Relative Identity and the Doctrine of the Trinity

Author(s):  
Michael C. Rea
1989 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-152 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Cain

The doctrine of the Trinity says that there is just one God and three distinct divine persons, each of whom is God. This would seem to imply that there are three divine persons, each a different person the other persons but the same God as the other persons. If we accept what I believe is the most popular account of identity current among logicians then we must hold that this apparent consequence is contradictory. We see this as follows (it will suffice to consider just the relation of Father and Son): logicians generally treat relativized identity expressions of the form ‘is the same A as’ (here ‘A’ stands in for a term which relativizes the identity) as being analysable in terms of absolute (or unrelativized) identity according to the following equivalence schema, (E):(E) a is the same A as b if and only if a is identical to b and a is an A and b is an A.The view under consideration affirms the following three sentences:(1) The Father and the Son are persons.(2) The Father is not the same person as the Son.(3) The Father is the same God as the Son.


2020 ◽  
pp. 185-200
Author(s):  
Michael C. Rea

The doctrine of the Trinity maintains that there are exactly three divine Persons (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit) but only one God. The philosophical problem raised by this doctrine is well known. On the one hand, the doctrine seems clearly to imply that the divine Persons are numerically distinct. How else could they be ‘three’ rather than one? On the other hand, it seems to imply that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are identical. If each Person is divine, how else could there be exactly ‘one’ God? But the divine Persons can’t be both distinct and identical. Thus, the doctrine appears to be incoherent. Some try to solve this problem by appeal to the view that identity is sortal-relative. This chapter argues that this strategy is unsuccessful as a stand-alone solution to the problem of the Trinity.


2003 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 431-445 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael C. Rea ◽  

2016 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 435-449
Author(s):  
H. E. BABER

AbstractI defend a relative identity solution to the identity puzzle posed by the doctrine of the Trinity. It has been argued that relative identity theories which admit absolute identity, such as the account proposed here, do not succeed in saving the doctrine of the Trinity from logical incoherence. I show that this argument fails. Relative identity theories that admit absolute identity are logically conservative, metaphysically innocent, and unproblematic. And, given the account I propose we can, without incurring any logical or metaphysical costs, hold that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are the same being but not the same trinitarian person.


1991 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 195-206
Author(s):  
Piet SCHOONENBERG

Author(s):  
Michael C. Rea

This book is the first of two volumes collecting together the most substantial work in analytic theology that I have done between 2003 and 2018. The essays in this volume focus on the nature of God, whereas the essays in the companion volume focus on humanity and the human condition. The essays in the first part of this volume deal with issues in the philosophy of theology having to do with discourse about God and the authority of scripture; the essays in the second part focus on divine attributes; and the essays in the third part discuss the doctrine of the trinity and related issues. The book includes one new essay, another essay that was previously published only in German translation, and new postscripts to two of the essays.


Author(s):  
Katrin König

SummaryChristian theologians can explain the Trinitarian faith today in dialogue with Islamic thinkers as “deepened monotheism”. Therefore it is important to widen the systematic-theological discourse in an ecumenical and transcultural perspective and to retrieve resources from Western and non-Western traditions of Trinitarian thought (I).In this paper I will first work out historically that the Trinitarian creed of Nicea and Constantinople was originally an ecumenical but non-Western creed (II). Afterwards, I investigate the philosophical-theological reflection on the Trinity by Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109) in the context of early interreligious encounters in the Latin West. Based on biblical, augustinian and Greek sources, he developed an approach to understand the mystery of the Trinity by rational arguments as “deepened monotheism” (III). Then I will proceed to explore the philosophical-theological dialogues on the Trinity from the Arabic philosopher and Syrian-orthodox theologian Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī (893–974). Much earlier he developed rational arguments for the Triunity of God with reference to Aristotle. Thereby he answers to anti-trinitarian arguments from Islamic thinkers like al-Kindī and al-Warrāq. He intends that the Trinitarian faith of Christian minorities can thereby be understood and tolerated by Islamic thinkers as rationally founded “deepened monotheism” (IV).In the end I will evaluate what these classics from the Western and non-western traditions of Trinitarian thought contribute to explicate the doctrine of the Trinity today in a pluralistic religious context as “deepened monotheism” (V).


2011 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTOPHER HUGHES CONN

AbstractIn this article I object to Le Poidevin's (2009) contention that relative identity is beset with an infinite metaphysical regress. I argue, first, that since Le Poidevin's regress argument presupposes a direct theory of reference, it does not apply to accounts of relative identity which reject this account of reference. I argue, second, that Le Poidevin's regress is not inevitable for one who accepts a direct account of reference, since it does not apply to the formal logic of relative identity which van Inwagen uses to articulate and defend the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation.


Augustinianum ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 189-207
Author(s):  
Carlo dell’Osso ◽  

The Tritheism of the sixth century has not been widely studied. John Philoponus, the greatest exponent of the theory, developed the idea by applying Aristotelian realism to the doctrine of the Trinity and concluded that in the Trinity there are three hypostases and three natures, whence comes the name for those who hold this position: “Tri-theists,” since they divide the one nature and substance of God into three. This article sheds light on the earliest stage of the development of Tritheism beginning in the year 557, when we can date the first appearance of John Askotzanges in the sources, and goes up until the first Syndocticon, the agreement reached between the Tritheists and the Theodosians at Constantinople in the beginning of the year 567. After the death of Theodosius in 566, Tritheism no longer remained merely a local reality in Constantinople but spilled over the confines of the Imperial capital and spread throughout the East, especially in Egypt.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document