scholarly journals The Roles of the State and the Market in Establishing Property Rights

1996 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 87-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrzej Rapaczynski
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Eastern Europe ◽  
Market Economy ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Market Response ◽  
Market Institutions ◽  
Market Mechanisms ◽  
To Come ◽  
Property Regime

Using the experiences of Eastern Europe as an example, this article argues that, contrary to the economists’ assumption that property rights are a precondition of a market economy, market institutions are often a prerequisite for a viable private property regime. Progress in the development of complex property rights in Eastern Europe, thus, cannot be expected to come primarily from a perfection of the legal system. Instead, it is more likely to arise as a market response to the demand for property rights. Indeed, legal entitlements can only be expected to become effective against a background of self-enforcing market mechanisms.

‘Take Down Mezuzahs, Remove Name-Plates’: The Emigration of Objects from Germany to Palestine

Jewishness ◽  
2008 ◽  
pp. 133-150
Author(s):  
Joachim Schlör
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Private Property ◽  
German Society ◽  
Good Time ◽  
Jeremy Bentham ◽  
National Socialist ◽  
Individual Memory ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter evaluates the meaning of objects inventoried and packed as emigrants prepared to leave Germany for Palestine after Adolf Hitler came to power. Private property has, for both the individual memory and the collective memory, a deep emotional significance. The exclusion of the Jews from German society started with the National Socialist policy of ‘Aryanization’, the expropriation of property. Many y émigrés had to abandon, to leave behind, their private dwellings. In the process, they lost more than the object itself. Around 1800, the British philosopher and legal theoretician Jeremy Bentham drew attention to the importance of the relationship between an object and its owner: ownership forms the basis of a hope. Thus, the threat of losing property is symbolic of the loss of all hope of a continued life in Germany and as a German. Ultimately, Aryanization and confiscation were a symbolic theft of identity. And in these cases, even the legal system was no longer capable of protecting property rights. Those who emigrated in good time were able to take at least some of their property with them.

Property Rights

2019 ◽  
pp. 611-614
Author(s):  
Thomas Apolte
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Market Economy ◽  
Significant Role ◽  
Economic Efficiency ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Resource Acquisition ◽  
Economic Competition ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
Ownership Structures ◽  
Distribution Of Wealth

Creation of ownership structures under private law as well as market liberalization can be seen as central to transformation. This chapter examines how private property rights, among others, encourage economic efficiency, strengthen economic competition, make businesses subject to the discipline of the market, and create a capital market. The emergence and development of a property rights structure at a given point in time is always also the result of a conflictual history. One of the advantages of a developed market economy is that conflictual resource acquisition lies in the past and has ceased to play a significant role in the recognition of the existing distribution of wealth. It is astonishing how little conflict was caused by post-socialist privatization.

The relationship between planning and the market from the perspective of property rights theory: A transaction cost analysis

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 404-424 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aleksandar D Slaev
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Cost Analysis ◽  
Market Economy ◽  
Market Mechanism ◽  
Market Mechanisms ◽  
Cost Criterion ◽  
Property Rights Theory ◽  
The Many ◽  
The Relationship

Current social and economic theory has yet to explain why, despite the many advantages of the market mechanism, planning is employed at all levels of market economy. Like other studies, this research proposes an explanation based on the form of property rights; however, it uses specific definitions of market, private planning and collective planning that establish unambiguous links between them and the structure of ownership. Thus, the article supports the position that the employment of planning or market mechanisms in economic and social activities depends solely on the structure of property rights. The contribution of this article is the formulation of two criteria for the allocation of property rights derived from Coase’s seminal works, termed in this text as Coase’s criterion of institutional optimisation and Coase’s market cost criterion. An important aspect of this proposal is the suggestion that Coase’s theory can be a powerful tool with which to study shared/common entitlements. It illuminates the nature and the mechanisms of private and collective planning and their relationship to the market. The article concludes that private planning may exist only if it is good enough to improve the efficiency of the market. Collective planning is indispensable when markets employ shared/collectively owned resources.

scholarly journals Privatization in economic theory

2007 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maja Drakic
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Economic System ◽  
Market Economy ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Free Market ◽  
Mass Scale ◽  
Equilibrium Models ◽  
Dominant Form ◽  
Private Property Rights

In reality privatization has never occurred according to the handbook rules of ordinary market transactions. Not even in advanced market economies can privatization transactions be described by the Walrasian or Arrowian, or Leontiefian equilibrium models, or by the equilibrium models of the game theory. In these economies transactions of privatization take place in a fairly organic way ? which means that those are driven by the dominance of private property rights and in a market economy. But despite this fact Western privatization also some peculiar features as compared to ordinary company takeovers, since the state as the seller may pursue non ? economic goals. Changes in the dominant form of property change positions and status of many individuals and groups in the society. That?s why privatization can even less be explained by ordinary market mechanisms in transition countries where privatizing state-owned property have happened in a mass scale and where markets and private property rights weren't established at the time process of privatization began. In this paper I?ll discuss and analyze the phenomenon of privatization in context of different economic theories arguing that empirical results go in favor of the public choice theory (Buchanan, 1978), theory of "economic constitution" (Brennan and Buchanan 1985), (Buchanan and Tullock, 1989), and theory of "collective action" (Olson, 1982). These theories argues that transition from one economic system into another, for example transition from collectivistic, socialistic system into capitalism and free market economy with dominant private property, will not happen through isolated changes of only few economic institutions, no matter how deep that changes would be. In other words privatization can not give results if it's not followed by comprehensive change of economic system because privatized companied wouldn't be able to operate in old environment.

The Economic and Political Liberalization of Socialism: The Fundamental Problem of Property Rights

1993 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 79-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
William H. Riker ◽  
David L. Weimer
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Market Economy ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Fundamental Problem ◽  
Political Regime ◽  
Political Liberalization ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
Political Experience ◽  
Collective Goods ◽  
Neoclassical Economic Theory

All our previous political experience, and especially, of course, the experience of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, offers little hope that democracy can coexist with the centralized allocation of economic resources. Indeed, simple observation suggests that a market economy with private property rights is a necessary, although not sufficient, condition for the existence of a democratic political regime. And this accords fully with the political theory of liberalism, which emphasizes that private rights, both civil and economic, be protected and secure. At the same time, our previous experience also indicates that market economies are more successful than centrally planned economies not only in producing, but also in distributing, both private and collective goods. This economic experienee is supported by neoclassical economic theory, which treats clearly defined and secure rights to private property as essential to a market economy.

The Market Economy

2020 ◽  
pp. 119-138
Author(s):  
Kevin Vallier
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Market Economy ◽  
Real World ◽  
Essential Role ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Political Trust ◽  
Central Feature ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
The Right

The market economy can create trust for the right reasons. Markets and property rights promote social and political trust in the real world by creating social cohesion through exchange and generating economic growth. Markets also arise from private property rights, which are publicly justified based on the essential role private property rights play in protecting individual rights and the rights of associations. This includes private property rights in capital, that is, productive property, which means that a broadly market-based economy will be a central feature in any society that maintains high levels of social and political trust in the right ways.

Property in the Kibbutz: Old and New

2018 ◽  
pp. 58-78
Author(s):  
Abraham Bell ◽  
Gideon Parchomovsky ◽  
Benjamin Weitz
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Free Market ◽  
Unique Property ◽  
Free Market Economy ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
System P ◽  
Legal Challenges ◽  
Property Regime ◽  
Israeli Kibbutz

In this chapter, we discuss the unique property norms that emerged within the Israeli kibbutz and the challenges to which they gave rise. Originally, the prevailing property regime in kibbutzim reflected a deep commitment to socialist ideology. All property was owned by the collective and individual members only held licences or permits to use kibbutz property. With time, as Israeli society has moved towards a free market economy and following a series of financial crises, most kibbutzim have abandoned the strict ban on private property and have gradually gravitated towards a system of private property rights. This transition has given rise to intricate legal challenges. It forced kibbutzim to adopt a system of allocating private property rights to their members in assets and has required Israeli courts to grapple with unique property arrangements that existed solely within kibbutzim and effectuate them within the formal legal system.

Environmental Impacts of Enhanced Private Property Rights

2002 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 367-381
Author(s):  
Ross McKitrick ◽  
Timothy Shufelt
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Data Base ◽  
Market Economy ◽  
Transition Economies ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Political Factors ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
International Data

There has been concern in western countries over whether strong private property rights empower polluters to the detriment of other citizens. This debate is now playing out in transition economies and developing countries, where the process of moving to a market economy involves strengthening property rights. We review the conflicting arguments and test them using a new international data base. After controlling for income, education and political factors we find that cross-sectional differences in property rights regimes explain some international differences in pollution rates, but changes in property rights laws within a country do not seem to affect emissions.

scholarly journals How the indigenous case of Xukuru before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights can inspire decolonial comparative studies on property rights

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Flavianne Fernanda Bitencourt Nóbrega ◽  
Camilla Montanha
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
International Law ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Property Right ◽  
Max Planck ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
Collective Property ◽  
First Time

This paper develops a decolonial comparative analysis of the concept of property rights, taking into consideration the decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, ruling on collective property rights of indigenous people for the first time against Brazil (case Xukuru People versus Brazil, 2018). For this purpose, the innovative method of decolonial comparative law, promoted by Ralf Michaels and Lena Salaymeh at the workshop organized by Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Law on 2019, was used to comparatively analyse private property rights and the collective property right in the Brazilian legal system from a decolonial perspective. The Xukuru indigenous case clearly shows the diverse problems and conflicts that arise when using the concept of property right based on a strong Eurocentric tradition. The challenges of registering an indigenous property in Brazil were identified in this context as a dysfunctional colonial model of private right that obstruct the exercise of collective property in Brazil. Thus, the decision of the Interamerican Court of Human Rights that introduces the concept of collective property rights in Brazil can inspire a decolonial approach in the domestic legal system and serve as learning process for other legal systems that are confronting similar problems.

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