Mine or ours? Unintended framing effects in dictator games

This paper reports results from a classroom dictator game comparing the effects of three different sets of standard instructions. The results show that seemingly small and typically unreported differences in standard instructions induce different perceptions regarding entitlement and ownership of the money to be distributed, and that these perceptions influence behaviour. Less is given when the task is described as a task of generosity and more when the task is a task of distribution (average 35 % vs. 52 %). The results can contribute to explaining the large variation in dictator game giving reported in the literature and show that even small and unreported differences in instructions change how the game is perceived. JEL codes: C70; C91; D63

A Kuhn–Tucker model for behaviour in dictator games

We consider a dictator game experiment in which dictators perform a sequence of giving tasks and taking tasks. The data are used to estimate the parameters of a Stone–Geary utility function over own-payoff and other’s payoff. The econometric model incorporates zero observations (e.g. zero-giving or zero-taking) by applying the Kuhn–Tucker theorem and treating zeros as corner solutions in the dictator’s constrained optimisation problem. The method of maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) is used for estimation. We find that selfishness is significantly lower in taking tasks than in giving tasks, and we attribute this difference to the “cold prickle of taking”.

An age-representative exploration of pro-social behavior: human generosity-offerings, expectations, and fairness

THE AIM OF THE PAPER Fairness and other-regarding preferences arguably are defining factors of the experiments conducted with dictator games, which provide an opportunity to examine the components of pro-sociality. Our analysis focuses on the experimental results suggesting that offerings and expectations are based on egalitarian behavior. Besides that, we attempted to explore the age-specific characteristics of hypothetical dictator games. METHODOLOGY We used survey data of an age-representative sample to measure how the results support previous research findings stating that generosity and its age-related aspects play a crucial role in the formation of human decisions and expectations. MOST IMPORTANT RESULTS Our results confirmed the dominance of hyper-fair behavior. However, significant differences were found across the dictator game variants in terms of the amounts of money marked. Subjects in cases of charity-offering, recipient-offering, and expectation give lower amounts on average compared to recipient-offerings and fairness, respectively. In contrast, the marked amounts are higher for recipient-offerings than for expectations with the absence of any significant age-effect. Acknowledgements: The project was financed by the European Social Fund: Comprehensive Development for Implementing Smart Specialization Strategies at the University of Pecs (EFOP-3.6.1.- 16-2016-00004). Declarations of interest: none.

If you've earned it, you deserve it: ultimatums, with Lego

The ultimatum and dictator games were developed to help identify the fundamental motivators of human behavior, typically by asking participants to share windfall endowments with other persons. In the ultimatum game, a common observation is that proposers offer, and responders refuse to accept, a much larger share of the endowment than is predicted by rational choice theory. However, in the real world, windfalls are rare: money is usually earned. I report here a small study aimed at testing how participants react to an ultimatum game after they have earned their endowments by either building a Lego model or spending some time sorting out screws by their length. I find that the shares that proposers offer and responders accept are significantly lower than that typically observed with windfall money, an observation that is intensified when the task undertaken to earn the endowment is generally less enjoyable and thus perhaps more effortful (i.e., screw sorting compared to Lego building). I suggest, therefore, that considerations of effort-based desert are often important drivers behind individual decision-making, and that laboratory experiments, if intended to inform public policy design and implementation, ought to mirror the broad characteristics of the realities that people face.

Rational Dictators in the Dictator Game Are Seen as Cold and Agentic but Not Intelligent

In Dictator Games, dictators decide how much of a given endowment to send to receivers with no further interactions. We explored the social inferences people draw about dictators from the dictators’ money amount sent and vice versa in 11 experiments ( N = 1,425): Participants rated “unfair” dictators, who sent little or no money, as more agentic, but less communal than “fair” dictators, who sent half of the endowment. Conversely, participants expected more agentic and conservative but less communal dictators to send less money than less agentic, more liberal, or more communal dictators. Participants also rated unfair dictators as less intelligent but expected less intelligent dictators to send more money. When participants played the Dictator Game with real money, only self-reported communion predicted the money amount sent. Thus, participants’ inferences might not reflect reality, but rational social actors should not only fear to appear unfair but also unintelligent.

Emotional Intelligence and Bargaining Behavior

In this experiment, we examined how trait Emotional Intelligence (EI) related tobehavior in social bargaining tasks. EI is theoretically related to both higher trait levels of empathy and better emotional regulation. More empathetic people may act more generously toward a bargaining partner. Subjects with better emotional regulation may be better at controlling their emotions in bargaining situations, which may help them make more self-interested choices. We used the Ultimatum and Dictator games to measure whether higher EI individuals behaved more generously or selfishly. These games are played between two people, where one person receives an endowment from the experimenter and decides how much to share with a recipient. The Ultimatum Game allows the recipient to reject offers, which forces the proposer to give his money back to the experimenter. In the Dictator Game, the recipient is unable to reject the proposer's offer. To maximize earnings, the most strategic thing to do in the Ultimatum Game is to make offers closer to even splits to avoid getting rejected by one's partner and to keep the whole endowment in the Dictator Game where there is no threat of retribution. Conversely, if a subject is motivated by fairness, they would make fair offers in both games. We found that subjects with higher EI acted strategically by being fair in the Ultimatum Game and selfish in the Dictator Game. These findings suggest that EI predicts more self interested behavior in bargaining situations.

People from lower social classes elicit greater prosociality: Compassion and deservingness matter

People are quick to form impressions of others’ social class, and likely adjust their behavior accordingly. If social class is linked to prosociality, as literature suggests, then an interaction partner’s class should affect prosocial behavior, especially when costs or investments are low. We test this expectation using social mindfulness (SoMi) and dictator games (DG) as complementary measures of prosociality. We manipulate target class by providing information regarding a target’s (a) position on a social class ladder, and (b) family background. Three studies using laboratory and online approaches ( Noverall = 557) in two nations (the Netherlands [NL], the UK), featuring actual and hypothetical exchanges, reveal that lower class targets are met with greater prosociality than higher class targets, even when based on information about the targets’ parents (Study 3). The effect of target class was partially mediated by compassion (Studies 2 and 3) and perceived deservingness of the target (Study 3). Implications and limitations are discussed.

Daily Prosocial Actions During the COVID-19 Pandemic Contribute to Giving Behavior in Adolescence and Young Adulthood

In the present preregistered study, we tested the impact of COVID-19 pandemic on opportunities for prosocial actions in adolescence, a formative phase for social development. 888 adolescents (10-20-years) and university students (18-25-years) completed two weeks of daily diaries on their daily prosocial support during the pandemic and Dictator Games giving directed to peers, friends and COVID-19 targets (medical doctors, COVID-19 patients, individuals with a poor immune system). Prosocial support directed to friends peaked in mid-adolescence, whereas prosocial support towards family members showed a gradual increase from childhood to young adulthood. Overall, adolescents gave more to COVID-19 targets than to peers and friends. Daily prosocial support experiences to friends predicted giving behavior to all targets, whereas prosocial support to family was specifically associated with giving to COVID-19 targets. Together, these findings elucidate the importance of prosocial experiences during the formative years of adolescence.