scholarly journals Quantum secure two-party computation for set intersection with rational players

2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (8) ◽  
Author(s):  
Arpita Maitra
2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (15) ◽  
pp. 6834
Author(s):  
Pradeepa Sampath ◽  
Nithya Shree Sridhar ◽  
Vimal Shanmuganathan ◽  
Yangsun Lee

Tuberculosis (TB) is one of the top causes of death in the world. Though TB is known as the world’s most infectious killer, it can be treated with a combination of TB drugs. Some of these drugs can be active against other infective agents, in addition to TB. We propose a framework called TREASURE (Text mining algoRithm basEd on Affinity analysis and Set intersection to find the action of tUberculosis dRugs against other pathogEns), which particularly focuses on the extraction of various drug–pathogen relationships in eight different TB drugs, namely pyrazinamide, moxifloxacin, ethambutol, isoniazid, rifampicin, linezolid, streptomycin and amikacin. More than 1500 research papers from PubMed are collected for each drug. The data collected for this purpose are first preprocessed, and various relation records are generated for each drug using affinity analysis. These records are then filtered based on the maximum co-occurrence value and set intersection property to obtain the required inferences. The inferences produced by this framework can help the medical researchers in finding cures for other bacterial diseases. Additionally, the analysis presented in this model can be utilized by the medical experts in their disease and drug experiments.


Author(s):  
Yalian Qian ◽  
Jian Shen ◽  
Pandi Vijayakumar ◽  
Pradip Kumar Sharma

Author(s):  
Liam Mulligan

Economics defines individual rationality as consumers making choices that maximize their utility in anticipation of the future consequences of these choices.  In theory, a consumer will take his or her income and allocate it towards purchases that maximize his or her utility given his or her stable of reasonably static preferences (in the short run) and estimated changes to preferences in the long run.  In order for an agent to maximize his or her utility, the agent must also maximize his or her income.   However, behavioural studies on human decisions in economic games (game theory) have shown that consumers do not always maximize their income.  Two games in particular (Ultimatum and Centipede) have demonstrated that seemingly rational players may not maximize income, whether for perceived fairness, justice, or punishment.  Practical applications of these results are observed in labour relations when striking unionized employees earn less with a labour stoppage than they would have if they had avoided losing time at work.  Specifically, a seven week strike in 2008 by CUPE Local 855 (Kawartha Lakes) is examined.  It is determined that all four job types in the City of Kawartha Lakes Children’s Services department lost income because of the strike.  Reasoning and empirical results from both the Ultimatum and Centipede games will be used to explain the Union’s decision to strike and to strike for as long as they did


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