Kidney exchange programs with altruistic donors increase health value

2021 ◽  
Vol 888 (1) ◽  
pp. 16-16
Keyword(s):  
Exchange Programs ◽  
Health Value ◽  
Kidney Exchange

The Mathematics behind Lifesaving Kidney Exchange Programs

Math Horizons ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-29
Author(s):  
Olivia M. Carducci
Keyword(s):  
Exchange Programs ◽  
Kidney Exchange

Kidney Exchange Programs in Europe (COST-ENCKEP); What Can We Learn from Each Other?

2018 ◽  
Vol 102 ◽  
pp. S508
Author(s):  
Bernadette J.J.M. Haase-Kromwijk ◽  
Aline Hemke ◽  
Peter Biró ◽  
Lisa Burnapp ◽  
Rachel Johnson ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Exchange Programs ◽  
Kidney Exchange

Maximizing expected number of transplants in kidney exchange programs

2016 ◽  
Vol 52 ◽  
pp. 269-276 ◽  
Author(s):  
Filipe Alvelos ◽  
Xenia Klimentova ◽  
Abdur Rais ◽  
Ana Viana
Keyword(s):  
Expected Number ◽  
Exchange Programs ◽  
Kidney Exchange

scholarly journals Pairwise Kidney Exchange over the Blood Group Barrier

2019 ◽  
Vol 87 (3) ◽  
pp. 1091-1133 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tommy Andersson ◽  
Jörgen Kratz
Keyword(s):  
Kidney Transplant ◽  
Blood Group ◽  
Medical Technology ◽  
Immunosuppressive Treatment ◽  
Preference Domain ◽  
Exchange Programs ◽  
Kidney Exchange ◽  
Patient Groups ◽  
To Receive ◽  
Positive Effect

Abstract Advances in medical technology have made kidney transplants over the blood group barrier feasible. This article investigates how such technology should be implemented when designing pairwise kidney exchange programs. The possibility to receive a kidney transplant from a blood group incompatible donor motivates an extension of the preference domain, allowing patients to distinguish between compatible donors and half-compatible donors (i.e. blood group incompatible donors that only become compatible after undergoing an immunosuppressive treatment). It is demonstrated that the number of transplants can be substantially increased by providing an incentive for patients with half-compatible donors to participate in kidney exchange programs. The results also suggest that the technology is beneficial for patient groups that are traditionally disadvantaged in kidney exchange programs (e.g. blood group O patients). The positive effect of allowing transplants over the blood group barrier is larger than the corresponding effects of including altruistic patient–donor pairs or of allowing three-way exchanges in addition to pairwise exchanges.

scholarly journals MAXIMUM WEIGHT CYCLE PACKING IN DIRECTED GRAPHS, WITH APPLICATION TO KIDNEY EXCHANGE PROGRAMS

2009 ◽  
Vol 01 (04) ◽  
pp. 499-517 ◽  
Author(s):  
PÉTER BIRÓ ◽  
DAVID F. MANLOVE ◽  
ROMEO RIZZI
Keyword(s):  
Directed Graphs ◽  
Exact Algorithm ◽  
Maximum Size ◽  
Practical Experience ◽  
Optimal Solutions ◽  
Maximum Weight ◽  
Packing Problems ◽  
Exchange Programs ◽  
Kidney Exchange ◽  
Cycle Packing

Centralized matching programs have been established in several countries to organize kidney exchanges between incompatible patient-donor pairs. At the heart of these programs are algorithms to solve kidney exchange problems, which can be modelled as cycle packing problems in a directed graph, involving cycles of length 2, 3, or even longer. Usually, the goal is to maximize the number of transplants, but sometimes the total benefit is maximized by considering the differences between suitable kidneys. These problems correspond to computing cycle packings of maximum size or maximum weight in directed graphs. Here we prove the APX-completeness of the problem of finding a maximum size exchange involving only 2-cycles and 3-cycles. We also present an approximation algorithm and an exact algorithm for the problem of finding a maximum weight exchange involving cycles of bounded length. The exact algorithm has been used to provide optimal solutions to real kidney exchange problems arising from the National Matching Scheme for Paired Donation run by NHS Blood and Transplant, and we describe practical experience based on this collaboration.

scholarly journals Recourse in Kidney Exchange Programs

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bart Smeulders ◽  
Valentin Bartier ◽  
Yves Crama ◽  
Frits C. R. Spieksma
Keyword(s):  
Integer Programming ◽  
Programming Problem ◽  
Cycle Length ◽  
Stochastic Integer Programming ◽  
Integer Programming Problem ◽  
Expected Number ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Exchange Programs ◽  
Kidney Exchange ◽  
Algorithmic Approaches

We introduce the problem of selecting patient-donor pairs in a kidney exchange program to undergo a crossmatch test, and we model this selection problem as a two-stage stochastic integer programming problem. The optimal solutions of this new formulation yield a larger expected number of realized transplants than previous approaches based on internal recourse or subset recourse. We settle the computational complexity of the selection problem by showing that it remains NP-hard even for maximum cycle length equal to two. Furthermore, we investigate to what extent different algorithmic approaches, including one based on Benders decomposition, are able to solve instances of the model. We empirically investigate the computational efficiency of this approach by solving randomly generated instances and study the corresponding running times as a function of maximum cycle length, and of the presence of nondirected donors. Summary of Contribution: This paper deals with an important and very complex issue linked to the optimization of transplant matchings in kidney exchange programs, namely, the inherent uncertainty in the assessment of compatibility between donors and recipients of transplants. Although this issue has previously received some attention in the optimization literature, most attempts to date have focused on applying recourse to solutions selected within restricted spaces. The present paper explicitly formulates the maximization of the expected number of transplants as a two-stage stochastic integer programming problem. The formulation turns out to be computationally difficulty, both from a theoretical and from a numerical perspective. Different algorithmic approaches are proposed and tested experimentally for its solution. The quality of the kidney exchanges produced by these algorithms compares favorably with that of earlier models.

Matching Kidneys with Priority in Kidney Exchange Programs

2019 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 336-346
Author(s):  
Wenhao Liu ◽  
Marc L. Melcher
Keyword(s):  
Monte Carlo Simulation ◽  
Monte Carlo ◽  
Waiting Time ◽  
Integer Program ◽  
Accurate Assessment ◽  
Global Knowledge ◽  
Exchange Programs ◽  
Kidney Exchange ◽  
Hazard Ratios ◽  
Fine Tune

Kidney exchanges were developed to match kidney failure patients with willing but incompatible donors to other donor-patient pairs. Finding a match in a large candidate pool can be modeled as an integer program. However, these exchanges accumulate participants with characteristics that increase the difficulty of finding a match and, therefore, increase patients’ waiting time. Therefore, we sought to fine-tune the formulation of the integer program by more accurately assigning priorities to patients based on their difficulty of matching. We provide a detailed formulation of prioritized kidney exchange and propose a novel prioritization algorithm. Our approach takes advantage of the global knowledge of the donor-patient compatibility within a pool of pairs and calculates an iterative, paired match power (iPMP) to represent the donor-patient pairs’ abilities to match. Monte Carlo simulation shows that an algorithm using the iPMP reduces the waiting time more than using paired match power (PMP) for the difficult-to-match pairs with hazard ratios of 1.3480 and 1.1100, respectively. Thus, the iPMP may be a more accurate assessment of the difficulty of matching a pair in a pool than PMP is, and its use may improve matching algorithms being used to match donors and recipients.

scholarly journals Ethical Considerations for Participation of Nondirected Living Donors in Kidney Exchange Programs

2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (6) ◽  
pp. 1460-1467 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. S. Woodle ◽  
J. A. Daller ◽  
M. Aeder ◽  
R. Shapiro ◽  
T. Sandholm ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Living Donors ◽  
Ethical Considerations ◽  
Exchange Programs ◽  
Kidney Exchange
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