scholarly journals Mine or ours? Unintended framing effects in dictator games

2022 ◽  
pp. 104346312110733
Author(s):  
Andreas Bergh ◽  
Philipp C Wichardt
Keyword(s):  
Dictator Game ◽  
Framing Effects ◽  
Jel Codes ◽  
Dictator Games

This paper reports results from a classroom dictator game comparing the effects of three different sets of standard instructions. The results show that seemingly small and typically unreported differences in standard instructions induce different perceptions regarding entitlement and ownership of the money to be distributed, and that these perceptions influence behaviour. Less is given when the task is described as a task of generosity and more when the task is a task of distribution (average 35 % vs. 52 %). The results can contribute to explaining the large variation in dictator game giving reported in the literature and show that even small and unreported differences in instructions change how the game is perceived. JEL codes: C70; C91; D63

Supernatural norm enforcement: Thinking about Karma and God reduces selfishness among believers

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cindel White ◽  
John Michael Kelly ◽  
Azim Shariff ◽  
Ara Norenzayan
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Framing Effects ◽  
Demographic Variables ◽  
Exclusion Criteria ◽  
Total N ◽  
Norm Enforcement ◽  
Dictator Games ◽  
Within Subjects

Four experiments (total N = 3591) examined how thinking about Karma and God increases adherence to social norms that prescribe fairness in anonymous dictator games. We found that (1) thinking about Karma decreased selfishness among karmic believers across religious affiliations, including Hindus, Buddhists, Christians, and non-religious Americans; (2) thinking about God also decreased selfishness among believers in God (but not among non-believers), replicating previous findings; and (3) thinking about both karma and God shifted participants’ initially selfish offers towards fairness (the normatively prosocial response), but had no effect on already fair offers. These supernatural framing effects were obtained and replicated in high-powered, pre-registered experiments and remained robust to several methodological checks, including hypothesis guessing, game familiarity, demographic variables, between- and within-subjects designs, and variation in data exclusion criteria. These results support the role of culturally-elaborated beliefs about supernatural justice as a motivator of believer’s adherence to prosocial norms.

scholarly journals Learning to be selfish? A large-scale longitudinal analysis of Dictator games played on Amazon Mechanical Turk

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonio Alonso Arechar ◽  
David Gertler Rand
Keyword(s):  
Longitudinal Analysis ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Mechanical Turk ◽  
Amazon Mechanical Turk ◽  
Social Setting ◽  
Negative Effects ◽  
Dictator Games

We investigate whether experience playing the Dictator Game (DG) affects prosociality by aggregating data from 37 experiments run on Amazon Mechanical Turk over a six-year period. While prior evidence has shown a correlation between experience on Amazon Mechanical Turk and selfishness, it is unclear to what extent this is the result of selection versus learning. Examining a total of 27,266 decisions made by 17,791 unique individuals, our data shows evidence of significant negative effects of both selection and learning. First, people who participated in a greater total number of our experiments were more selfish, even in their first game – indicating that people who are more likely to select into our experiments are more selfish. Second, a given individual tends to transfer less money over successive experiments – indicating that experience with the DG leads to greater selfishness. These results provide clear evidence of learning even in this non-strategic social setting.

scholarly journals The Effect of Sense of Community Responsibility on Residents’ Altruistic Behavior: Evidence from the Dictator Game

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 460
Author(s):  
Chao Yang ◽  
Yanli Wang ◽  
Yuhui Wang ◽  
Xuemeng Zhang ◽  
Yong Liu ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Sense Of Community ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Demographic Variables ◽  
Altruistic Behavior ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Dictator Games ◽  
Significant Difference ◽  
Community Responsibility ◽  
The Rich ◽  
High Level

Understanding the new mechanism of altruistic behavior is pivotal to people’s health and social development. Despite the rich literature on altruism, this is the first study exploring the association between the sense of community responsibility (SOC-R) and altruistic behavior by repeated dictator games. Data were gathered from 95 residents (30% male; M age = 33.20 years). Demographic variables, money motivation, and SOC-R were measured. The results revealed that there was a significant positive correlation between SOC-R and altruistic behavior, and SOC-R had a positive predictive effect on residents’ altruistic behavior. With the increasing of the number of tasks assigned, the level of residents’ altruistic behavior gradually decreased. There was a significant difference in money allocation between the groups with high and low levels of SOC-R. The level of altruistic behavior in the group with a high level of SOC-R was significantly higher than that in the the group with a low level of SOC-R. Findings from the present study highlighted the potential value of strengthening residents’ SOC-R in the improvement of altruism. Implications and directions for future research were also discussed.

scholarly journals Controlling for presentation effects in choice

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 251-281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yves Breitmoser
Keyword(s):  
Simple Model ◽  
User Interfaces ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Model Testing ◽  
Comparative Statics ◽  
Economic Experiments ◽  
Dictator Games ◽  
Stochastic Errors ◽  
Out Of Sample

Experimenters make theoretically irrelevant decisions concerning user interfaces and ordering or labeling of options. Reanalyzing dictator games, I first show that such decisions may drastically affect comparative statics and cause results to appear contradictory across experiments. This obstructs model testing, preference analyses, and policy predictions. I then propose a simple model of choice incorporating both presentation effects and stochastic errors, and test the model by reanalyzing the dictator game experiments. Controlling for presentation effects, preference estimates become consistent across experiments and predictive out‐of‐sample. This highlights both the necessity and the possibility to control for presentation in economic experiments.

scholarly journals Altruistic Preferences in the Dictator Game: Replication of Andreoni and Miller (2002) in Japan

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-21
Author(s):  
Jiayi Xue ◽  
Yohsuke Ohtsubo
Keyword(s):  
Utility Maximization ◽  
Revealed Preference ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Fixed Number ◽  
Replication Studies ◽  
Dictator Games

We conducted two replication studies of Andreoni and Miller’s (2002) modified dictator game study, which revealed that participants’ altruistic decisions were consistent with the notion of utility maximization. The two studies (Study 1 with small stake sizes and Study 2 with large stake sizes) included 11 modified dictator games, in which participants allocated a fixed number of tokens between themselves and their recipient. In eight of the 11 games, each token’s value was different for each player. In Study 1 (N = 78), 85% of participants did not violate the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP) throughout the 11 games. In Study 2 (N = 58), 81% of participants did not violate GARP. These results suggest that participants’ decisions were largely consistent with utility maximization. Following Andreoni and Miller’s analysis, we classified all participants (except one anomalous case) into the Selfish, Leontief (egalitarian), and Perfect Substitutes (utilitarian) groups. The majority of participants were classified into either the Leontief or Prefect Substitutes groups (i.e., non-selfish groups).

scholarly journals Emotional Intelligence and Bargaining Behavior

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Sazhin
Keyword(s):  
Emotional Intelligence ◽  
Emotional Regulation ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Trait Emotional Intelligence ◽  
Dictator Games ◽  
Bargaining Behavior

In this experiment, we examined how trait Emotional Intelligence (EI) related tobehavior in social bargaining tasks. EI is theoretically related to both higher trait levels of empathy and better emotional regulation. More empathetic people may act more generously toward a bargaining partner. Subjects with better emotional regulation may be better at controlling their emotions in bargaining situations, which may help them make more self-interested choices. We used the Ultimatum and Dictator games to measure whether higher EI individuals behaved more generously or selfishly. These games are played between two people, where one person receives an endowment from the experimenter and decides how much to share with a recipient. The Ultimatum Game allows the recipient to reject offers, which forces the proposer to give his money back to the experimenter. In the Dictator Game, the recipient is unable to reject the proposer's offer. To maximize earnings, the most strategic thing to do in the Ultimatum Game is to make offers closer to even splits to avoid getting rejected by one's partner and to keep the whole endowment in the Dictator Game where there is no threat of retribution. Conversely, if a subject is motivated by fairness, they would make fair offers in both games. We found that subjects with higher EI acted strategically by being fair in the Ultimatum Game and selfish in the Dictator Game. These findings suggest that EI predicts more self interested behavior in bargaining situations.

Social Preferences and Fairness Norms as Informal Institutions: Experimental Evidence

2011 ◽  
Vol 101 (3) ◽  
pp. 509-513 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pamela Jakiela
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Important Determinant ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Informal Institutions ◽  
Relative Importance ◽  
Dictator Games ◽  
The Status ◽  
Rural Kenya ◽  
Fairness Norms

We conduct a series of dictator games in which the status of the dictator relative to other players varies across treatments. Experiments are conducted in a conventional university lab and in villages in rural Kenya. We find that status is an important determinant of dictator game giving, but the relative importance of earned and unearned status differs across cultures.

scholarly journals Do people care about social context? Framing effects in dictator games

2012 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 349-371 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Dreber ◽  
Tore Ellingsen ◽  
Magnus Johannesson ◽  
David G. Rand
Keyword(s):  
Social Context ◽  
Framing Effects ◽  
Dictator Games

scholarly journals A Kuhn–Tucker model for behaviour in dictator games

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter G. Moffatt ◽  
Graciela Zevallos
Keyword(s):  
Utility Function ◽  
Econometric Model ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Maximum Simulated Likelihood ◽  
Constrained Optimisation ◽  
Simulated Likelihood ◽  
Dictator Games ◽  
Corner Solutions

AbstractWe consider a dictator game experiment in which dictators perform a sequence of giving tasks and taking tasks. The data are used to estimate the parameters of a Stone–Geary utility function over own-payoff and other’s payoff. The econometric model incorporates zero observations (e.g. zero-giving or zero-taking) by applying the Kuhn–Tucker theorem and treating zeros as corner solutions in the dictator’s constrained optimisation problem. The method of maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) is used for estimation. We find that selfishness is significantly lower in taking tasks than in giving tasks, and we attribute this difference to the “cold prickle of taking”.

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