Divine Attributes as a Topic in Analytic Theology

Analytic theology differs from other forms of theology primarily in its methodology: its ambitions, its style, its conversation partners, and so on. This is where the most interesting differences between analytic philosophical discussions of the divine attributes and contemporary theological discussions of that topic are to be found. The main positive thesis of this chapter is that the most distinctive features of the approach to divine attributes that one finds in the analytic philosophical literature are simply instances of more general distinctives of analytic theology. The chapter focuses on some of the distinguishing features of the way in which the topic of divine attributes is approached in analytic philosophy of religion as contrasted with the way(s) in which many contemporary theologians are inclined to approach it. The end result is a clearer picture both of the nature of analytic theology in general and of the distinctive character of an analytic approach to the topic of divine attributes.

Theology without Idolatry or Violence

In Theology without Metaphysics, Kevin Hector offers a broadly Wittgensteinian theory about the nature and deployment of human concepts and predicates with the goal of showing how both can be applied to God in a non-metaphysical way. In this way, he hopes to show that cataphatic theology is not inherently metaphysical, and that one can therefore engage in it without falling into idolatry or violence. After brief clarification of the ‘idolatry’ and ‘violence’ objections against metaphysics, followed by an explanation of the way in which Hector’s proposal is supposed to provide a non-metaphysical way of doing substantive, cataphatic theology, this chapter identifies five difficulties that beset Hector’s view.

Polytheism and Christian Belief

Christian philosophers and theologians have long been concerned with the question of how to reconcile their belief in three fully divine Persons with their commitment to monotheism. The most popular strategy for doing this—the social trinitarian strategy—argues that, though the divine Persons are in no sense the same God, monotheism is secured by certain relations that obtain among them. It is argued that if the social trinitarian understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity is correct, then Christianity is not interestingly different from the polytheistic Amun-Re theology of Egypt’s New Kingdom period. Thus, social trinitarianism should be classified as a version of polytheism rather than monotheism.

The Trinity

The Christian doctrine of the Trinity poses a serious philosophical problem. On the one hand, it seems to imply that there is exactly one divine being; on the other hand, it seems to imply that there are three. There is another well-known philosophical problem that presents us with a similar sort of tension: the problem of material constitution. After an examination of two classificatory schemes (the Latin tradition which traces its historical roots through the western church. and the Greek tradition which traces its roots through the eastern church) this chapter argues that a relatively neglected solution to the problem of material constitution can be developed into a novel solution to the problem of the Trinity.

God beyond Being

Theologians divide as to how best to understand God’s transcendence. Famously, towards the end of his Mystical Theology, Pseudo-Dionysius characterized God’s transcendence by saying that God is ‘beyond every denial, beyond every assertion’ and that God ‘lies beyond thought and beyond being’. Many in his wake have followed him in these affirmations. Contemporary analytic philosophers commonly dismiss such claims as unintelligible or inconsistent with basic doctrines of Christianity (e.g. that God exists, is personal, became incarnate). But they are so deeply entrenched in the tradition that it seems a worthwhile effort to try to do them justice. This chapter develops an intelligible account of divine transcendence that accommodates the language of beyondness while at the same time remaining consistent with the truth of central Christian doctrines.

Gender as a Divine Attribute

It is standard within the Christian tradition to characterize God in predominantly masculine terms. Let ‘traditionalism’ refer to the view that this pattern of characterization is theologically mandatory. This chapter seeks to undercut the main motivations for traditionalism by showing that it is not more accurate to characterize God as masculine rather than feminine (or vice versa). The novelty of the argument lies in the fact that it presupposes neither theological anti-realism nor a robust doctrine of divine transcendence, but instead rests heavy theoretical weight on the imago Dei doctrine and the method of perfect-being theology. The chapter closes by examining the implications of its main argument for the moral and liturgical propriety of characterizing God in predominantly masculine terms.

Introduction

This chapter introduces the volume. The chapters in the first part of the volume deal with metatheological issues pertaining to discourse about God and the authority of scripture; the chapters in the second part focus on divine attributes; and the chapters in the third part discuss the doctrine of the trinity and related issues. The section headings of this introduction match the part divisions of the book, but it is not the aim here to summarize the chapters included in each section’s corresponding part. Instead, this introduction aims to supplement those papers with a more general discussion of some of the author’s past and current thinking on the various loci covered by the chapters in the volume.

Relative Identity and the Doctrine of the Trinity

The doctrine of the Trinity maintains that there are exactly three divine Persons (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit) but only one God. The philosophical problem raised by this doctrine is well known. On the one hand, the doctrine seems clearly to imply that the divine Persons are numerically distinct. How else could they be ‘three’ rather than one? On the other hand, it seems to imply that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are identical. If each Person is divine, how else could there be exactly ‘one’ God? But the divine Persons can’t be both distinct and identical. Thus, the doctrine appears to be incoherent. Some try to solve this problem by appeal to the view that identity is sortal-relative. This chapter argues that this strategy is unsuccessful as a stand-alone solution to the problem of the Trinity.

Realism in Theology and Metaphysics

Since the early 2000s, increasing attention has been paid in two separate disciplines to questions about realism and ontological commitment. The disciplines are analytic metaphysics on the one hand, and theology on the other. Chapter 1 discusses two arguments for the conclusion that realism in theology and metaphysics—that is, a realist treatment of doctrines in theology and metaphysics—is untenable. The first is due to Peter Byrne, the second to Bas van Fraassen. The chapter concludes that practitioners of metaphysics and theology ought simply to ignore this conclusion. Those who are already sceptical of theology or metaphysics or both will find in the objections plenty to agree with. But they should not convince the unconvinced.

Material Constitution and the Trinity [with Jeffrey Brower]

The Christian doctrine of the Trinity poses a serious philosophical problem. On the one hand, it seems to imply that there is exactly one divine being. On the other hand, it seems to imply that there are three divine beings. There is another well-known philosophical problem that presents us with a similar sort of tension: the problem of material constitution. This chapter argues that a relatively neglected solution to the problem of material constitution—an appeal to the Aristotelian doctrine of numerical sameness without identity—can be developed into a novel solution to the problem of the Trinity.