scholarly journals The Logical Problem of the Trinity and the Strong Theory of Relative Identity

Sophia ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-245 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Molto
Keyword(s):  
Relative Identity ◽  
Logical Problem ◽  
The Trinity

Relative identity, singular reference, and the Incarnation: a response to Le Poidevin

2011 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTOPHER HUGHES CONN
Keyword(s):  
Formal Logic ◽  
Relative Identity ◽  
Regress Argument ◽  
Van Inwagen ◽  
Singular Reference ◽  
Direct Theory ◽  
The Trinity

AbstractIn this article I object to Le Poidevin's (2009) contention that relative identity is beset with an infinite metaphysical regress. I argue, first, that since Le Poidevin's regress argument presupposes a direct theory of reference, it does not apply to accounts of relative identity which reject this account of reference. I argue, second, that Le Poidevin's regress is not inevitable for one who accepts a direct account of reference, since it does not apply to the formal logic of relative identity which van Inwagen uses to articulate and defend the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation.

scholarly journals An episodic account of divine personhood

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
JUSTIN MOONEY
Keyword(s):  
Recent Literature ◽  
Logical Problem ◽  
New Model ◽  
The Trinity ◽  
Divine Personhood

Abstract I present Ned Markosian's episodic account of identity under a sortal, and then use it to sketch a new model of the Trinity. I show that the model can be used to solve at least three important Trinitarian puzzles: the traditional ‘logical problem of the Trinity’, a less-discussed problem that has been dubbed the ‘problem of triunity’, and a problem about the divine processions that has been enjoying increased attention in the recent literature.

scholarly journals Identical Legal Entities and the Trinity: Relative-Social Trinitarianism

2016 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 128-146
Author(s):  
James Goetz
Keyword(s):  
Numerical Identity ◽  
Relative Identity ◽  
Social Trinitarianism ◽  
The Trinity ◽  
Legal Entities

Goetz outlined legal models of identical entities that include natural persons who are identical to a coregency and natural persons who are identical to a general partnership. Those entities cohere with the formula logic of relative identity. This essay outlines the coexistence of relative identity and numerical identity in the models of identical legal entities, which is an account of impure relative identity. These models support the synthesis of Relative Trinitarianism and Social Trinitarianism, which I call Relative-Social Trinitarianism.

scholarly journals Paraphrase and the Doctrine of the Trinity

2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-194
Author(s):  
Joseph Jedwab ◽  
John A. Keller ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Logical Problem ◽  
Doctrine Of The Trinity ◽  
The Trinity ◽  
Explicit Discussion

The Doctrine of the Trinity says that there is one God, that there are three divine Persons, and that each divine Person is God. The Logical Problem of the Trinity is that these claims seem logically inconsistent. We argue that any coherent and orthodox solution to the Logical Problem must use the technique of paraphrase: a logically or metaphysically more perspicuous reformulation. If so, discussions of paraphrase deserve more prominence in the literature on the Doctrine of the Trinity. We also show that such explicit discussion has important implications for theorizing about the Trinity.

Social Trinitarianism and polytheism

2011 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-107
Author(s):  
BRANDON CAREY
Keyword(s):  
Logical Problem ◽  
Common Objection ◽  
Social Trinitarianism ◽  
The Trinity

AbstractSocial Trinitarians attempt to solve the logical problem of the Trinity by claiming that there are three numerically distinct divine persons. A common objection to this view is that it is seemingly committed to the existence of multiple Gods and is therefore polytheistic. I consider Edward Wierenga's response to this objection, as well as two other possible responses, and show that each faces serious philosophical problems. I conclude that, in the absence of a better method of distinguishing the property of being divine from that of being a God, Social Trinitarians are committed to the existence of more than one God.

scholarly journals The Doctrine of the Trinity and the Logic of Relative Identity

1989 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-152 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Cain
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Relative Identity ◽  
Doctrine Of The Trinity ◽  
The Trinity ◽  
Father And Son

The doctrine of the Trinity says that there is just one God and three distinct divine persons, each of whom is God. This would seem to imply that there are three divine persons, each a different person the other persons but the same God as the other persons. If we accept what I believe is the most popular account of identity current among logicians then we must hold that this apparent consequence is contradictory. We see this as follows (it will suffice to consider just the relation of Father and Son): logicians generally treat relativized identity expressions of the form ‘is the same A as’ (here ‘A’ stands in for a term which relativizes the identity) as being analysable in terms of absolute (or unrelativized) identity according to the following equivalence schema, (E):(E) a is the same A as b if and only if a is identical to b and a is an A and b is an A.The view under consideration affirms the following three sentences:(1) The Father and the Son are persons.(2) The Father is not the same person as the Son.(3) The Father is the same God as the Son.

Relative Identity and the Doctrine of the Trinity

2020 ◽  
pp. 185-200
Author(s):  
Michael C. Rea
Keyword(s):  
Holy Spirit ◽  
Philosophical Problem ◽  
The Other ◽  
Relative Identity ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Doctrine Of The Trinity ◽  
The One ◽  
The Trinity

The doctrine of the Trinity maintains that there are exactly three divine Persons (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit) but only one God. The philosophical problem raised by this doctrine is well known. On the one hand, the doctrine seems clearly to imply that the divine Persons are numerically distinct. How else could they be ‘three’ rather than one? On the other hand, it seems to imply that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are identical. If each Person is divine, how else could there be exactly ‘one’ God? But the divine Persons can’t be both distinct and identical. Thus, the doctrine appears to be incoherent. Some try to solve this problem by appeal to the view that identity is sortal-relative. This chapter argues that this strategy is unsuccessful as a stand-alone solution to the problem of the Trinity.

Relative Identity and the Doctrine of the Trinity

2003 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 431-445 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael C. Rea ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Relative Identity ◽  
Doctrine Of The Trinity ◽  
The Trinity
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