scholarly journals LA RELATIVITÀ E LA REALTÀ DEL MOMENTO PRESENTE

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mauro Dorato
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Present Moment ◽  
Entity Realism

In this paper I examine the problem of scientific realism from the viewpoint of the question of reality of time, and of the present moment in particular. For this purpose, I examine four different views about the reality of time, corresponding in the debate on scientific realism to theory realism, entity realism, structural realism and what we could call “weak realism” (intersubjectice agreement). I conclude that the relational character of “being present” need not entail the reducibility of mental states to physical states, but rather the necessity of considering together the objective succession of physical events perceived by our brain and the awareness of this succession made possible by our brain.

scholarly journals D. Dennett’s Real Patterns as a Modal Ontology: Essentialist Interpretation of Truth-Making

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 59-74
Author(s):  
Nikita V. Golovko
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Realistic Interpretation ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Modal Ontology

The paper aims to make a satisfactory realistic interpretation of the solution of the truth-making problem within the framework of D. Dennett’s real patterns conception in order to show that D. Dennett’s ontology can be interpreted in a realistic sense not only within the framework of J. Ladyman’s structural realism. As a starting point, the solution of the truth-making problem within the concept of “serious essentialism” by E. J. Lowe is considered. Our thesis is that the expansion of the D. Dennett’s conception with E. J. Lowe’s “serious essentialism” leads us to the conclusion that D. Dennett’s ontology not only receives a satisfactory realistic interpretation of the solution of the truth-making problem, but also provides an opportunity to answer properly to the definition of scientific realism given by M. Devitt.

Reconsidering Structural Realism

2003 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 517-536 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan McArthur
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Scientific Change ◽  
Empirical Content ◽  
No Miracles Argument ◽  
Critical Attention ◽  
Discontinuous Nature

In the lengthy debate over the question of scientific realism one of the least discussed positions is structural realism. However, this position ought to attract critical attention because it purports to preserve the central insights of the best arguments for both realism and anti-realism. John Worrall has in fact described it as being ‘the best of both worlds’ that recognizes the discontinuous nature of scientific change as well as the ‘no-miracles’ argument for scientific realism. However, the validity of this claim has been called into question by Stathis Psillos. He questions its ability to correctly account for the examples of scientific change that its supporters, like Worrall (following Poincaré), claim ought to be understood in a structural realist light.In this paper I examine these arguments for and against structural realism and demonstrate that neither Worrall nor Psillos is fully correct. I agree with Psillos’ claim that realism with regards to a theory ought not to be ‘all or nothing,’ that one should not always take the whole of a theory to be true or else commit only to the belief in its directly empirical content.

scholarly journals Epistemic structural realism, modality and laws of nature

2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 447
Author(s):  
Bruno Borge
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Epistemic Structural Realism ◽  
The One

According to epistemic structural realism (EER) scientific theories provide us only with knowledge about the structure of the unobservable world, but not about its nature. The most significant objection that this posi- tion has faced is the so-called Newman’s problem. In this paper I offer an alternative objection to EER. I argue that its formulation leads to undesirable skeptical positions in two fields close to scientific realism: the debates on modality and laws of nature. I also show that there is an interesting sense in which my objection is stronger than the one offered by Newman.

Miracles and Models: Why reports of the death of Structural Realism may be exaggerated

2007 ◽  
Vol 61 ◽  
pp. 125-154
Author(s):  
John Worrall
Keyword(s):  
Quantum Mechanics ◽  
General Theory ◽  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Final Section ◽  
Recent Literature ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Theory Of Relativity ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
General Theory Of Relativity ◽  
The Third

What is it reasonable to believe about our most successful scientific theories such as the general theory of relativity or quantum mechanics? That they are true, or at any rate approximately true? Or only that they successfully ‘save the phenomena’, by being ‘empirically adequate’? In earlier work I explored the attractions of a view called Structural Scientific Realism (hereafter: SSR). This holds that it is reasonable to believe that our successful theories are (approximately) structurally correct (and also that this is the strongest epistemic claim about them that it is reasonable to make). In the first part of this paper I shall explain in some detail what this thesis means and outline the reasons why it seems attractive. The second section outlines a number of criticisms that have none the less been brought against SSR in the recent (and as we shall see, in some cases, not so recent) literature; and the third and final section argues that, despite the fact that these criticisms might seem initially deeply troubling (or worse), the position remains viable.

Thomist vs. Scotist Perspectives on Ontic Structural Realism

2020 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 323-337
Author(s):  
Travis Dumsday ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Science Literature ◽  
Ontic Structural Realism ◽  
Metaphysics Of Science ◽  
Important Player ◽  
Epistemic Structural Realism

Structural realism has re-emerged as part of the debate between scientific realism and antirealism. Since then it has branched into several different versions, notably epistemic structural realism and ontic structural realism. The latter theory (which itself has now divided into competing formulations) is still an important perspective in the realism/antirealism dialectic; however, its significance has expanded well beyond that debate. Today ontic structural realism is also an important player in the metaphysics of science literature, engaging with a variety of ontological questions. One of these pertains to the basic categories of ontology, with the proponents of ontic structural realism typically advocating a radical rethinking of how to view substance and relation while calling into question the (allegedly) traditional privileging of the former over and against the latter. In this paper I assess ontic structural realism from the perspective of two major systems: Thomism and Scotism. I argue that the basic commitments of Thomism allow for some surprising convergences with ontic structural realism, while Scotism does not.

scholarly journals FROM SCIENTIFIC STRUCTURALISM TO TRANSCENDENTAL STRUCTURALISM

2016 ◽  
Vol 57 (135) ◽  
pp. 759-780
Author(s):  
Patricia Kauark-Leite ◽  
◽  
Ronaldo Penna Neves ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
The Other ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Realist Position ◽  
Epistemic Structural Realism

ABSTRACT In the current debate between scientific realism and empiricism, both sides seem to embrace some sort of structuralism as an important component of their descriptions of science. The structural realism is generally presented in two versions: one ontic and the other epistemic. It has been argued that that epistemic structural realism (ESR) is close, if not identical, to a Kantian approach. We aim to show that this is not the case, since ESR, being fundamentally a realist position, cannot be fully consistent with a transcendental approach. Such a position is better called transcendental structuralism (TS), an alternative that we believe is worth being investigated on its own. In this paper, we will take Henry Allison's interpretation of transcendental idealism as a starting point to establish the distinctions between ESR and TS.

El Nuevo Experimentalismo en España: entre Ian Hacking y Gustavo Bueno

1970 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos M. Madrid Casado
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Ian Hacking ◽  
Experimental Practice ◽  
Entity Realism ◽  
Experimental Use

ResumenEl nuevo experimentalismo todavía no es muy conocido en España. Sin embargo, este artículo propone que el filósofo español Gustavo Bueno mantiene bastantes ideas comunes con el filósofo experimentalista Ian Hacking. Ambos centran su atención sobre la propia práctica experimental. En realidad, ambos conciben la ciencia como intervención o manipulación (criterio del uso experimental) y, en consecuencia, critican el estatuto científico de la Astrofísica y la Cosmología. Finalmente, se muestra que el realismo materialista de Bueno guarda una posición paralela a la del realismo experimental de Hacking.Palabras ClaveNuevo Experimentalismo, realismo científico, realismo de entidadesAbstractThe new experimentalist movement is not widely known as yet in Spain. However this paper suggests that the spanish philosopher Gustavo Bueno has many ideas in common with the experimentalist philosopher Ian Hacking. Both focus their attention upon experimental practice itself. Actually, they conceive science as intervention or manipulation (criterion of experimental use) and therefore they criticize the scientific role of Astrophysics and Cosmology. Finally, it is shown that Bueno’s point of view of materialist realism parallels the position held by Hacking about experimental realism.KeywordsNew Experimentalism, scientific realism, entity-realism

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