Command-and-control regulation, incentive for pollution abatement, and market structure

2020 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 159-180
Author(s):  
Ping Lin ◽  
Yu Pang
Author(s):  
Cary Coglianese ◽  
Evan Mendelson

The conventional view of regulation emphasises two opposing conditions: freedom and control. Government can either leave businesses with complete discretion to act according to their own interests, or it can impose regulations taking that discretion away by threatening sanctions aimed at bringing firms' interests into alignment with those of society, as a whole. This article focuses specifically on two alternatives to traditional, so-called command-and-control regulation: namely, meta-regulation and self-regulation. It defines these alternatives and situates their use in an overall regulatory governance toolkit. Drawing on the existing body of social science research on regulatory alternatives, this article identifies some of the strengths and weaknesses of both meta-regulation and self-regulation, and considers how these strengths and weaknesses are affected by different policy conditions.


2012 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-24
Author(s):  
K.P.V. O’Sullivan ◽  
Darragh Flannery

This paper provides the first insights into the factors that may drive the resilience of command and control regulation in modern policy making. We show how the forces of uncertainty and internal dynamics among customers, producers and regulators are the most dominate factors preventing the adoption of non-CAC regulations. Using case study evidence of internet regulation, we then integrate our analysis into the most prominent regulatory choice behavior theories and illustrate that regardless of the theory, these factors can help explain the dominance of command and control as a choice of regulation.


Author(s):  
Raphaël Gellert

Chapter 3 shows that a number of the issues that data protection has encountered and which have served as the impetus for the GDPR reform process can be understood from the regulatory viewpoint. More in particular, they amount to the traditional criticism addressed against command and control rulemaking. It is possible to argue that the command and control model of regulation is based upon two assumptions. First, enforcement is operated through sanctions or the threat thereof—what is referred to as deterrencedeterrence|, and it is assumed that such deterrence always works. Second, it is assumed that the regulatory goalsregulatory goals| (and the standards and safeguards they lead to) are somewhat unproblematic. This last set of issues is multi-dimensional insofar as it affects the determination of what counts as an adequate standard and safeguard, but it also affects the implementation in practice of these standards. Just as determining what is the behaviour that will lead to the achievement of regulators is less than obvious, so is the concrete implementation and compliance with the various rules that are meant to lead to such behaviour. This is encapsulated for instance in the data controllers’ uncertainty on how exactly to apply certain data protection provisions, or in the inefficiency of a number of mechanisms such as notification obligations. Finally, due notice should be paid to technological evolutions, which can aggravate these issues.


Risk Analysis ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 309-318 ◽  
Author(s):  
Howard C. Kunreuther ◽  
Patrick J. McNulty ◽  
Yong Kang

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