scholarly journals Allocation of an indivisible object on the full preference domain: axiomatic characterizations

2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-53
Author(s):  
C. Gizem Korpeoglu
Keyword(s):  
Preference Domain ◽  
Axiomatic Characterizations ◽  
Indivisible Object

scholarly journals Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification

2016 ◽  
Vol 80 ◽  
pp. 47-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sylvain Béal ◽  
Sylvain Ferrières ◽  
Eric Rémila ◽  
Philippe Solal
Keyword(s):  
Axiomatic Characterizations

Effects of Players’ Nullification and Equal (Surplus) Division Values

2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (01) ◽  
pp. 1750029 ◽  
Author(s):  
Takumi Kongo
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Equal Division ◽  
Transferable Utility ◽  
Tu Games ◽  
Axiomatic Characterizations ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Monotonicity Axioms ◽  
Equal Surplus Division

We provide axiomatic characterizations of the solutions of transferable utility (TU) games on the fixed player set, where at least three players exist. We introduce two axioms on players’ nullification. One axiom requires that the difference between the effect of a player’s nullification on the nullified player and on the others is relatively constant if all but one players are null players. Another axiom requires that a player’s nullification affects equally all of the other players. These two axioms characterize the set of all affine combinations of the equal surplus division and equal division values, together with the two basic axioms of efficiency and null game. By replacing the first axiom on players’ nullification with appropriate monotonicity axioms, we narrow down the solutions to the set of all convex combinations of the two values, or to each of the two values.

scholarly journals Organizing Time Exchanges: Lessons from Matching Markets

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 338-373
Author(s):  
Tommy Andersson ◽  
Ágnes Cseh ◽  
Lars Ehlers ◽  
Albin Erlanson
Keyword(s):  
Matching Markets ◽  
Coordination Problems ◽  
Preference Domain ◽  
Balanced Allocation ◽  
Common Platform

This paper considers time exchanges via a common platform (e.g., markets for exchanging time units, positions at education institutions, and tuition waivers). There are several problems associated with such markets, e.g., imbalanced outcomes, coordination problems, and inefficiencies. We model time exchanges as matching markets and construct a non-manipulable mechanism that selects an individually rational and balanced allocation that maximizes exchanges among the participating agents (and those allocations are efficient). This mechanism works on a preference domain whereby agents classify the goods provided by other participating agents as either unacceptable or acceptable, and for goods classified as acceptable, agents have specific upper quotas representing their maximum needs. (JEL C78, D47, D82)

scholarly journals Pairwise Kidney Exchange over the Blood Group Barrier

2019 ◽  
Vol 87 (3) ◽  
pp. 1091-1133 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tommy Andersson ◽  
Jörgen Kratz
Keyword(s):  
Kidney Transplant ◽  
Blood Group ◽  
Medical Technology ◽  
Immunosuppressive Treatment ◽  
Preference Domain ◽  
Exchange Programs ◽  
Kidney Exchange ◽  
Patient Groups ◽  
To Receive ◽  
Positive Effect

Abstract Advances in medical technology have made kidney transplants over the blood group barrier feasible. This article investigates how such technology should be implemented when designing pairwise kidney exchange programs. The possibility to receive a kidney transplant from a blood group incompatible donor motivates an extension of the preference domain, allowing patients to distinguish between compatible donors and half-compatible donors (i.e. blood group incompatible donors that only become compatible after undergoing an immunosuppressive treatment). It is demonstrated that the number of transplants can be substantially increased by providing an incentive for patients with half-compatible donors to participate in kidney exchange programs. The results also suggest that the technology is beneficial for patient groups that are traditionally disadvantaged in kidney exchange programs (e.g. blood group O patients). The positive effect of allowing transplants over the blood group barrier is larger than the corresponding effects of including altruistic patient–donor pairs or of allowing three-way exchanges in addition to pairwise exchanges.

OUTCOME LEVEL ANALYSIS OF BELIEF CONTRACTION

2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-204 ◽  
Author(s):  
SVEN OVE HANSSON
Keyword(s):  
Belief Change ◽  
Belief Contraction ◽  
Axiomatic Characterizations ◽  
Outcome Set ◽  
Level Analysis

AbstractThe outcome set of a belief change operator is the set of outcomes that can be obtained with it. Axiomatic characterizations are reported for the outcome sets of the standard AGM contraction operators and eight types of base-generated contraction. These results throw new light on the properties of some of these operators.

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