La coherencia de la doctrina trinitaria desde la noción de función de Gottlob Frege

En este artículo se pretende mostrar la coherencia de los enunciados sobre el Dios uno y trino en la teología analítica, a partir de su formulación en el llamado credo atanasiano. Se ofrece un panorama crítico sobre la discusión acerca de la inteligibilidad del misterio de la Trinidad en la teología filosófica analítica reciente, así como las diversas soluciones en algunos de sus más destacados representantes: la del trinitarianismo social (William Hasker), la del trinitarianismo latino (Brian Leftow) y la identidad relativa aplicada a la teoría trinitaria (Peter van Inwagen). Para superar las dificultades que tienen estas posiciones, derivadas, sobre todo, de su problemática noción de persona, se presenta una contribución a esta discusión con un novedoso análisis de la Trinidad, basado en la noción de función de Gottlob Frege. Con este análisis se explica por qué no hay contradicción entre los enunciados trinitarios, y así se justifica la consistencia y, en consecuencia, la coherencia de la doctrina trinitaria. Abstract: This article aims to show the coherence of the statements about the one and triune God in analytic theology, starting from their formulation in the so-called Athanasian Creed. It offers a critical overview of the discussion about the intelligibility of the mystery of the Trinity in recent analytic philosophical theology, as well as the various solutions in some of its most prominent representatives: the social trinitarianism (William Hasker), the Latin trinitarianism (Brian Leftow) and the relative identity applied to trinitarian theory (Peter van Inwagen). In order to overcome the difficulties with these positions, derived, above all, from their problematic notion of personhood, a contribution to this discussion is presented with a novel analysis of the Trinity, based on Gottlob Frege's notion of function. This analysis explains why there is no contradiction between trinitarian statements, and thus justifies the consistency and, consequently, the coherence of trinitarian doctrine.

The Trinity: Prototype of Real Existence or Danger to Political Wellbeing? Tanner, Volf, and Yannaras in Conversation

Kathryn Tanner maintains that political theologies based on the Trinity are not only unsound, but potentially dangerous. Her primary concern is that the Trinity, by definition, cannot serve as a “model” for human socio-political organization. Miroslav Volf, while sharing Tanner’s sense that Trinitarian political theologies are fraught, nevertheless, maintains that the Trinity can serve as a “vision” for human socio-political relations, albeit not as a “program”. This article brings Tanner and Volf into conversation with Eastern Orthodox philosopher-theologian Christos Yannaras, whose Trinitarian political theology regards the Trinity as the “prototype” or “archetype” of a mode of existence in which humans can participate by transcending their natures, with the aim of realizing truth. This article argues that Yannaras offers a novel way of conceptualizing Trinitarian political theology which escapes Tanner and Volf’s criticisms, on the one hand, and offers Social Trinitarianism a fresh and fertile perspective that could advance its discourse.

The Communion of the Son with the Father

Chapter 5 proceeds by way of engagement with Keith Ward’s recent argument against any theology that would posit eternal love between the divine persons. What can we say about the relationship of the eternal Son to his Father? Is love shared between the divine persons? Or would that entail polytheism? The prayer of Jesus in John 17 would seem to be relevant to this question, and the interpretation of that prayer is central to this chapter. The chapter first clarifies some aspects of the recent debates over “Social Trinitarianism.” With this background in mind, it then turns to an analysis of Ward’s intriguing proposal, and offers a counter proposal that is grounded in an interpretation of Johannine theology.

Polytheism and Christian Belief

Christian philosophers and theologians have long been concerned with the question of how to reconcile their belief in three fully divine Persons with their commitment to monotheism. The most popular strategy for doing this—the social trinitarian strategy—argues that, though the divine Persons are in no sense the same God, monotheism is secured by certain relations that obtain among them. It is argued that if the social trinitarian understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity is correct, then Christianity is not interestingly different from the polytheistic Amun-Re theology of Egypt’s New Kingdom period. Thus, social trinitarianism should be classified as a version of polytheism rather than monotheism.

Wolfhart Pannenberg’s Postfoundational Ecclesiology

This article interprets Wolfhart Pannenberg’s ecclesiology through a postfoundational framework. Pannenberg’s postfoundational theological methodology, based around the centrality of sub ratione Dei, is a dialectical relationship between the ‘from below’ movement of context (‘true infinite’) and the ‘from above’ movement of universal truth (Trinity) which reflects the differentiation-in-unity found in the immanent and economic Trinity. Accordingly, this article argues, Pannenberg’s ecclesiology, including his understanding of church essence (its role in creation and its constitutive members) and its activities (baptism, Eucharist, ministry) displays postfoundational relations between the particular and the universal bridging the divide between the secular and the sacred, the past, present, and future, and individual and community. In the discussion, concepts such as Christ’s ‘person,’ ‘transignification,’ Christocentric election, and social trinitarianism are used to move the discussion past modern dualism and postmodern relativism and toward postfoundational relationality.

Wolfhart Pannenberg’s Postfoundational Ecclesiology

This article interprets Wolfhart Pannenberg’s ecclesiology through a postfoundational framework. Pannenberg’s postfoundational theological methodology, based around the centrality of sub ratione Dei, is a dialectical relationship between the ‘from below’ movement of context (‘true infinite’) and the ‘from above’ movement of universal truth (Trinity) which reflects the differentiation-in-unity found in the immanent and economic Trinity. Accordingly, this article argues, Pannenberg’s ecclesiology, including his understanding of church essence (its role in creation and its constitutive members) and its activities (baptism, Eucharist, ministry) displays postfoundational relations between the particular and the universal bridging the divide between the secular and the sacred, the past, present, and future, and individual and community. In the discussion, concepts such as Christ’s ‘person,’ ‘transignification,’ Christocentric election, and social trinitarianism are used to move the discussion past modern dualism and postmodern relativism and toward postfoundational relationality.

Molinism and the Person-Will Paradigm

The traditional Molinist scheme implies that God is one center of consciousness, knowledge, and will. The person-will paradigm, however, claims there are three centers of consciousness, knowledge, and will in the Godhead. I argue that the Molinist ought to reject the person-will paradigm, and thus reject both monothelitism and social trinitarianism. I begin by presenting standard accounts of Molinism, monothelitism, and social trinitarianism. Then I consider three approaches to reconciling Molinism and the person-will paradigm. I show that each approach is fraught with difficulties.

Social Trinitarianism and the tripartite God

In this article, I consider the most prominent contemporary attempts to reconcile Social Trinitarianism (ST) with monotheism, arguing that within ST, only mereological (part/whole) accounts can ultimately preserve monotheism. A corollary of this is that every other condition (or set of conditions) adduced in defense of a monotheistic ST really entails tritheism, that is, until a part/whole condition is deployed. Such models, I contend, fail necessarily insofar as they attempt to solve a puzzle that is wholly quantitative in nature with purely qualitative considerations. I conclude by remarking that the Social Trinity model propounded by William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland succeeds where the others fail, though this model is itself by no means impervious to weighty objections.