A Qualitative Characterization of Symmetric Open-Loop Nash Equilibria in Discounted Infinite Horizon Differential Games

2011 ◽  
Vol 149 (1) ◽  
pp. 151-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Ling ◽  
M. R. Caputo
Author(s):  
Xun Li ◽  
Jingtao Shi ◽  
Jiongmin Yong

This paper is concerned with two-person mean-field linear-quadratic non-zero sum stochastic differential games in an infinite horizon. Both open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibria are introduced. Existence of an open-loop Nash equilibrium is characterized by the solvability of a system of mean-field forward-backward stochastic differential equations in an infinite horizon and the convexity of the cost functionals, and the closed-loop representation of an open-loop Nash equilibrium is given through the solution to a system of two coupled non-symmetric algebraic Riccati equations. The existence of a closed-loop Nash equilibrium is  characterized by the solvability of a system of two coupled symmetric algebraic Riccati equations. Two-person mean-field linear-quadratic zero-sum stochastic differential games in an infinite time horizon are also considered. Both the existence of open-loop and closed-loop saddle points are characterized by the solvability of a system of two coupled generalized algebraic Riccati equations with static stabilizing solutions. Mean-field linear-quadratic stochastic optimal control problems in an infinite horizon are discussed as well, for which it is proved that the open-loop solvability and closed-loop solvability are equivalent.


Author(s):  
Olfa Draouil ◽  
Bernt Øksendal

We study stochastic differential games of jump diffusions, where the players have access to inside information. Our approach is based on anticipative stochastic calculus, white noise, Hida–Malliavin calculus, forward integrals and the Donsker delta functional. We obtain a characterization of Nash equilibria of such games in terms of the corresponding Hamiltonians. This is used to study applications to insider games in finance, specifically optimal insider consumption and optimal insider portfolio under model uncertainty.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
pp. 415-426
Author(s):  
Anna V. Tur ◽  
◽  
Natalya G. Magnitskaya ◽  

One class of differential games with random duration is considered. It is assumed that duration of the game is a random variable with values from a given finite interval. The game can be interrupted only on this interval. Methods of construction feedback and open-loop Nash equilibria for such games are proposed.


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