A note on “new quantum key agreement protocols based on Bell states”

2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhengjun Cao ◽  
Olivier Markowitch
2021 ◽  
pp. 2150137
Author(s):  
Jie Tang ◽  
Lei Shi ◽  
Jiahua Wei ◽  
Yang Xue ◽  
Huicun Yu

Based on the logic Bell states, we present two novel multi-party quantum key agreement (QKA) protocols under collective noise. The proposed protocols make full use of four-qubit logic Bell states as quantum resources and perform the novel encoding operation to generate the shared key. The security analysis shows that these two protocols can resist against both participant and outsider attacks. Furthermore, compared with the other existing multi-party QKA protocols over collective noise, our protocols have higher qubit efficiency. Finally, we perform the simulation of the relationship between efficiency and security, which is completely consistent with the conclusion of the security analysis of the protocols.


2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (10) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yu-Guang Yang ◽  
Bo-Ran Li ◽  
Dan Li ◽  
Yi-Hua Zhou ◽  
Wei-Min Shi

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hussein Abulkasim ◽  
Atefeh Mashatan ◽  
Shohini Ghose

AbstractQuantum key agreement enables remote participants to fairly establish a secure shared key based on their private inputs. In the circular-type multiparty quantum key agreement mode, two or more malicious participants can collude together to steal private inputs of honest participants or to generate the final key alone. In this work, we focus on a powerful collusive attack strategy in which two or more malicious participants in particular positions, can learn sensitive information or generate the final key alone without revealing their malicious behaviour. Many of the current circular-type multiparty quantum key agreement protocols are not secure against this collusive attack strategy. As an example, we analyze the security of a recently proposed multiparty key agreement protocol to show the vulnerability of existing circular-type multiparty quantum key agreement protocols against this collusive attack. Moreover, we design a general secure multiparty key agreement model that would remove this vulnerability from such circular-type key agreement protocols and describe the necessary steps to implement this model. The proposed model is general and does not depend on the specific physical implementation of the quantum key agreement.


2019 ◽  
Vol 58 (5) ◽  
pp. 1659-1666 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hao-Nan Liu ◽  
Xiang-Qian Liang ◽  
Dong-Huan Jiang ◽  
Yong-Hua Zhang ◽  
Guang-Bao Xu

2013 ◽  
Vol 62 (17) ◽  
pp. 170304
Author(s):  
Yin Xun-Ru ◽  
Ma Wen-Ping ◽  
Shen Dong-Su ◽  
Wang Li-Li

2020 ◽  
Vol 57 (17) ◽  
pp. 172703
Author(s):  
唐杰 Tang Jie ◽  
石磊 Shi Lei ◽  
魏家华 Wei Jiahua ◽  
于惠存 Yu Huicun ◽  
武天雄 Wu Tianxiong ◽  
...  

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhiwei Sun ◽  
Rong Cheng ◽  
Chunhui Wu ◽  
Cai Zhang

AbstractFairness is an important standard needed to be considered in a secure quantum key agreement (QKA) protocol. However, it found that most of the quantum key agreement protocols in the travelling model are not fair, i.e., some of the dishonest participants can collaborate to predetermine the final key without being detected. Thus, how to construct a fair and secure key agreement protocol has obtained much attention. In this paper, a new fair multiparty QKA protocol that can resist the collusive attack is proposed. More specifically, we show that in a client-server scenario, it is possible for the clients to share a key and reveal nothing about what key has been agreed upon to the server. The server prepares quantum states for clients to encode messages to avoid the participants’ collusive attack. This construction improves on previous work, which requires either preparing multiple quantum resources by clients or two-way quantum communication. It is proven that the protocol does not reveal to any eavesdropper, including the server, what key has been agreed upon, and the dishonest participants can be prevented from collaborating to predetermine the final key.


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