Bribes, market power and access to credit: evidence from cross-country firm-level data

Author(s):  
Le Thanh Ha ◽  
Dao Hanh Le ◽  
Nguyen Ngoc Mai
2021 ◽  
Vol 69 ◽  
pp. 585-612
Author(s):  
Le Thanh Ha ◽  
To Trung Thanh ◽  
Doan Ngoc Thang ◽  
Pham Thi Hoang Anh

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 251-265
Author(s):  
Timothy Besley ◽  
Nicola Fontana ◽  
Nicola Limodio

Firms in tradable sectors are more likely to be subject to external competition to limit market power, while nontradable firms are more dependent on domestic policies and institutions. This paper combines an antitrust index available for multiple countries with firm-level data from Orbis covering more than 12 million firms from 94 countries, including 20 sectors over 10 years and finds that profit margins of firms operating in nontradable sectors are significantly lower in countries with stronger antitrust policies compared to firms operating in tradable sectors. The results are robust to a wide variety of empirical specifications. (JEL D22, E02, L44)


2020 ◽  
Vol 69 ◽  
pp. 75-92
Author(s):  
Ngoc Thang Doan ◽  
Thi Kim Chi Vu ◽  
Thi Cam Thuy Nguyen ◽  
Thi Hong Hai Nguyen ◽  
Kieu Trang Nguyen

Econometrica ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 88 (5) ◽  
pp. 2037-2073 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Peters

Markups vary systematically across firms and are a source of misallocation. This paper develops a tractable model of firm dynamics where firms' market power is endogenous and the distribution of markups emerges as an equilibrium outcome. Monopoly power is the result of a process of forward‐looking, risky accumulation: firms invest in productivity growth to increase markups in their existing products but are stochastically replaced by more efficient competitors. Creative destruction therefore has pro‐competitive effects because faster churn gives firms less time to accumulate market power. In an application to firm‐level data from Indonesia, the model predicts that, relative to the United States, misallocation is more severe and firms are substantially smaller. To explain these patterns, the model suggests an important role for frictions that prevent existing firms from entering new markets. Differences in entry costs for new firms are less important.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document