The discriminatory incentives to bundle in the cable television industry

2007 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory S. Crawford
2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nodir Adilov ◽  
Peter J. Alexander ◽  
Brendan Michael Cunningham

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 256-282 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andre Boik

Local television stations are platforms in a two-sided market connecting advertisers and viewers. This paper explicitly examines the effect that important intermediaries (such as cable, telephone, and satellite distributors) may have on a platform's pricing behavior in a two-sided market. I find that stations raise their fees to cable distributors because stations prefer that viewers access their content through satellite distributors with whom they do not compete in the local advertising market, and that station mergers lower stations' fees to distributors by partially internalizing a pricing externality that results from the mandatory bundling of local content. (JEL C78, D12, G34, L11, L82, M37)


Author(s):  
Deepti Verma ◽  
Gaurav Gupta ◽  
Kamat Keshav

Pricing strategy plays a key role in most organizations. The pricing decision of bundling or à la carte in the case of cable television industry is a long debated one. While consumers seem to favor the à la carte option, operators are persistent in continuing with the bundling options. In this chapter, we explore both sides of the argument. We then discuss several factors affecting the players in the eco-system of cable television industry; these include the subscriber-operator relationship, operator-distributor relationship, and the role of government policies affecting their decisions. In concluding we use these factors to conceptualize a framework that seeks to assist the players in the cable television industry in choosing an adequate pricing model.


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