scholarly journals Do people care about social context? Framing effects in dictator games

2012 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 349-371 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Dreber ◽  
Tore Ellingsen ◽  
Magnus Johannesson ◽  
David G. Rand
Author(s):  
Anna Dreber ◽  
Tore Ellingsen ◽  
Magnus Johannesson ◽  
David G. Rand

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cindel White ◽  
John Michael Kelly ◽  
Azim Shariff ◽  
Ara Norenzayan

Four experiments (total N = 3591) examined how thinking about Karma and God increases adherence to social norms that prescribe fairness in anonymous dictator games. We found that (1) thinking about Karma decreased selfishness among karmic believers across religious affiliations, including Hindus, Buddhists, Christians, and non-religious Americans; (2) thinking about God also decreased selfishness among believers in God (but not among non-believers), replicating previous findings; and (3) thinking about both karma and God shifted participants’ initially selfish offers towards fairness (the normatively prosocial response), but had no effect on already fair offers. These supernatural framing effects were obtained and replicated in high-powered, pre-registered experiments and remained robust to several methodological checks, including hypothesis guessing, game familiarity, demographic variables, between- and within-subjects designs, and variation in data exclusion criteria. These results support the role of culturally-elaborated beliefs about supernatural justice as a motivator of believer’s adherence to prosocial norms.


2022 ◽  
pp. 104346312110733
Author(s):  
Andreas Bergh ◽  
Philipp C Wichardt

This paper reports results from a classroom dictator game comparing the effects of three different sets of standard instructions. The results show that seemingly small and typically unreported differences in standard instructions induce different perceptions regarding entitlement and ownership of the money to be distributed, and that these perceptions influence behaviour. Less is given when the task is described as a task of generosity and more when the task is a task of distribution (average 35 % vs. 52 %). The results can contribute to explaining the large variation in dictator game giving reported in the literature and show that even small and unreported differences in instructions change how the game is perceived. JEL codes: C70; C91; D63


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vanessa Saalfeld ◽  
Zeina Ramadan ◽  
Vaughan Bell ◽  
Nichola Raihani

Fear of others intending harm is central in paranoia but it is unclear to what extent social context alters paranoid attributions, and how this interacts with pre-existing paranoia. We examined social interactions via game theory paradigms across social rank (Experiment 1) and political group affiliation (Experiment 2) as a function of pre-existing paranoia using two pre-registered Dictator Games (N=2,030) for real money. Interacting with someone from a higher social rank or a political out-group led to an increase in paranoid attributions of harmful intent for ambiguous actions. Pre-existing paranoia predicted a general increase in harmful intent attribution but there was no interaction with social situation: highly paranoid people showed the same magnitude of increase to non-paranoid people, although from a higher baseline. We conclude that social context affects paranoid attributions but ongoing paranoia represents a lowered threshold for detecting social threat rather than an impaired reactivity to it.


1985 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 1015-1023 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Gifford ◽  
Timothy M. Gallagher

1985 ◽  
Vol 30 (11) ◽  
pp. 853-858 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara Ross
Keyword(s):  

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