydropower. While political instability, electricity production from hydropower, and electricity production from oil, gas, and coal have negative significant effect. However in the short run energy use and resource rent percentage of GDP have positive and negative significant effect respectively, but in the long run the two variables have no significant effect. Error correction coefficient is negative 0.64, which indicates that deviation from long run disequilibrium adjusts toward equilibrium at a rate of 64% per year. Based on the result this study recommends that the government should improve the performance of GDP growth by quality education, lower lending interest rate, improving political stability through controlling internal conflicts caused by difference in religion and ethnicity, improving energy security.


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