scholarly journals An ontology of weak entity realism for HPC kinds

Synthese ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Reuben Sass
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Uljana Feest ◽  
Friedrich Steinle

The authors provide an overview of philosophical discussions about the roles of experiment in science. First, they cover two approaches that took shape under the heading of “new experimentalism” in the 1980s and 1990s. One approach was primarily concerned with questions about entity realism, robustness, and epistemological strategies. The other has focused on exploratory experiments and the dynamic processes of experimental research as such, highlighting its iterative nature and drawing out the ways in which such research is grounded in experimental systems, concepts and operational definitions. Second, the authors look at more recent philosophical work on the epistemology of causal inference, in particular highlighting discussions in the philosophy of the behavioral and social sciences, concerning the extrapolation from laboratory contexts to the world.


Philosophia ◽  
1997 ◽  
Vol 25 (1-4) ◽  
pp. 481-482
Author(s):  
Howard Sankey
Keyword(s):  

Synthese ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 193 (3) ◽  
pp. 991-1006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Boaz Miller
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Bence Nanay

Abstract The concept of mental representation has long been considered to be central concept of philosophy of mind and cognitive science. But not everyone agrees. Neo-behaviorists aim to explain the mind (or some subset thereof) without positing any representations. My aim here is not to assess the merits and demerits of neo-behaviorism, but to take their challenge seriously and ask the question: What justifies the attribution of representations to an agent? Both representationalists and neo-behaviorists tend to take it for granted that the real question about representations is whether we should be realist about the theory of representationalism. This paper is an attempt to shift the emphasis from the debate concerning realism about theories to the one concerning realism about entities. My claim is that regardless of whether we are realist about representational theories of the mind, we have compelling reasons to endorse entity realism about mental representations.


Author(s):  
Mauro Dorato

In this paper I examine the problem of scientific realism from the viewpoint of the question of reality of time, and of the present moment in particular. For this purpose, I examine four different views about the reality of time, corresponding in the debate on scientific realism to theory realism, entity realism, structural realism and what we could call “weak realism” (intersubjectice agreement). I conclude that the relational character of “being present” need not entail the reducibility of mental states to physical states, but rather the necessity of considering together the objective succession of physical events perceived by our brain and the awareness of this succession made possible by our brain.


Synthese ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 196 (2) ◽  
pp. 499-517 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bence Nanay
Keyword(s):  

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