D-WASPAS: Addressing Social Cognition in Uncertain Decision-Making with an Application to a Sustainable Project Portfolio Problem

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 619-641 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vahid Mohagheghi ◽  
S. Meysam Mousavi
2012 ◽  
Vol 27 ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
A. Castelnovo ◽  
R. Ranieri ◽  
M. Marcatili ◽  
S. Scarone

2018 ◽  
Vol 87 ◽  
pp. 171-178 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katja Koelkebeck ◽  
Lisa Kuegler ◽  
Waldemar Kohl ◽  
Alva Engell ◽  
Rebekka Lencer

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Bang ◽  
Rani Moran ◽  
Nathaniel Douglass Daw ◽  
Stephen M Fleming

Computing confidence in one's own and others' decisions is crucial for success in many social situations. There has been substantial progress in our understanding of confidence in oneself, but little is known about how we form confidence in others. Here, we address this question by asking subjects undergoing fMRI to place bets on perceptual decisions made by themselves or one of three other players of varying ability. We show that subjects' compute confidence in another player's decisions by combining distinct estimates of player ability and decision difficulty - allowing them to predict that a good player may get a difficult decision wrong and that a bad player may get an easy decision right. We find that this computation is supported by an interaction between brain systems traditionally implicated in decision-making (LIP) and theory of mind (TPJ, dmPFC). These results reveal a neurocomputational interplay between self- and other-related processes during social cognition.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Arioli ◽  
Chiara Crespi ◽  
Nicola Canessa

Social cognition refers to a set of processes, ranging from perception to decision-making, underlying the ability to decode others’ intentions and behaviors to plan actions fitting with social and moral, besides individual and economic considerations. Its centrality in everyday life reflects the neural complexity of social processing and the ubiquity of social cognitive deficits in different pathological conditions. Social cognitive processes can be clustered in three domains associated with (a) perceptual processing of social information such as faces and emotional expressions (social perception), (b) grasping others’ cognitive or affective states (social understanding), and (c) planning behaviors taking into consideration others’, in addition to one’s own, goals (social decision-making). We review these domains from the lens of cognitive neuroscience, i.e., in terms of the brain areas mediating the role of such processes in the ability to make sense of others’ behavior and plan socially appropriate actions. The increasing evidence on the “social brain” obtained from healthy young individuals nowadays constitutes the baseline for detecting changes in social cognitive skills associated with physiological aging or pathological conditions. In the latter case, impairments in one or more of the abovementioned domains represent a prominent concern, or even a core facet, of neurological (e.g., acquired brain injury or neurodegenerative diseases), psychiatric (e.g., schizophrenia), and developmental (e.g., autism) disorders. To pave the way for the other papers of this issue, addressing the social cognitive deficits associated with severe acquired brain injury, we will briefly discuss the available evidence on the status of social cognition in normal aging and its breakdown in neurodegenerative disorders. Although the assessment and treatment of such impairments is a relatively novel sector in neurorehabilitation, the evidence summarized here strongly suggests that the development of remediation procedures for social cognitive skills will represent a future field of translational research in clinical neuroscience.


2020 ◽  
pp. 194855062094431
Author(s):  
Mathew S. Isaac ◽  
Katie Spangenberg

This research documents a perfection premium in evaluative judgments wherein individuals disproportionately reward perfection on an attribute compared to near-perfect values on the same attribute. For example, individuals consider a student who earns a perfect score of 36 on the American College Test to be more intelligent than a student who earns a near-perfect 35, and this difference in perceived intelligence is significantly greater than the difference between students whose scores are 35 versus 34. The authors also show that the perfection premium occurs because people spontaneously place perfect items into a separate mental category than other items. As a result of this categorization process, the perceived evaluative distance between perfect and near-perfect items is exaggerated. Four experiments provide evidence in favor of the perfection premium and support for the proposed underlying mechanism in both social cognition and decision-making contexts.


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