The Firm as Observer: Data Resources and Firm Longevity in Bylund’s Austrian Theory of the Firm

Author(s):  
Mark A. DeWeaver
Author(s):  
Nicolai J. Foss ◽  
Pierre Klein ◽  
Stefan Linder

Austrian economics focuses on markets but has much to say about organizations. In particular, Austrian insights on the structure of production, the heterogeneity and subjectivity of resources, the nature of uncertainty, the role of monetary calculation, and the function of the entrepreneur provide solid foundations for a distinctly Austrian theory of organizations. This chapter reviews these insights, discusses recent literature on Austrian economics and the theory of the firm, and suggests new directions for developing and extending an Austrian approach to organizations. In doing so it answers the following questions: Why, do organizations, large and small, emerge and persist? How do they avoid the problem of economic calculation faced by socialist economies? Why do organizations take the shapes they do, why do their characteristics vary over time and across industries, and why do they succeed or fail? Are most organizations stable over time, or do organizations, like markets, adapt and learn? and How do entrepreneurs arrange assets and manage individuals within organizations?


2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 357-382
Author(s):  
Aidan Walsh ◽  
Malcolm Brady

Rules and rule-following are becoming better understood as decision-making and coordination mechanisms. Further, that hierarchy is an under-appreciated element of natural spontaneous, rule-based, orders has caused confusion. The article argues firstly that the ability to meld rule-following and hierarchy in one theory of the firm presents an opportunity for a possible consistent Austrian theory of the firm. The paper then proceeds to discuss how rule-following is embedded in conventional theories of the firm and how a rule-based firm can create value in the larger spontaneous order of the extended market. The paper concludes by arguing that even though conventional views around hierarchy and the giving of orders within a firm may have a role, the conventional view may be under-privileging the role of rules, rule-following and the consequent natural emergence of hierarchy.


2010 ◽  
pp. 110-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Avdasheva ◽  
N. Dzagurova

The article examines the interpretation of vertical restraints in Chicago, post-Chicago and New Institutional Economics approaches, as well as the reflection of these approaches in the application of antitrust laws. The main difference between neoclassical and new institutional analysis of vertical restraints is that the former compares the results of their use with market organization outcomes, and assesses mainly horizontal effects, while the latter focuses on the analysis of vertical effects, comparing the results of vertical restraints application with hierarchical organization. Accordingly, the evaluation of vertical restraints impact on competition differs radically. The approach of the New Institutional Theory of the firm seems fruitful for Russian markets.


2012 ◽  
pp. 41-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Storchevoy

The paper deals with development of a general theory of the firm. It discusses the demand for such a theory, reviews existing approaches to its generalization, and offers a new variant of general theory of the firm based on the contract theory. The theory is based on minimization of opportunistic behaviour determined by the material structure of production (a classification of ten structural factors is offered). This framework is applied to the analysis of three boundaries problems (boundaries of the job, boundaries of the unit, boundaries of the firm) and five integration dilemmas (vertical, horizontal, functional, related, and conglomerate).


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