Mine, Ours and Yours? Unintended Framing Effects in Dictator Games

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Bergh ◽  
Philipp C. Wichardt
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cindel White ◽  
John Michael Kelly ◽  
Azim Shariff ◽  
Ara Norenzayan

Four experiments (total N = 3591) examined how thinking about Karma and God increases adherence to social norms that prescribe fairness in anonymous dictator games. We found that (1) thinking about Karma decreased selfishness among karmic believers across religious affiliations, including Hindus, Buddhists, Christians, and non-religious Americans; (2) thinking about God also decreased selfishness among believers in God (but not among non-believers), replicating previous findings; and (3) thinking about both karma and God shifted participants’ initially selfish offers towards fairness (the normatively prosocial response), but had no effect on already fair offers. These supernatural framing effects were obtained and replicated in high-powered, pre-registered experiments and remained robust to several methodological checks, including hypothesis guessing, game familiarity, demographic variables, between- and within-subjects designs, and variation in data exclusion criteria. These results support the role of culturally-elaborated beliefs about supernatural justice as a motivator of believer’s adherence to prosocial norms.


2012 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 349-371 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Dreber ◽  
Tore Ellingsen ◽  
Magnus Johannesson ◽  
David G. Rand

2022 ◽  
pp. 104346312110733
Author(s):  
Andreas Bergh ◽  
Philipp C Wichardt

This paper reports results from a classroom dictator game comparing the effects of three different sets of standard instructions. The results show that seemingly small and typically unreported differences in standard instructions induce different perceptions regarding entitlement and ownership of the money to be distributed, and that these perceptions influence behaviour. Less is given when the task is described as a task of generosity and more when the task is a task of distribution (average 35 % vs. 52 %). The results can contribute to explaining the large variation in dictator game giving reported in the literature and show that even small and unreported differences in instructions change how the game is perceived. JEL codes: C70; C91; D63


Author(s):  
Anna Dreber ◽  
Tore Ellingsen ◽  
Magnus Johannesson ◽  
David G. Rand

2001 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernest S. Park ◽  
Amani El-Alayli ◽  
Norbert Kerr ◽  
Lawrence A. Messe

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Whitney ◽  
John M. Hinson ◽  
Peter J. Rosen

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Whitney ◽  
Christa A. Rinehart ◽  
John M. Hinson ◽  
Allison L. Matthews ◽  
Aaron K. Wirick

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. Monica Chien ◽  
T. Bettina Cornwell ◽  
Ravi Pappu
Keyword(s):  

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