scholarly journals Presupposition, assertion, and definite descriptions

Author(s):  
Paul Elbourne

AbstractIn recent work on the semantics of definite descriptions, some theorists (Elbourne in Definite descriptions, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013; Schoubye in Noûs 47(3):496–533, 2013) have advocated broadly Fregean accounts, whereby a definite description ‘the F’ introduces a presupposition to the effect that there is exactly one F and refers to it if there is, while other theorists (Abbott, in: Gundel, Hedberg (eds) Reference: Interdisciplinary perspectives, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 61–72, 2008; Hawthorne and Manley in The reference book, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) have advocated accounts whereby ‘the F’ introduces a presupposition to the effect that there is exactly one F but otherwise has the semantics of ‘an F’, introducing existential quantification. It is argued that the latter theories, since they have definite descriptions encode assertoric content to the effect that there is an F, have difficulty accounting for the felicity of ‘The F is G’ when it is already presupposed that there is an F.

English Today ◽  
1988 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 54-57

Below are some excerpts from Indian and British English: A Handbook of Usage and Pronunciation, by Paroo Nihalani, R. K. Tongue, and Priya Hosali (Oxford University Press, India, 1979, 3rd impression 1987, pp. 260, ISBN 0 19 561864 5, Rupees 50, £3.95). Of this work, the Indian Journal of Linguistics says: ‘It is invaluable as a handy reference book and should take its place on the reference-shelf of all Indians’, while The Hindu (Madras), calls it ‘an invaluable guide to those interested in the English language’. We endorse these comments.


2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan Simonelli

AbstractIn recent work, Robert Brandom (2008. Between Saying and Doing. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2019. A Spirit of Trust. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press) has articulated important connections between the deontic normative statuses of entitlement and commitment and the alethic modal statuses of possibility and necessity. In this paper, I articulate an until now unexplored connection between Brandom’s core normative statuses of entitlement and commitment and the agentive modal statuses of ability and compulsion. These modals have application not only in action, but also in perception and inference, and, in both of these cases, there is a direct mapping between the normative statuses that one bears towards various claims, articulated from the perspective of the attributor of commitments and entitlements, and the agentive modal statuses that one bears towards various judgments, articulated from the perspective of the undertaker of commitments. I will highlight this correspondence, focusing on the case of perception, and show how it sheds light on the account of mindedness that emerges from Brandom’s theory of discursive practice.


Erkenntnis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Felix Bräuer

AbstractMany philosophers, following Williamson (The Philosophical Review 105(4): 489–523, 1996), Williamson (Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000), subscribe to the constitutive rule account of assertion (CRAA). They hold that the activity of asserting is constituted by a single constitutive rule of assertion. However, in recent work, Maitra (in: Brown & Cappelen (ed). Assertion: new philosophical essays, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011), Johnson (Acta Analytica 33(1): 51–67, 2018), and Kelp and Simion (Synthese 197(1): 125–137, 2020a), Kelp and Simion (in: Goldberg (ed) The Oxford Handbook of Assertion, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2020b) aim to show that, for all the most popular versions of the constitutive rule of assertion proposed in the literature, asserting is not an activity constituted by a single constitutive rule and that therefore CRAA is very likely false. To reach this conclusion, they all present a version of what can be dubbed the engagement condition objection. That is, they each propose a necessary condition on engaging in rule-constituted activities. Then they argue that, for all the most popular versions of the constitutive rule of assertion proposed in the literature, one can make assertions without satisfying this condition. In response, I present a counterexample that shows that the proposed engagement conditions lead to counterintuitive results, and I propose an alternative that better captures our intuitions. Then I argue that this alternative engagement condition is compatible with all the most popular versions of the constitutive rule of assertion.


2000 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-135
Author(s):  
Donald F. Reindl

This book is designed as a textbook to introduce students to language typology and language phenomena. Although not intended to be an introduction to linguistics or a reference book, the wealth of information it contains will provide interesting and rewarding reading for language professionals and students alike.


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